Suchergebnisse

The ways of decision-making within the EU have significantly changed in the last decades: The rule of unanimity has been more and more substituted by majority voting in order to speed up decision-making processes in a Union of 27 heterogeneous member states. A third possibility is now offered by the Lisbon Treaty including a constitutional right of withdrawal. A member state encountering a loss in its benefits caused by a decision made by majority voting may now demand compensating transfers by using the right of withdrawal. It might threaten to leave the EU if the compensation is denied. Hence, does this mean that member states now have regained a negotiation power comparable to the right to veto? Using a game theoretic approach we investigate the amount of compensating transfers to be offered under majority decisions with exit option compared to decisions requiring unanimity. ; peerReviewed

This article tries to analyze Italian government's stance after Albania's de facto withdrawal from the Warsaw Treaty in 1961 and de jure denunciation of this treaty in 1968. The retreat of Soviet troops from Vlora Naval Base had a considerable impact on Italy's foreign relations with Albania in many regards. Concerning internal interests, Italy had a close relationship with Albania and had always demonstrated the willingness to enhance her influence in this respect. On the other hand, for Italy being a NATO member country, Albania's withdrawal from the Warsaw Treaty was an enormous relief. The possibility that the two superpowers clash on the Adriatic Sea was considerably minimized. This led to a genuine interest in Albania. Albanian political immigrants in Italy played a major role in enhancing this attention. Nevertheless, because of the communist regime in Albania, the rapprochement wanted by Italy remained merely a desire which did not exceed bilateral economic relations. Viewed as an opportunity for Albania to open up to the West, this effort constitutes another chance deliberately "missed" by the regime at home. DOI:10.5901/mjss.2017.v8n2p155

The ways of decision-making within the EU have significantly changed in the last decades: The rule of unanimity has been more and more substituted by majority voting in order to speed up decision-making processes in a Union of 27 heterogeneous member states. A third possibility is now offered by the Lisbon Treaty including a constitutional right of withdrawal. A member state encountering a loss in its benefits caused by a decision made by majority voting may now demand compensating transfers by using the right of withdrawal. It might threaten to leave the EU if the compensation is denied. Hence, does this mean that member states now have regained a negotiation power comparable to the right to veto? Using a game theoretic approach we investigate the amount of compensating transfers to be offered under majority decisions with exit option compared to decisions requiring unanimity.

The ways of decision making within the EU have significantly changed in the last decades: the rule of unanimity has been more and more substituted by majority voting in order to speed up decision-making processes in a Union of 27 heterogeneous member states. A third possibility is now offered by the Lisbon Treaty including a constitutional right of withdrawal: A member state encountering a loss in its benefits caused by a decision made by majority voting may now demand compensating transfers by using the right of withdrawal: It might threaten to leave the EU if the compensation is denied. Are member states becoming as powerful as they are under the rule of unanimity because they use the right of withdrawal as a threat point? Using a game theoretic approach we show that normally compensating transfers will be lower under majority decisions with exit option compared to decisions requiring unanimity; under certain conditions however transfers could also be as high as in the case of unanimity. In practise, the EU will offer compensating transfers depending on how credible a member state threatens to leave the Union. By using cheap talk a member state may increase the credibility of its outside option and therefore receive higher transfers.

States — Federal States and Confederations — Application of international law in dispute between States within Federation — Treaty dispute between Länder of Federal Republic of GermanyStates — Conduct of foreign relations — Treaty-making powers — Role of executive — Role of legislature — Discretionary powers of executive — Whether denunciation requiring ratification by legislatureTreaties — Termination — Denunciation — Multilateral treaties — Effects of denunciation — Treaty providing for denunciation without determining its effects — Whether denunciation resulting in withdrawal of denouncing party or dissolution of treaty relationship — Lack of general rule under customary international law — Whether dissolution or withdrawal more closely corresponding to hypothetical intention and interests of the parties366Treaties — Termination — Legal validity — Denunciation — Whether requiring ratification by legislature — Counter-denunciation — Conditions for effectiveness — Principle of good faith — Whether residual obligations are created by withdrawal from multilateral treaty relationship by one of the partiesTreaties — Interpretation — Rules of interpretation — Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969, Articles 31 and 32 — Intention of parties — Supplementary means of interpretation — Preparatory work — Circumstances of conclusion — Object and purpose of treaty — Subsequent practice of parties — Application of rules of international law to dispute concerning gap in provisions of treaty between Länder of the Federal Republic of GermanySources of international law — General principles of law — Loss of rights — Mistake in interpretation of treaty — Estoppel — AcquiescenceInternational organizations — Legal status — Common institutions established by multilateral treaty — Effect on operation of institutions of withdrawal of one of the parties to treaty — Norddeutscher Rundfunk — The law of the Federal Republic of Germany