ABM Treaty withdrawal: Neither necessary nor prudent
In: Arms control today, Band 32, Heft 1, S. 12-20
ISSN: 0196-125X
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In: Arms control today, Band 32, Heft 1, S. 12-20
ISSN: 0196-125X
World Affairs Online
In: American journal of political science
ISSN: 1540-5907
AbstractThis article examines how treaty withdrawal affects international cooperation. By terminating its treaty commitments, the exiting state could earn a reputation for unreliability, making other states less willing to cooperate with it. However, states' reactions to withdrawal vary markedly, even though it is public behavior. I develop an experiential theory of international cooperation that explains this variation. I argue that withdrawal damages the exiting state's relations with other treaty members, causing them to ratify fewer agreements with it in the future. I test this theory using an original data set of all treaties registered with the United Nations and a case study of France's exit from NATO's Status of Forces Agreement. I find that withdrawal reduces treaty members' ratification of agreements with the exiting state by 7.9% in the 7 years after exit. This effect increases with the salience and material cost of withdrawal and can spill across issue areas.
Intro -- Cover -- Dedication -- Title Page -- Acknowledgements -- Contents -- Introduction -- I. Towards a Law of Withdrawal -- A. What is Withdrawal? -- B. What is the Law of Withdrawal? -- II. Why Does It All Work? The Purpose of This Book -- III. The Structure of the Book and Some Preliminary Caveats -- 1. What is the Law of Withdrawal For? A Sketch of the Objectives -- Introduction -- I. State Consent, Sovereignty and Withdrawal -- A. Defining Sovereignty -- B. Critically Appraising State Consent -- C. Withdrawal as the Undoing of State Consent? -- II. Four Justifications for the Existence of the Law of Withdrawal -- A. Withdrawal Safeguards a State in Light of Changing External Circumstances -- B. Withdrawal as Recognition of a Political Decision by a State Party -- C. An Escape Hatch against 'Delegation Creep' -- D. The Law of Withdrawal as a Guarantee of Good Faith -- Conclusion: The Two Concerns -- 2. The Structure of Withdrawal Clauses: Theory and Form -- Introduction -- I. Theoretical Templates for Understanding How Withdrawal Clauses Shape State Behaviour -- II. Initiating a Declaration of Withdrawal -- A. The Process of Withdrawal as a Counterpoint to Accession -- B. Demonstrating the Necessity for Withdrawal -- C. Initiating Withdrawal as a Means of Stopping Proceedings -- III. Notification Provisions -- A. Whom to Notify -- B. Substance of the Notification -- C. Withdrawal of a Notification -- IV. The Temporal Issues of Withdrawal -- A. The Time from Accession to Notification -- B. The Time from Notification to Exit -- Conclusion: Thinking about Withdrawal Clauses -- 3. Obligations after Withdrawal -- Introduction -- I. The Sources of Law for Obligations on Exit -- A. Obligations within Withdrawal Clauses -- B. Breaches of Obligations Prior to Withdrawal -- II. The Right to a Hearing after Exit -- A. Investment Arbitration.
In: European journal of international law, Band 30, Heft 1, S. 73-104
ISSN: 1464-3596
In: The current digest of the post-Soviet press, Band 70, Heft 43-044, S. 3-7
In: American journal of international law: AJIL, Band 97, Heft 1, S. 205-207
ISSN: 2161-7953
In: American journal of international law: AJIL, Band 113, Heft 3, S. 631-634
ISSN: 2161-7953
On February 2, 2019, the United States formally notified Russia that it would withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in six months and that, effective immediately, it was suspending its performance under the treaty in light of Russia's material breach. This decision came more than three months after the Trump administration indicated that the United States was planning to withdraw from the treaty.
