This article recovers "evangelical toleration" as a neglected tradition in early modern political thought with important consequences for contemporary political theory and practice. Many political theorists dismiss the prudential arguments made by "proto-liberal" thinkers like Roger Williams or John Locke in favor of toleration as a necessary precondition for evangelism and conversion as intolerant, unacceptably instrumental, and inessential to their deeper theories. By contrast, critics of liberalism treat them as smoking gun evidence for an imperial and civilizing mission underlying liberal toleration. I argue that both sides underestimate evangelical toleration's genealogical and theoretical importance. Not only were evangelical considerations essential in shaping the particular institutions associated with toleration in England and America, the varieties of evangelical toleration represented by Williams and Locke shed significant light on the very different institutions—and intuitions—governing the expression of religious difference in liberal democracies today.
The underlying concept of multiculturalism in many European discussions is different from that made prominent by the classic cases, e.g. in Canada, that have functioned as paradigm cases which the most prominent theories of multiculturalism have been tailored to fit and justify. "Euro-multiculturalism" denotes a) a different object of debates, i.e. the kind of diversity that multiculturalism is about, b) a different definition of what counts as multiculturalism policy responses to this diversity, and c) a different normative background explaining what is at stake in European multiculturalism controversies. Euro-multiculturalism is a) about mainly immigrant religious minorities rather than indigenous or national minorities defined in mainly cultural or linguistic terms; b) does not for the most part consist in special group-differentiated rights or forms of recognition going beyond established liberal rights, but rather is concerned with the interpretation and application of standard liberal rights and rules to cases involving this new diversity; and c) should be understood as premised on an underlying discussion about the meaning of liberalism rather than as a debate about normative commitments fundamentally different from liberalism. The paper considers two objections to the proposed understanding of Euro-multiculturalism, namely a) that it over-inclusive in the sense that it includes religion as a central category and thereby neglects important differences between religion and culture, and b) that it is under-inclusive in the sense that it collapses multiculturalism into standard liberal political theory and fails to explain what is distinctive about multiculturalism. Finally the paper shows that multiculturalism in this sense can involve issues of toleration. ; The underlying concept of multiculturalism in many European discussions is different from that made prominent by the classic cases, e.g. in Canada, that have functioned as paradigm cases which the most prominent theories of multiculturalism have been tailored to fit and justify. "Euro-multiculturalism" denotes a) a different object of debates, i.e. the kind of diversity that multiculturalism is about, b) a different definition of what counts as multiculturalism policy responses to this diversity, and c) a different normative background explaining what is at stake in European multiculturalism controversies. Euro-multiculturalism is a) about mainly immigrant religious minorities rather than indigenous or national minorities defined in mainly cultural or linguistic terms; b) does not for the most part consist in special group-differentiated rights or forms of recognition going beyond established liberal rights, but rather is concerned with the interpretation and application of standard liberal rights and rules to cases involving this new diversity; and c) should be understood as premised on an underlying discussion about the meaning of liberalism rather than as a debate about normative commitments fundamentally different from liberalism. The paper considers two objections to the proposed understanding of Euro-multiculturalism, namely a) that it over-inclusive in the sense that it includes religion as a central category and thereby neglects important differences between religion and culture, and b) that it is under-inclusive in the sense that it collapses multiculturalism into standard liberal political theory and fails to explain what is distinctive about multiculturalism. Finally the paper shows that multiculturalism in this sense can involve issues of toleration.
Toleration is a key concept of liberalism, both from the historical and conceptual points of view. On the other hand, as people's freedom to live according to their moral and religious ideas has long become a basic value for liberal societies and their political constitutions, it is reasonable to understand that there is nothing to be tolerated nor by citizens neither by the State. However, a part of the scope and meaning of the fundamental rights and freedoms is subject to what John Rawls calls reasonable disagreements and this is a field where toleration understood in the classic way is compatible with equality: not to intervene against that which is being disapproved understood has a raison d'être. Since the 1980s, toleration has been present in the debates on how to deal with pluralism in a constitutional democracy. This has to be connected to the rise of identity politics: political and intellectual movements such as multiculturalism or comunitarism that questioned whether social order based on neutral criteria was either possible or desirable or both things at the same time. Outstanding liberal philosophers were among those demanding political priority for comunitarian values and those who showed interest for toleration as a key concept to articulate pluralism. Key distinctions between them can be explained as the result of the different approaches they take when facing classical theories on toleration: whereas John Locke's is a major influence on Rawls, John Stuart Mill's is on the others, while Gray, Walzer and Rorty follow Isaiah Berlin's reading of Mill. ; Universidad de Málaga, Campus de Excelencia Internacional Andalucía Tech.
