Suchergebnisse

Numerous studies indicate that political institutions play an important role in explaining variation in voter turnout across countries. The nuances of institutions unique to presidential elections have been largely overlooked, however, despite the different incentives they offer for voters to participate in elections. This article examines the effect that four presidential institutions had on voter turnout in presidential elections between 1974 and 2004—the timing of elections (whether concurrent or nonconcurrent), the power of the presidency, presidential electoral rules (plurality or majority runoff), and reelection rules. To isolate the effect of presidential institutions, this study controls for other likely influences on turnout, including the economic environment and the wider political context. It finds that (a) runoff elections dampen turnout whereas incumbency spurs it and (b) more powerful presidencies and elections, when held concurrently with legislative elections, have little effect on voter participation.

Der Beitrag in der Festschrift für Peter Schmidt betrachtet die Wahlbeteiligung in neuen Demokratien. Zunächst geht der Beitrag auf die unterschiedlichen Arbeitsweisen der Autoren und des Gewürdigten ein und beschreibt anschließend Theorie und Daten der skizzierten Analyse. Im Mittelpunkt steht dabei die Wahlbeteiligung und ihre Veränderungen im Zusammenhang mit dem jeweiligen Wahlsystem. Dabei geht es um die Analyse der Auswirkungen, die z. B. die Einschätzung des Wählers auf seine möglichen Einflussmöglichkeiten auf die Wahlbeteiligung hat. (wie z. B. mit Wahlstimmen umgegangen wird, die kleineren, schwächeren Parteien zufließen). Der Beitrag beschreibt das Modell einer solchen Analyse, bei dem der Versuch unternommen wurde Rationalität und Lernprozess bei Wahlen mittels aggregierter Daten zu ermitteln. (ICB2).

Role of ethnicity, electoral districting, and the vote share needed for election; based on data from six US cities, 1976-86.

A growing literature has argued that electoral turnout decreases the more government policy constrained by economic and institutional factors. This paper investigates whether a certain type of policy constraint, fiscal rules, lowers turnout. Since fiscal rules set limits for government fiscal policy, they should lower the incentive for citizens to participate electorally. However, using parliamentary turnout data in a large panel of democratic countries, little robust evidence is found in favor of fiscal rules having a depressing effect on electoral turnout. Analysis of European individual-level data also suggests that national fiscal rules do not affect inequality in electoral turnout between income groups either. Difference-in-discontinuity evidence from Italian municipalities further suggests that the results are causally identified.