Turnout
In: Parliamentary affairs: a journal of representative politics, Band 54, Heft 4, S. 775-788
ISSN: 0031-2290
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In: Parliamentary affairs: a journal of representative politics, Band 54, Heft 4, S. 775-788
ISSN: 0031-2290
World Affairs Online
In: Parliamentary affairs: a journal of comparative politics, Band 54, Heft 4, S. 775-788
ISSN: 1460-2482
In: Parliamentary affairs: a journal of comparative politics, Band 50, Heft 4, S. 720-732
ISSN: 1460-2482
In: Parliamentary affairs: a journal of representative politics, Band 50, Heft 4: Britain votes 1997, S. 720-732
ISSN: 0031-2290
World Affairs Online
In: Parliamentary affairs: a journal of representative politics, Band 50, Heft 4, S. 720-732
ISSN: 0031-2290
In: Electoral studies: an international journal on voting and electoral systems and strategy, Band 86, S. 102681
ISSN: 1873-6890
This paper proposes a model of turnout in which citizens have a preference for conformism, which adds to the instrumental preference for the electoral outcome. Under this environment multiple equilibria arise, some that generate a (more realistic) high level of turnout, for a wide rage of parameter values. It is also shown that high levels of turnout are robust to the introduction of asymmetry and heterogeneity in the parameter governing the preference for conformism and with respect to the reference group for conformism. This model suggests that high turnout can only be achieved as the outcome of a particular coordination among citizens and, therefore, introduces a different perspective in understanding the citizens' decision to vote, which allows also to account for large shifts in turnout rates that are observed after compulsory laws have been introduced or abolished. Moreover, this set up proposes a theory for the D term used in rational theories of voting to account for high turnout rates.
BASE
In: Policy studies review: PSR, Band 9, Heft Spring 90
ISSN: 0278-4416
Electoral districting and the vote share needed for election are analysed in terms of structural features. Challenges to the majority vote requirement and electoral formats are based on claims arising under the 1982 Voting Rights Act that these arrangements dilute the influence of minority voters. Examines turnout and its racial breakdown to determine whether there is a relationship with the challenged mechanisms. (SJK)
In: Political studies: the journal of the Political Studies Association of the United Kingdom, S. 003232172211480
ISSN: 1467-9248
One strategy in defence of compulsory voting is based on what I call the non-instrumental value of high turnout: the idea that almost-universal participation in elections is valuable per se. This article argues that we do not have democratic reasons to value compelled turnout. First, thanks to an original analysis of the practice of voting, I identify three constitutive rules that make the physical acts of marking and casting a ballot count as proper voting. This preliminary analysis serves to illuminate the fact that the act of voting has democratic value if it is performed in a free and reason-responsive way. Second, I identify political equality and popular control as democratic values that high turnout expresses. Finally, the article rejects the non-instrumental case for compulsory voting because it cannot ensure that people vote in a reason-responsive way and, if they do not, high turnout lacks democratic value.
SSRN
Working paper
In: European journal of political research: official journal of the European Consortium for Political Research, Band 33, Heft 2, S. 239-261
ISSN: 1475-6765
Abstract. We examine turnout in 324 democratic national lower house elections held in 91 countries, between 1972 and 1995. We rely on Freedom House ratings of political rights to determine whether an election is democratic or not. We distinguish three blocs of factors that affect turnout: the socio–economic environment, institutions, and party systems. We show that turnout is influenced by a great number of factors and that the patterns that have been shown to prevail in studies dealing with more limited samples of countries generally hold when we look at a larger set of democracies. But we also show that the socioeconomic environment, which has been downplayed in previous studies, has a substantial impact on turnout.
In: European journal of political research: official journal of the European Consortium for Political Research, Band 33, Heft 2, S. 239-261
ISSN: 0304-4130
We examine turnout in 324 democratic national lower house elections held in 91 countries, between 1972 and 1995. We rely on Freedom House ratings of political rights to determine whether an election is democratic or not. We distinguish three blocs of factors that affect turnout: the socio-economic environment, institutions, and party systems. We show that turnout is influenced by a great number of factors and that the patterns that have been shown to prevail in studies dealing with more limited samples of countries generally hold when we look at a larger set of democracies. But we also show that the socio-economic environment, which has been downplayed in previous studies, has a substantial impact on turnout. (European Journal of Political Research / FUB)
World Affairs Online
In: Political analysis: PA ; the official journal of the Society for Political Methodology and the Political Methodology Section of the American Political Science Association, Band 9, Heft 1, S. 45-57
ISSN: 1476-4989
This article develops a model that simultaneously considers individual turnout and vote choice while also accounting for uncertainty about candidates. The theoretical development of this model implies that the effects of uncertainty on turnout vary with the strength of individual preferences. Application of the model to individual choice in the 1996 American presidential election confirms that decreasing uncertainty about the character traits of the candidates decreases the probability of abstention for individuals with strong preferences but increases the probability of abstention for individuals with weak preferences.
In: American journal of political science, Band 60, Heft 3, S. 607-624
ISSN: 1540-5907
World democracies widely differ in legislative, executive, and legal institutions. Different institutional environments induce different mappings from electoral outcomes to the distribution of power. We explore how these mappings affect voters' participation in an election. We show that the effect of such institutional differences on turnout depends on the distribution of voters' preferences. We uncover a novel contest effect: Given the preferences distribution, turnout increases and then decreases when we move from a more proportional to a less proportional power‐sharing system; turnout is maximized for an intermediate degree of power sharing. Moreover, we generalize the competition effect, common to models of endogenous turnout: Given the institutional environment, turnout increases in the ex ante preferences evenness, and more so when the overall system has lower power sharing. These results are robust to a wide range of modeling approaches, including ethical voter models, voter mobilization models, and rational voter models.