Do authoritarian governments' responses towards different civil society organizations (CSOs) reflect policy differentiations? Building on the existing literature of graduated control, diversification of civil society, and consultative authoritarianism, this paper utilizes an online field experiment,1 and interviews with government officials and CSO leaders to demonstrate that local governments have the tendencies to intentionally treat different CSOs with different policy responses, referred to as "deliberate differentiation" in this paper. However, contrary to what the existing literature would suggest, this study reveals that at the local level, such differentiation is driven more by the state's interest in extracting productivity and outsourcing responsibility for the provision of public goods and less by the state's need to acquire information from CSOs, including politically sensitive advocacy groups. (China Q/GIGA)
In: Chan , S , Boran , I , van Asselt , H , Iacobuta , G , Niles , N , Rietig , K , Scobie , M , Bansard , J S , Delgado Pugley , D , Delina , L L , Eichhorn , F , Ellinger , P , Enechi , O , Hale , T , Hermwille , L , Honegger , M , Hurtado Epstein , A , La Hoz Theuer , S , Mizo , R , Sun , Y , Toussaint , P & Wambugu , G 2019 , ' Promises and risks of nonstate action in climate and sustainability governance ' , Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change , vol. 10 , no. 3 , e572 , pp. 1-8 . https://doi.org/10.1002/wcc.572
Sustainable Development Goals and the Paris Agreement stand as milestone diplomatic achievements. However, immense discrepancies between political commitments and governmental action remain. Combined national climate commitments fall far short of the Paris Agreement's 1.5/2°C targets. Similar political ambition gaps persist across various areas of sustainable development. Many therefore argue that actions by nonstate actors, such as businesses and investors, cities and regions, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), are crucial. These voices have resonated across the United Nations (UN) system, leading to growing recognition, promotion, and mobilization of such actions in ever greater numbers. This article investigates optimistic arguments about nonstate engagement, namely: (a) "the more the better"; (b) "everybody wins"; (c) "everyone does their part"; and (d) "more brings more." However, these optimistic arguments may not be matched in practice due to governance risks. The current emphasis on quantifiable impacts may lead to the under-appreciation of variegated social, economic, and environmental impacts. Claims that everybody stands to benefit may easily be contradicted by outcomes that are not in line with priorities and needs in developing countries. Despite the seeming depoliticization of the role of nonstate actors in implementation, actions may still lead to politically contentious outcomes. Finally, nonstate climate and sustainability actions may not be self-reinforcing but may heavily depend on supporting mechanisms. The article concludes with governance risk-reduction strategies that can be combined to maximize nonstate potential in sustainable and climate-resilient transformations. This article is categorized under: Policy and Governance > Multilevel and Transnational Climate Change Governance.
In: Carraro , V , Conzelmann , T & Jongen , H 2019 , ' Fears of peers? Explaining peer and public shaming in global governance ' , Cooperation and Conflict , vol. 54 , no. 3 , pp. 335-355 . https://doi.org/10.1177/0010836718816729
This article conducts a comparative analysis of peer and public pressure in peer reviews among states. Arguing that such pressure is one increasingly important form of shaming in global politics, we seek to understand the extent to which five different peer reviews exert peer and public pressure and how possible variation among them can be explained. Our findings are based on responses to an original survey and semi-structured interviews among participants in the reviews. We find that peer and public pressure exist to different degrees in the peer reviews under study. Such differences cannot be explained by the policy area under review or the international organization in which peer reviews are organized. Likewise, the expertise of the actors involved in a peer review or perceptions of the legitimacy of peer review as a monitoring instrument do not explain the variation. Instead, we find that institutional factors and the acceptance of peer and public pressure among the participants in a peer review offer the best explanations.
A diversity of modes of quantification in contemporary societies have now been explored, following the path of scholars who inspired this field, such as Alain Desrosières. This introduction to the special issue of the Revue d'Anthropologie des Connaissances on the politics of calculation argues that there remains a gap between different strains of the sociology of quantification - one that emphasizes the governmentality it embodies and the discipline it establishes, the other that pays attention to the collective mobilization capacities it offers. It is suggested that public policy and governance is a good field of investigation, to understand how these two "regimes of quantification" are articulated together, and evaluate the extent to which actors external to the networks that control public policies can influence them by recalculating both the problems addressed and the effects of policy programs. Combining the sociology of science and technology and political sociology, this special issue thus hypothesizes that calculation is one of the ways of building coalitions in governance, and one of the objects of what is being debated in its arenas; and, conversely, that governance is one of the contexts in which contemporary forms of calculation are forged and algorithms invented.
Since GE14, the Selangor state government's relations with the Pakatan Harapan federal government have improved but there are calls for governance to be further decentralised.
This special issue focuses on the interactions between accounting, public sector organisations and the socio-economic and political environments in which they operate, with a specific focus on the critical analysis of policy and practice in the fight against corruption. The aim of the special issue is to disseminate knowledge to enable a more sustainable, accountable and less corrupt public sector, regardless of where it is located in the world. It presents the work of a global community of scholars engaged in research projects on policies and strategies related to accountability, transparency, auditing, regulatory disclosure, governance, investor protection and anti-corruption initiatives in public sector organisations. The papers presented here address many different angles of corruption and aspects of the way in which it is reported using a broad range of methodologies, theoretical frameworks and research locations. Collectively, these papers demonstrate that more attention needs be given to investigating the human cost associated with illegal activity that leads to human suffering, inequality, and lifetime costs. They further emphasise that we have much to learn about regulatory disclosure and jurisprudential practice in the fight against fraud and corruption.
