Suchergebnisse

This document presents the theoretical framework that constitutes the foundation of the TransCrisis project. It sketches the causal relations between our core concepts: political leaders, political leadership, TBCs, and (institutional capacities for) crisis management. We will build on this theoretical framework to design a codebook for empirical research. The purpose of the framework and the accompanying codebook is to ensure a shared understanding of what constitutes TBC management. Use of the codebook and consistent terminology will enable the integration of results from the research-based WPs. This document is structured as follows:  First, it explains the nature and dynamics of TBCs;  Second, it conceptualizes TBC management;  Third, it explains how political leadership can facilitate and enable TBC management that is both effective and legitimate;  Fourth, it depicts the key variables in this research project;  Fifth, it presents an outline of individual research-based WPs as well as where exactly they fit into the framework of the project.

The Horizon 2020 TransCrisis project has studied the EU's capacities to deal with transboundary crises and how these capacities are related to Member State capacities and their governance arrangements.1 We found that the European Union (EU) has many capacities of different types (plans, alert systems, regulations, ad hoc systems) that can be employed to organise a response against transboundary crises. But these capacities are scattered across institutions and agencies, their use is not always clearly defined, and their performance is uneven at best. We argue that these capacities and their governance arrangements should be strengthened, and urgently so. We also offer a set of recommendations to decision-makers at both the EU and the member-state level to enhance these capacities. This document should be read as an addendum to our White Paper, which laid the groundwork for this prescriptive effort.2 Both the White Paper and these recommendations for the world of practice are motivated by one overriding concern: the prospect of more, and more serious, crises that threaten the wellbeing of European citizens and undermine the legitimacy of its institutions. In light of these developments, we offer practical suggestions for enhancing particular processes, mechanisms and organisations to deal with a variety of transboundary threats. Our suggestions come, by necessity, in the form of a menu: certain courses fit certain appetites. It is for the practitioner to assess what the best match between threat and prescription is.

AbstractThe nation state is discovering the limits of its crisis management capacities. The Ebola and Zika outbreaks, the financial crisis, the downing of flight MH17 over Ukraine, sinking ships overfilled with refugees, cyber-attacks, urban terrorism and existential environmental threats serve as strong reminders of the complex origins and transboundary dimensions of many contemporary crises and disasters. As these transboundary aspects of modern crises become increasingly manifest, the need for international, collaborative responses appears ever clearer. But that collaboration does not always emerge in time (or at all). Even in the European Union, which has various transboundary crisis management mechanisms in place, the willingness to initiate joint crisis responses varies. This observation prompted our research question: Why do states collaborate in response to some transboundary crises but not others? We bring together the crisis and collective action literatures to formulate a theoretical framework that can help answer this question. This article identifies crucial factors that facilitate a possible pathway toward a joint response.

Modern societies rely on complex technological systems that are deeply intertwined with other complex systems that stretch across geographical, judicial and administrative borders. When threats emanate from this transboundary space, national governments are often surprised and discover that existing crisis management arrangements do not suffice. This article describes the political and administrative challenges that accompany transboundary crises. It argues that arrangements and processes that work reasonably well for "bounded" crises are unlikely to work in the case of transboundary crises. It formulates an agenda for political debate and academic research. The bottom line is that we need to rethink traditional crisis management arrangements in order to prepare for these increasingly common type of threats.

AbstractEU agencies have emerged as entities offering technical coordination to member states and support to the European Commission in different policy areas. Their expertise may play a role in responding to unexpected crises. Against this backdrop, we examine under which circumstances EU agencies, through their specialized expertise, are involved in transboundary crisis responses, and when they acquire a leading position in coordinating those responses. To do so, we study four agencies which faced crises: the EBA and the 2012 banking crisis; the ECDC and the 2014 Ebola outbreak; EFSA and the 2011 E. coli outbreak; and Frontex and the 2015 refugee crisis. Our findings discuss to what extent agencies' involvement in transboundary crises is related to functional (sector characteristics) and institutional (delegation of authority) variables. We also identify that under certain political conditions EU agencies' coordination capacity is activated, allowing them to emerge as leading institutions in transboundary crisis resolution.