In adopting a foreign cult, ancient Roman worshippers were not searching for a new religion to replace their old one, but rather seeking to expand the range of gods and practices at their disposal. They assumed that all traditional gods and religions were valid and effective. There was, therefore, an implicit toleration built into the system of ancient polytheism, and this was admired by the thinkers of the Enlightenment, though the Roman state never guaranteed freedom of worship. The cult of Isis was distasteful to the Roman élite, and the government often reacted brutally to particular actions by her worshippers. Nevertheless, her cult was always popular with the general public and the state never wished to abolish it, and eventually built a public temple to Isis. The worshippers of Isis tested the limits of Roman toleration and demonstrated its vitality.
Title: The Rohingya Muslims' Crisis in the Rakhine State of Myanmar: 'Recognition as Toleration' and 'Religious Toleration' Abstract: The inhuman annihilation of the Rohingya people from the Rakhine state by the Myanmar military and the Buddhist majority, which is supported by the Myanmar government as they watched the massacre silently, could be considered as genocide. Ashley Kinseth claims: "in terms of rate of escalation, this is the greatest mass exodus - and has the makings to become the most significant humanitarian catastrophe - since the 1994 Rwandan genocide, when over 800,000 Hutus and moderate Tutsis were slaughtered." The main reason of this massacre, as claimed by the Myanmar state officials, was an "armed attack by a Rohingya group, the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army, against more than 20 Myanmar police stations and an army base on Aug 25, 2017" (Beyrer and Kamarulzaman 1570), "killing 12 members of Myanmar's security forces" (Gibbens). But there are other issues, such as political, religious, economic, ethnic, etc., which actually motivate the Myanmar military and the Buddhists (the majority religious group in Myanmar) to kill and dislocate the Rohingya from their Rakhine state. The paper examines the current Rohingya Muslims' crisis in Myanmar while investigating the Buddhist Burmese's underlying religious discourses in displacing the Rohingya from the Rakhine state. In doing so, this paper analyzes the current massacre in relation to Anna E. Galeotti's theory on 'toleration as recognition' and Locke's 'theory on toleration,' particularly in regards what Locke has forwarded as 'religious toleration' in his canonical Letters to figure out the suitability of either of them for a possible solution to the crisis.
This article determines which education enables the perpetuation of diverse ways of life and the liberal democracy that accommodates this diversity. Liberals like John Rawls, Stephen Macedo, and William Galston have disagreed about the scope of civic education. Based on an analysis of toleration—the primary means for maintaining a pluralist liberal democracy—I argue that schools should teach democratic participatory skills and a minimal exposure to diversity to enable citizens to participate in the democratic process of defining which cultural and religious practices the state should tolerate or prohibit through its laws. To make this argument, I contend, in contrast to several scholars, that toleration is practiced primarily between the democratic state and citizens rather than among citizens. Although many theorists do not show the educational implications of their theories, I conclude that schools must teach: (a) mutual respect among citizens, (b) citizens' constitutional rights, (c) democratic participatory skills, (d) a basic understanding of other worldviews, and (e) critical media skills. Students should master these components through instruction on government, cultures and religions, and the media, but more important through discussions and democratic simulations both inside and outside the classroom.
lt is very likely that the most difficult task of moral and political philosophy has always been that of assessing comprehensive views which contradict each other, not so much in what concerns the interests expressed by individuals but in what regards what is considered to be of genuine value.' lf individuals do not agree with each other about what constitutes a good and valuable life, then they would probably end up having dramatic conflicts, even if their actions are motivated by an honest altruistic attitude. Our deep beliefs about what is good and valuable for the life of all the individuals in our own community will prompt u5 to use the coercive mechanisms of the state in order to achieve the desiderata and the ideals that we share, not only for our own sake but also for those who happen not to share the same vision on the values and meaningfulness of a good life. Of course, those who disagree with us will try to make use of the institutions of the state in the very same way as we do in order to promote and support their own values and ideals. Unfortunateiy, as we know too well from history, the deep disagreements concerning values can turn into very traumatic conflicts to a much greater extent than the mere conflicts of interests.
The idea of toleration as the appropriate response to difference has been central to liberal thought since Locke. Although the subject has been widely and variously explored, there has been reluctance to acknowledge the new meaning that current debates on toleration have when compared with those at its origins in the early modern period and with subsequent discussions about pluralism and freedom of expression. This collection starts from a clear recognition of the new terms of the debate. It recognises that a new academic consensus is slowly emerging on a view of tolerance that is reasonable in two senses. Firstly of reflecting the capacity of seeing the other's viewpoint, secondly on the relatively limited extent to which toleration can be granted. It reflects the cross-thematic and cross-disciplinary nature of such discussions, dissecting a number of debates such as liberalism and communitarianism, public and private, multiculturalism and the politics of identity, and a number of disciplines: moral, legal and political philosophy, historical and educational studies, anthropology, sociology and psychology. A group of distinguished authors explore the complexities emerging from the new debate. They scrutinise, with analytical sophistication, the philosophical foundation, the normative content and the broadly political implications of a new culture of toleration for diverse societies. Specific issues considered include the toleration of religious discrimination in employment, city life and community, social ethos, publicity, justice and reason and ethics. The book is unique in resolutely looking forward to the theoretical and practical challenges posed by commitment to a conception of toleration demanding empathy and understanding in an ever-diversifying world.