In: American journal of international law: AJIL, Band 114, Heft 4, S. 779-784
ISSN: 2161-7953
On May 21, 2020, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced that the United States would withdraw from the Treaty on Open Skies. The treaty, which has been ratified by several former Soviet Republics and most North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members, allows states parties to conduct observation flights over each other's territory to build trust and transparency with respect to arms control. The treaty gives state parties a right to withdraw upon six months of notice, which Pompeo stated would be formally given by the United States on May 22. Pompeo described the U.S. withdrawal as a response to Russian violations of the treaty and held open the possibility that the United States would rescind its notice of withdrawal in the event of full Russian compliance. U.S. allies in Europe reaffirmed their own commitment to the treaty and to working with Russia over disputes arising from it. The announced U.S. withdrawal raises significant issues of U.S. domestic law, as the Trump administration did not comply with preconditions to withdrawal that had been established by Congress in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020.
In: American journal of international law: AJIL, Band 114, Heft 3, S. 443-462
ISSN: 2161-7953
AbstractThe withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union has prompted a global recalibration of treaty relations. Due to the Withdrawal Agreement and its transition period, the UK is expanding its international treaty-making powers as it is gradually released from the constraints of EU law. Practice to date shows the creation of many new international legal instruments through which governments have sought to address the novel questions that Brexit raises for the international law of treaties.
In: Foreign policy bulletin: the documentary record of United States foreign policy, Band 4, Heft 1, S. 32-34
ISSN: 1745-1302
In: Foreign policy bulletin: the documentary record of United States foreign policy, Band 4, S. 32-33
ISSN: 1052-7036
Selected official statements from US and North Korean sources; text of UN Security Council Resolution 825.
In: CNS reports / Monterey Institute of International Studies / Center for Nonproliferation Studies
World Affairs Online
In: The international & comparative law quarterly: ICLQ, Band 68, Heft 3, S. 499-537
ISSN: 1471-6895
AbstractWithdrawal from international adjudication is a contemporary phenomenon with wide implications. The act of treaty withdrawal is not to be seen as merely the unilateral executive exercise of the individual sovereign prerogative of a State. International law places checks upon the exercise of withdrawal, recognising that it is an act that of its nature affects the interests of other States parties, which have a collective interest in constraining withdrawal. National courts have a complementary function in restraining unilateral withdrawal in order to support the domestic constitution. The arguments advanced against international adjudication in the name of popular democracy at the national level can serve as a cloak for the exercise of executive power unrestrained by law. The submission by States to peaceful settlement of disputes through international adjudication is central, not incidental, to the successful operation of the international legal system.
In: International security, Band 33, Heft 1, S. 45-81
ISSN: 1531-4804
In recent years, American treaty behavior has produced growing concern among both allies and less friendly nations. On such fundamental issues as nuclear proliferation, terrorism, human rights, civil liberties, environmental disasters, and commerce, the United States has generated confusion and anger abroad. Such a climate is not conducive to needed cooperation in the conduct of foreign and security policy. Among U.S. actions that have caused concern are the failure to ratify several treaties; the attachment of reservations, understandings, and declarations before ratification; the failure to support a treaty regime once ratified; and treaty withdrawal. The structural and historical reasons for American treaty behavior are deeply rooted in the United States' system of government and do not merely reflect superpower arrogance.
International adjudication is currently under assault, encouraging a number of States to withdraw, or to consider withdrawing, from treaties providing for international dispute settlement. This Working Paper argues that the act of treaty withdrawal is not merely as the unilateral executive exercise of the individual sovereign prerogative of a State. International law places checks upon the exercise of withdrawal, recognising that it is an act that of its nature affects the interests of other States parties, which have a collective interest in constraining withdrawal. National courts have a complementary function in restraining unilateral withdrawal in order to support the domestic constitution. The arguments advanced against international adjudication in the name of popular democracy at the national level can serve as a cloak for the exercise of executive power unrestrained by law. The submission by States of their disputes to peaceful settlement through international adjudication is central, not incidental, to the successful operation of the international legal system.
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