EU agencies have emerged as entities offering technical coordination to member states and support to the European Commission in different policy areas. Their expertise may play a role in responding to unexpected crises. Against this backdrop, we examine under which circumstances EU agencies, through their specialized expertise, are involved in transboundary crisis responses, and when they acquire a leading position in coordinating those responses. To do so, we study four agencies which faced crises: the EBA and the 2012 banking crisis; the ECDC and the 2014 Ebola outbreak; EFSA and the 2011 E. coli outbreak; and Frontex and the 2015 refugee crisis. Our findings discuss to what extent agencies' involvement in transboundary crises is related to functional (sector characteristics) and institutional (delegation of authority) variables. We also identify that under certain political conditions EU agencies' coordination capacity is activated, allowing them to emerge as leading institutions in transboundary crisis resolution.

Modern societies rely on complex technological systems that are deeply intertwined with other complex systems that stretch across geographical, judicial and administrative borders. When threats emanate from this transboundary space, national governments are often surprised and discover that existing crisis management arrangements do not suffice. This article describes the political and administrative challenges that accompany transboundary crises. It argues that arrangements and processes that work reasonably well for "bounded" crises are unlikely to work in the case of transboundary crises. It formulates an agenda for political debate and academic research. The bottom line is that we need to rethink traditional crisis management arrangements in order to prepare for these increasingly common type of threats.

AbstractThis paper discusses the intricacies of external transboundary crises, namely those cross‐border threats whose management requires coordination among EU and non‐EU countries. Specifically, it explores the extent to which European integration theories shed light on the coordination of external transboundary crisis responses by assessing the weight and role of the actor constellations involved in the civil aviation response to the 2010 Icelandic ash cloud crisis. The use of social network analysis as a methodological tool generates novel empirical evidence on the configuration of crisis management structures. The analysis shows that many EU Member States led decision‐making, whereas supranational organizations were instrumental in the coordination of the ash cloud crisis response. The centrality of these bodies contrasts with the peripheral position of most interest groups. This paper also suggests that external transboundary crises present complex management dynamics that distinguish them from generic transboundary threats. For example, the response to the ash cloud crisis was not commanded by the European Economic Area/European Free Trade Association countries where its epicentre was located. The empirical analysis was based on information extracted from a survey to experts involved in the management of this episode, as well as from ten semi‐structured elite interviews.

Crises and disasters feature high on political and public agendas around the world. Practitioners wrestle with the challenge to provide protection while maintaining legitimacy. They pine for insights that lie at the heart of public administration: designing effective institutions and preserving transparency; enabling and empowering citizens without undermining a coordinated response; balancing long‐term risks against short‐term needs; bridging the divide between theory and practice, and between the public and private sectors. But in the debates about designing institutions that protect against transboundary threats and critical infrastructure failures, the public administration community is strangely absent. It has parked itself on the sideline, concerning itself with the routine processes of governance. In this article, we argue that the time has come for public administration scholars to incorporate crisis and disaster management into the main research agendas of the field.

The European Union has experienced a series of transboundary crises that have tested its capacity and legitimacy. The financial and refugee crises have highlighted the political and administrative limits to existing EU crisis management arrangements. In particular, they have strained understandings of member state solidarity, and they have given rise to conflicts over the direction of future EU transboundary crisis management capacities within and across policy domains. To develop enhanced transboundary crisis management capacity and legitimacy, it is essential to understand the different types of crises that have affected the European Union - ranging from 'traditional' emergencies, such as terrorist attacks or natural disasters, to the consequences of enhanced market liberalisation and integration, such as the banking crisis or the dramatic levels of youth unemployment, and the explicit rejection by member states of key liberal democratic constitutional commitments, namely 'backsliding'. In addition, the context of the new normal of re-nationalised electoral politics, the challenge of coordinating highly dispersed systems of multi-level governance, and the tension of dealing with (often incompatible) short- and long-term objectives also shape EU transboundary crisis management. This White Paper identifies four deficits in contemporary transboundary crisis management: deficits in central authority, in prescriptiveness, in subsidiarity, and in flexibility. These deficits point to the contested nature of debates over future transboundary crisis management in the EU and its member states. This White Paper identifies four different approaches towards enhancing capacity and legitimacy: i) a reliance on 'ad hoc' responses, ii) a strengthening of EU-level capacity; iii) a strengthening of multi-level governance; and iv) a strengthening of consistency of member state policies. Each of these approaches is associated with distinct advantages and pathologies.