Includes indexes. ; Bibliography: v. [1], p. 421-477. ; [1] From the beginning of the English Reformation to the death of Queen Elizabeth.--[2] From the accession of James I to the convention of the Long Parliament, 1603-1640.--[3] From the convention of the Long Parliament to the Restoration, 1640-1660.--[4] Attainment of the theory and accommodations in thought and institution, 1640-1660. ; Mode of access: Internet.
One aspect of the issue of toleration of religion is how far the government and others should recognize religious claims of conscience. Such claims will be present in any liberal democracy. The particular controversies on which attention is mainly focused shift, but certain underlying themes remain. In this essay, I outline what I take to be the major issues about government recognition of religious claims of conscience. I then address the special problems created when a claim of conscience ends up competing with an opposing claim of conscience or with basic premises about fairness and justice. We can conceive of these as competing claims of toleration. Just such competition is involved when the question is a possible exemption from compliance with laws that recognize same-sex marriage and from laws that require insurance coverage of contraceptive drugs, two prominent issues in our present political setting
This chapter explains why granting conscientious exemptions is almost always the outcome of toleration – and always the outcome of toleration – in cases where the exemption is granted from a law that reflects or enforces moral values. The chapter explains why the principle of toleration better explains both the practice of granting conscientious exemptions and the attitude of those who grant the exemptions. Much of the discomfort that this argument causes and much of the criticism of it, result from confusing the dominant descriptive aspect of toleration with its non-existent normative aspect; from mistakenly seeing toleration as a reason or justification; and from mistakenly perceiving it as a political or moral virtue. The chapter explains why toleration is a descriptive concept and never a reason or justification to act in a certain way, and why toleration is not a political or moral virtue, but rather either morally good, morally allowed, morally prohibited or a lesser evil – all according to the circumstances. The chapter then continues to explain why the concepts of neutrality and respect fail to accurately describe the practice of granting conscientious exemptions and the attitude of those who grant the exemptions. As to neutrality, it fails to describe the practice of granting conscientious exemptions, both because the state is not and can never be neutral, and because the argument that granting conscientious exemptions results from state's neutrality can never be coherent. As to respect, it either misses the nature of conscientious exemptions – or collapses into the definition of toleration. The chapter concludes with a conceptual note according to which the concepts of neutrality and toleration have some overlooked similarities, generally, and also within the context of granting conscientious exemptions.
This paper analyses the role of the principle of secularism with respect to the consolidation of the democratic 'host' nations which confront themselves with other cultural and religious identities. The aim is pursued by a revisitation of the concept, in the light of the philosophy of ideas. The core of the argumentation is the following: both liberal and liberal-democratic western states are grounded on what contemporary scholars, proving true John Locke, call the subtle art of distinction among spheres and dimensions of individual and collective life. This must be reconsidered nowadays in order to tackle properly the struggle among groups whose specific symbolic internal cohesion is based on forms of religious identity.
In diverse societies like Australia, Britain, Canada and The Netherlands, government policy has increasingly focused on inter-citizen relations. There have been demands for citizens to respect each others' differences, as well as fears about declining social cohesion and acts of intolerance. In political theory, these themes also have currency, although here they often have been obscured by a tendency to think in terms of 'majorities' and minorities', and 'we' and 'they', rather than in terms of the state and the individual citizen. This thesis argues that while respect of difference may seem to be the best way to successfully accommodate individual difference, it is an indefensible demand on the citizen: such a demand is both excessive and unnecessary, and has the potential to unjustifiably limit individual freedom and the accommodation of difference. Further, the requirement for social cohesion is often overstated, while acts of intolerance are best avoided by citizens respecting each others' sameness (citizenship) rather than their difference. As far as the state is concerned, by clearly distinguishing specific instances of tolerance (which always involve forbearance) from the general practice of toleration, the thesis defends toleration as a general and maximally permissive practice – one which is compatible with both liberal neutrality and the maximal accommodation of individual difference, and thus the freedom of individuals to live their lives as they see fit.
Dealing with Diversity: Towards a Political Theory of Toleration. Liberalism and Minority Rights: Liberalizating Minorities. Liberal Pluralism and Diversity. Political Liberalism and Diversity: Political Transformation. Towards a Political Theory of Toleration. ; Dealing with Diversity: Towards a Political Theory of Toleration. Liberalism and Minority Rights: Liberalizating Minorities. Liberal Pluralism and Diversity. Political Liberalism and Diversity: Political Transformation. Towards a Political Theory of Toleration. ; LUISS PhD Thesis
