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ON MARCH 12, 1993, NORTH KOREA ANNOUNCED THAT IT INTENDS TO WITHDRAW FROM THE NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION TREATY. PYONGYANG'S DECISION IS WIDELY VIEWED AS HAVING POTENTIALLY SERIOUS IMPLICATIONS FOR EAST ASIAN SECURITY AND FOR THE GLOBAL NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME.

The article analyzes the dynamics, causes and implications of the collapse of the Open Skies Treaty in the broader context of gradual dismantlement of the network of arms control and confidence building regimes created at the end of the Cold War. The central focus is on the explanation of the declining U.S. support for the treaty since the 2010s and the eventual withdrawal addressed against the background of the evolution of the U.S. approach to arms control during the first two decades of the 21st century. While policies changed from one president to another, a sequence of U.S. administrations shared growing loss of interest in arms control and unwillingness to invest in generating domestic support for existing and new agreements. The weakening of arms control became preferable to limitations on the U.S.' own programs and forces, in line with the belief that the United States was sufficiently advanced to remain ahead of any possible competitors, including Russia. While arms control issues are more effectively addressed through detailed, difficult negotiations and compromises, the evolving U.S. approach to perceived treaty violations by Russia amounted to an ultimatum to Moscow to admit violations and fix them the way the U.S. wants them to be fixed. Russia's decision to follow suit by withdrawing from the treaty, while not immediate or preordained, is explained as driven both by political motives and, in cost-benefit terms, by concerns that the United States would keep access to data on Russia collected under the treaty through the U.S. NATO allies. The prospects for modest upgrade of the arms control agenda under the Biden administration are also addressed.

On February 2, 2019, the United States formally notified Russia that it would withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty in six months and that, effective immediately, it was suspending its performance under the treaty in light of Russia's material breach. This decision came more than three months after the Trump administration indicated that the United States was planning to withdraw from the treaty.

On May 21, 2020, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced that the United States would withdraw from the Treaty on Open Skies. The treaty, which has been ratified by several former Soviet Republics and most North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members, allows states parties to conduct observation flights over each other's territory to build trust and transparency with respect to arms control. The treaty gives state parties a right to withdraw upon six months of notice, which Pompeo stated would be formally given by the United States on May 22. Pompeo described the U.S. withdrawal as a response to Russian violations of the treaty and held open the possibility that the United States would rescind its notice of withdrawal in the event of full Russian compliance. U.S. allies in Europe reaffirmed their own commitment to the treaty and to working with Russia over disputes arising from it. The announced U.S. withdrawal raises significant issues of U.S. domestic law, as the Trump administration did not comply with preconditions to withdrawal that had been established by Congress in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020.

AbstractThe withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union has prompted a global recalibration of treaty relations. Due to the Withdrawal Agreement and its transition period, the UK is expanding its international treaty-making powers as it is gradually released from the constraints of EU law. Practice to date shows the creation of many new international legal instruments through which governments have sought to address the novel questions that Brexit raises for the international law of treaties.

Selected official statements from US and North Korean sources; text of UN Security Council Resolution 825.

AbstractWithdrawal from international adjudication is a contemporary phenomenon with wide implications. The act of treaty withdrawal is not to be seen as merely the unilateral executive exercise of the individual sovereign prerogative of a State. International law places checks upon the exercise of withdrawal, recognising that it is an act that of its nature affects the interests of other States parties, which have a collective interest in constraining withdrawal. National courts have a complementary function in restraining unilateral withdrawal in order to support the domestic constitution. The arguments advanced against international adjudication in the name of popular democracy at the national level can serve as a cloak for the exercise of executive power unrestrained by law. The submission by States to peaceful settlement of disputes through international adjudication is central, not incidental, to the successful operation of the international legal system.