Multilateral Governance of Nuclear Risks
In: Risk, hazards & crisis in public policy, Band 10, Heft 2, S. 142-154
ISSN: 1944-4079
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In: Risk, hazards & crisis in public policy, Band 10, Heft 2, S. 142-154
ISSN: 1944-4079
In: Security studies, Band 25, Heft 1, S. 142-179
ISSN: 1556-1852
In: China and the Group 20, S. 233-246
In: Development and change, Band 50, Heft 1, S. 164-190
ISSN: 1467-7660
ABSTRACTMultilateral development banks (MDBs) are one of the most popular forms of international organization, with at least 27 operating in the world today. Although most academics and policy makers focus on the World Bank and major regional MDBs, the majority of MDBs are in fact relatively small, and controlled by developing as opposed to industrialized countries. How do the differing governance arrangements of these 'minilateral' development banks (MnDBs) impact their operations? This article takes the Trade and Development Bank (TDB), an MDB in Africa with 22 regional member countries, as a case study to consider this question. Based on an analysis of TDB's track record since 2005 and interviews with management and shareholders, the author finds that borrower‐led governance leads to substantial disadvantages in terms of access to finance. Borrower‐led governance permits TDB and other MnDBs greater operational flexibility, which partially compensates for this financial disadvantage, but these operational strategies come with trade‐offs in terms of developmental effectiveness. The findings suggest that MnDBs have substantial latent potential and, in an increasingly multipolar world, they are likely to grow in coming years. However, MnDBs need to ensure that their developmental value added is strengthened in step with their financial power.
In: Journal of risk research: the official journal of the Society for Risk Analysis Europe and the Society for Risk Analysis Japan, Band 25, Heft 8, S. 959-975
ISSN: 1466-4461
In: Journal of Risk Research, Special Issue on Multilateral Governance of Technological Risk, p. 1-17. DOI: 10.1080/13669877.2019.1617338.
SSRN
Publikacja recenzowana / Peer-reviewed publication ; Celem artykułu jest przedstawienie współczesnych dylematów w kwestii zarządzania Internetem jako nowym dobrem wspólnym ludzkości i przykładem tzw. nowych dóbr wspólnych. W ślad za Lawrence'em Lessigiem omówione zostały trzy warstwy Internetu: fizyczna, logiczna i treści. W tym kontekście przedstawiono dokonania Grupy Roboczej ds. Zarządzania Internetem (WGIG) powołanej przez Sekretarza Generalnego ONZ oraz rolę Forum Zarządzania Internetem (IGF). Zaprezentowano rozbieżne preferencje państw w wyborze suwerennego, wielostronnego lub międzyrządowego modelu zarządzania Internetem. W szczególności ukazano przeciwstawne działania USA i Unii Europejskiej oraz Chin i Rosji oraz podkreślanie przez te dwa ostatnie państwa zagadnienia cyberbezpieczeństwa i cybersuwerenności, co prowadzi do ograniczenia wolności słowa w Internecie i treściowej fragmentacji sieci. Autor proponuje wydzielenie kwestii możliwych do regulacji w drodze porozumień międzyrządowych. Zarazem dochodzi do wniosku, iż mechanizmy wielostronnego zarządzania siecią mogą uzyskać legitymację, jeżeli będą bardziej rzetelne i reprezentatywne niż system międzyrządowy. ; The purpose of this article is to present contemporary dilemmas in the management of the Internet as a new common good of mankind and an example of so called "new commons". In the wake of the Lawrence Lessig's writings discussed are the three layers of the Internet: physical, logical and content. In this context, presented are the achievements of the Working Group on Internet Governance (WGIG) initiated by the UN Secretary General and the role of the Internet Governance Forum (IGF). Presented are divergent preferences of states in choosing a sovereign, multi-stakeholder or multilateral model of Internet governance. In particular, the article demonstrates conflicting actions of the US, European Union and China, Russia and issues of cybersecurity and cyber sovereignty highlighted by the latter two countries, which lead to restrictions on freedom of speech in the Internet and fragmentation of the network in its content layer. The author proposes to separate issues for feasible regulation by multilateral agreements. At the same time he concludes that the mechanisms of multilateral network management can gain legitimacy if they are more reliable and representative than the intergovernmental system.
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