In the years since liberalization, state power has been rescaled in India's polity and this is both a cause and consequence of greater inter-state competition for footloose capital. In this context, some state governments are designing special regulatory tools to attract and concentrate investments by easing 'doing business' for private investors and leveraging land resources—primarily in their largest cities. Equally important, they ensure public investments are channelled to these select spaces and that resources are available for maintaining high standards of infrastructure. In Hyderabad, the 'Industrial Area Local Authority' (IALA) is a powerful tool that allows privatised management by state and non-state actors of recently constructed productive spaces, mainly concentrating globalised service sector activities, including by collecting local tax revenues and various development charges to be spent exclusively within the industrial area. In this way, governance and fiscal functions are outsourced to non-elected bodies, outside the purview of democratic institutions. By essentially replacing municipal authorities, the IALA framework produces new forms of governance at the same time that it generates fragmentation of the institutional fabric of urban spaces. In effect, it creates a tool for by-passing urban politics, or in the case of periurban spaces does not allow an urban politics to emerge. Building on recent research, this paper examines the implications of IALAs in Hyderabad on urban governance and local state sovereignty.
The objective of this study is to assess governance drivers of FDI in a panel of BRICS and MINT countries for the period 2001-2011. We bundle and unbundle governance determinants using a battery of contemporary and non-contemporary estimation techniques. Our findings reveal the following: Firstly, for both contemporary and non-contemporary specifications, while the majority of our governance determinants of Gross FDI are significant, they are overwhelmingly insignificant for Net FDI. Secondly, the significance of the governance dynamics in increasing order of magnitude are general governance, political governance, economic governance, political stability, regulation quality and government effectiveness. Thirdly, for non-contemporary specifications, the significance of governance variables is as follows in ascending order of magnitude: economic governance, institutional governance, general governance, corruption-control, political governance and political stability. The importance of combining governance indicators is captured by the effects of political governance, economic governance and institutional governance. The results indicate that the simultaneous implementation of the various components of governance clarifies a country's attractiveness for FDI location. Policy implications are discussed with particular emphasis on the timing of FDI and its targeting.
Populists claim that they alone represent the voice of the people against a corrupt elite. We argue that populist governments augment this claim by appropriating and manipulating the language and methods of participatory governance. Advancing an analytical framework on content, process, effect, resource efficiency and communication dimensions, we illustrate these arguments with the National Consultations in Hungary in 2010–18. Our conclusion for the case study is that these exercises were deeply flawed for securing popular input into policy-making. The implication for scholarship is that participatory governance enthusiasts need to be more aware not just of the uses, but also the abuses, of public input, while scholars of populism should pay more attention to the actual policies and practices populist actors employ to gain or maintain power. ; This work was supported by the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant number 726840 (TROPICO project - Transforming into Open, Innovative and Collaborative Governments).
Network governance, which involves an informal and self-regulated set of public and private actors, who together address various political and social problems, has substantially altered the institutional landscape concerning the formation and implementation of public policy. A common view is that this has made it possible to enhance pluralism and disperse political power by transferring power from the sovereign state to a wider set of private actors and stakeholders. I argue in this article that we need to analyze network governance in reference to the concept of domination and the theoretical tradition of neo-republicanism. For this purpose, I develop a theoretical framework that specifies five dimensions in which domination may arise and, conversely, be mitigated. An alternative image of network governance emerges which reveals that this type of governance may in fact generate a form of institutional domination that encompasses both citizens and civil society actors due to the arbitrary influence that certain network participants come to exercise upon the life choices of nonparticipants.
Capital flight constitutes a major constraint to Africa's efforts to fill the large and growing financing gaps that hold back its progress towards achieving sustainable development goals. The mounting evidence on the unrecorded outflows of capital from Africa has spurred calls for strategies to curb the financial hemorrhage that is afflicting the continent. The existing evidence is still inadequate, however, on four fronts. First, the quantitative evidence is predominantly aggregate and does not furnish adequate country-specific information on the mechanisms of capital flight, its institutional contexts, and the role of domestic and foreign players in facilitating it. Second, the literature has not paid adequate attention to the destinations of wealth accumulated through capital flight and the roles of the banking sector and public institutions in destination jurisdictions. Third, much of the literature conflates the capital flight with the broader concept of illicit financial flows. While all capital flight is illicit owing to its unrecorded transfer – and often, as well, by virtue of the illegal origins of the wealth, and the failure to declare the assets and pay tax on the associated income – not all illicit financial flows are capital flight; for example, payments for smuggled imports are an illicit flow but distinct from capital flight. Fourth, the existing literature has not sufficiently explored the two-way relationship between capital flight and governance in national and international institutions. To help fill these gaps in the literature, the African Development Policy Program at the Political Economy Research Institute has initiated detailed analyses in a project generously supported by the Open Society Foundations and the Friedrich Ebert Foundation. This Working Paper series presents the project's outputs. Our goal in issuing these reports is to engender informed public participation in decision making on financial regulation. Key findings will be distilled and published in the coming year in an edited volume that is forthcoming from Oxford University Press.
There is an emerging consensus at international level that systemic transformations are needed to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Such transformations require paradigm shifts in policies, with appropriate governance frameworks to implement them. Fundamental transformations are likely to generate winners and losers; the latter may act strategically to deter transformation. Most governance literature points at mutual gains negotiation methods to prevent the emergence of losers and create 'win-win' package deals. In this article a different – and less researched – approach will be discussed: (economic) compensation strategies. Drawing on the political economy literature of reform in transition economies, I propose three compensation strategies to buy out or weaken the opposition of strategic losers – big bang, optimal sequencing and divide-and-rule governance reforms – that can help to frame discussions around the political feasibility of new governance frameworks for SDG transformations. The paper suggests that careful consideration needs to be given to the design of these compensation packages, since history tells us that buying acceptance for reform can involve not just variation in economic outcomes, it can also have long-term political implications and distributional effects.