Suchergebnisse

The Lisbon Treaty from 2009 introduced the possibility for individual member states to withdraw from the European Union (EU) on the basis of a unilateral decision. In June 2016 the UK decided to leave the EU invoking article 50 of the treaty. But is withdrawal democratically legitimate? In fact, the all affected principle suggests that it is undemocratic for subunits to leave larger political units when it adversely affects other citizens without including them in the decision. However, it is unclear what the currency of this affectedness is and, hence, why withdrawal would be undemocratic. We argue that it is the effect of withdrawal on the status of citizens as free and equal that is decisive and that explains why unilateral withdrawal of subunits from larger units is democratically illegitimate. Moreover, on the 'all affected status principle' that we develop, even multilaterally agreed withdrawal is undemocratic because the latter diminishes the future ability of citizens to make decisions together regarding issues that affect their status as free and equal. On this basis, we conclude that it is undemocratic for a member state such as the UK to withdraw from the European Union.

The Lisbon Treaty from 2009 introduced the possibility for individual member states to withdraw from the European Union (EU) on the basis of a unilateral decision. In June 2016 the UK decided to leave the EU invoking article 50 of the treaty. But is withdrawal democratically legitimate? In fact, the all affected principle suggests that it is undemocratic for subunits to leave larger political units when it adversely affects other citizens without including them in the decision. However, it is unclear what the currency of this affectedness is and, hence, why withdrawal would be undemocratic. We argue that it is the effect of withdrawal on the status of citizens as free and equal that is decisive and that explains why unilateral withdrawal of subunits from larger units is democratically illegitimate. Moreover, on the 'all affected status principle' that we develop, even multilaterally agreed withdrawal is undemocratic because the latter diminishes the future ability of citizens to make decisions together regarding issues that affect their status as free and equal. On this basis, we conclude that it is undemocratic for a member state such as the UK to withdraw from the European Union. ; The Lisbon Treaty from 2009 introduced the possibility for individual member states to withdraw from the European Union on the basis of a unilateral decision. But would withdrawal be democratically legitimate? In fact, the all-affected principle suggests that it is undemocratic for subunits to leave larger political units because it adversely affects other citizens without including them in the decision. However, it is unclear what the currency of this affectedness is and, hence, why withdrawal would be undemocratic. We argue that it is the effect of withdrawal on the status of citizens as free and equal that is decisive and that explains why unilateral withdrawal of subunits from larger units is democratically undesirable. Moreover, on the 'all-affected status principle' that we develop, even multilaterally agreed withdrawal is undemocratic because the latter diminishes the future ability of citizens to make decisions together regarding issues that affect their status as free and equal. On this basis, we conclude that it would be undemocratic for a member state to withdraw from the European Union.

The Lisbon Treaty from 2009 introduced the possibility for individual member states to withdraw from the European Union (EU) on the basis of a unilateral decision. In June 2016 the United Kingdom decided to leave the EU invoking article 50 of the treaty. But is withdrawal democratically legitimate? In fact, the all-affected principle suggests that it is undemocratic for subunits to leave larger political units when it adversely affects other citizens without including them in the decision. However, it is unclear what the currency of this affectedness is and, hence, why withdrawal would be undemocratic. We argue that it is the effect of withdrawal on the status of citizens as free and equal that is decisive and that explains why unilateral withdrawal of subunits from larger units is democratically illegitimate. Moreover, on the 'all-affected status principle' that we develop, even multilaterally agreed withdrawal is undemocratic because the latter diminishes the future ability of citizens to make decisions together regarding issues that affect their status as free and equal. On this basis, we conclude that it is undemocratic for a member state such as the United Kingdom to withdraw from the EU.

Aus US-amerikanischer Sicht

The recent targeted strike resulting in the death of Qassem Soleimani has received extensive attention for its violations of international law by the US. However, one area that has not been considered following the 3 January 2020 attack is the possible consequences this may have for Iran's nuclear non-proliferation legal obligations. Iranian officials have previously alluded to the possibility of Iran withdrawing from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) 1968 following the US withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in May 2018 and re-imposition of targeted economic sanctions against Iran. This article considers whether Iran can withdraw from the NPT, thus freeing Iran from its legal commitments not to develop nuclear weapons. It revisits the withdrawal provisions found in Article X of the NPT and examines the invocation of the 'extraordinary events' clause by other states in relation to other instruments too. In light of this, the discussion considers whether Iran can legally withdraw from the NPT, before concluding with some thoughts as to whether it should in fact pursue this option.

In October of 2018, the Trump administration announced that the United States would withdraw from four international agreements. On October 3, 2018, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced that the United States would withdraw from the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights with Iran. Later that day, National Security Advisor John Bolton announced that the United States was also withdrawing from the Optional Protocol to the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (VCDR). Both withdrawals were triggered by pending International Court of Justice (ICJ) cases grounded in these treaties that were recently brought against the United States. Two weeks later, in an escalation of the ongoing trade dispute with China, the United States gave notice of withdrawal from the Universal Postal Union (UPU), the international body charged with overseeing the international mailing system. Finally, on October 22, 2018, President Trump announced that the United States would be terminating the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty with Russia. Unlike other withdrawals undertaken by the Trump administration, this latest round involved three Article II treaties to which the Senate had provided its advice and consent. In addition, the international commitments withdrawn from in this round were long-standing ones, with U.S. participation in the UPU going back as far as 1875.

ON MAY 11, 1993, THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL APPROVED RESOLUTION 825, CALLING ON NORTH KOREA TO HONOR ITS TREATY OBLIGATIONS AND RECONSIDER ITS DECISION TO WITHDRAW FROM THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION TREATY. THE RESOLUTION WAS APPROVED 13-0, WITH CHINA AND PAKISTAN ABSTAINING.

Introduction -- Theoretical background -- Reconstructing the treaty concept -- The limits of informality in the expression of consent to be bound -- State consent in treaty withdrawal cases -- Succession to public order treaties -- State consent and reservations to human rights treaties -- Conclusion

During the summer of 1953, two questions of political importance to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization were raised. According to press reports, some NATO members felt that the Council should discuss the questions of Germany and of the policy which the west should adopt if the Soviet Union proposed full withdrawal of all foreign troops from Germany as a prelude to reunification. The eventual agreement, if any were reached, was not made known, but press reports indicated that there were several obstacles to such a discussion: 1) the German Federal Republic was not a member of NATO; 2) the United States did not want to consider publicly alternatives to the European Defense Community; 3) France opposed direct entrance of the German Federal Republic into NATO; and 4)other NATO members felt that the work of the organization should be first in the military, and eventually in the economic social and cultural fields but not in the political-diplomatic field.