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This article explores the political and cultural context of the riots provoked by changes in the Trisagion (512). Along with the advancing integration of the Byzantine Empire with Christianity, the state's interest in theological problems increased; these problems were also reflected in the liturgy. Worship was used as a tool of imperial policy. This mutual interaction between politics and liturgy can be observed particularly clearly in the history of the Trisagion. This hymn, in its primitive form appearing in the book of Isaiah (as the familiar Sanctus Sanctus Sanctus), had two interpretations from the first centuries. According to the first one, the hymn referred to God, or – with the development of theology – to the whole Holy Trinity. According to the second interpretation (probably originating from Antioch), it referred to Christ. Already in the 4th century, the Trisagion entered the liturgy. In the middle of the 5th century, we encounter a new version of the Trisagion (known as SanctusDeus, Sanctus Fortis), which was an elaboration of the above-mentioned hymn. It also found use in the liturgy and originally had a Trinitarian sense. The Monophysites, in order to give the hymn an anti-Chalcedonian sense, added to it the expression who was crucified for us; this makes the hymn unambiguously Christological, but it may also suggest theopaschism (all of the Trinity was crucified). In Antioch, where the Trisagion first appeared in that form (and where the hymn had always been interpreted as referring to Christ), this addition did not provoke protests from the Chalcedonians. However, when the Monophysite emperor Anastasius decided to introduce this version to the liturgy in Constantinople, the inhabitants of the capital – accustomed to understanding the Trisagion in the Trinitarian sense – interpreted the change as an offence against the Trinity. This caused the outbreak of the Trisagion riots (512). Not long afterwards, restoring the anthem in the version without the addition became one of the postulates of military commander Vitalian's rebellion against Anastasius. Thus, in the case under analysis, we see theology and liturgy blending with current politics; one and the same hymn could be understood as heretical in one city and as completely orthodox in another.

"In When Riot Cops Are Not Enough, sociologist and activist Mike King examines the policing, and broader political repression, of the Occupy Oakland movement during the fall of 2011 through the spring of 2012. King's active and daily participation in that movement, from its inception through its demise, provides a unique insider perspective to illustrate how the Oakland police and city administrators lost the ability to effectively control the movement. Drawn from King's intensive field work, the book focuses on the physical, legal, political, and ideological dimensions of repression--in the streets, in courtrooms, in the media, in city hall, and within the movement itself--When Riot Cops Are Not Enough highlights the central role of political legitimacy, both for mass movements seeking to create social change, as well as for governmental forces seeking to control such movements. Although Occupy Oakland was different from other Occupy sites in many respects, King shows how the contradictions it illuminated within both social movement and police strategies provide deep insights into the nature of protest policing generally, and a clear map to understanding the full range of social control techniques used in North America in the twenty-first century"--

This research considers the bureaucratic politics of recent riot crisis management and urban policy in Britain and the United States.1 The bureaucratic politics model is evaluated and a tentative framework for its development as a way of analysing governmental responses to urban riots is proposed.2 The links between crisis management in riots and wider urban policy are identified as being important in developing an understanding of the nature of post‐riot policy responses within the context of the broader political environment.

"The close diplomatic, economic, and military ties that comprise the 'special relationship' between the United States and Great Britain have received significant attention from historians over the years. Less frequently noted are the countries' shared experiences of empire, white supremacy, racial inequality, and neoliberalism--and the attendant struggles for civil rights and political reform that have marked their recent history. This exceptional collection traces the contours of this other 'special relationship,' exploring its implications for our understanding of the development of an internationally interconnected civil rights movement. Here, scholars from a range of research fields contribute essays on a wide variety of themes, from solidarity protests to calypso culture to white supremacy"--

One distinguishing feature of mainstream social science is its growing regard for model building and formal hypothesis testing. In South Asian studies this is most evident in accounts of ethnic riots or communal violence. This paper examines a model of votes and violence proposed by Steven Wilkinson. We first examine how well the model performs against a data set that we have assembled on the twenty worst incidents of communal violence in India since 1950. The Wilkinson model is consistent with some important key facts in our data set, most notably in terms of levels of urbanization and "percentage Muslims" in riot-affected towns and cities. However, proximity to national or state elections is not found to be a strong driver of prolonged ethnic rioting. Nor is it the case that India's worst instances of communal violence occurred mainly where there was direct electoral competition between less than 3.5 effective political parties, the other main predictive variable in the Wilkinson model. We then discuss the limitations more broadly of attempts to explain and even predict ethnic violence within the framework of a quantitative model. We pay attention to time inconsistencies, principal-agent problems, religiosity and the homogenization of riot events, and omitted variables (notably, memory work and ideological fervour). We conclude with some general remarks on the search for order in social science. (Pac Aff/GIGA)

Developing the thesis that music is a central experience of art and life, the essays in this edited volume focus on the visual and performing arts interrogate and detail significant instances of intra-art relatons which contributed to key developments in modernism and postmodernism. The insistent influence of Wagner is considered, as well as the enduring aura of late-Romanticism into the contemporary period. From publisher's website: Opening with an account of print portraiture facilitating Franz Liszt's celebrity status and concluding with Riot Grrrl's noisy politics of feminism and performance, this interdisciplinary anthology charts the relationship between music and the visual arts from late Romanticism and the birth of modernism to 'postmodernism', while crossing from Western art to the Middle East. Focused on music as a central experience of art and life, these essays scrutinize 'the musicalisation of art' focusing on the visual and performing arts and detailing significant instances of intra-art relations between c. 1840 and the present day. Essays reflect on the aesthetic relationships of music to painting, performance and installation, sound-and- silence, time-and-space. The insistent influence of Wagner is considered as well as the work and ideas of Manet, Satie and Cage, Thomas Wilfred, La Monte Young and Eliasson. What distinguishes these studies are the convictions that music is never alone and that a full understanding of the "isms" of the last two hundred years is best achieved when music's influential presence in the visual arts is acknowledged and interrogated.

Recent monographs on Russian social development have raised a number of hypotheses regarding our general understanding of processes of political and social change. In his volume on the early history of Russian workers Reginald Zelnik, for instance, proposes that moderate labor unrest reinforced traditional repressive patterns, while extreme conflicts motivated innovative reform. In the work of Robert E. Johnson and of Victoria Bonnell we find the suggestion that workers in small-scale enterprises and artisan shops were often more radical and organized than those in larger industrial enterprises. The fragmented and antagonistic nature of Russian society, with multiple splits of both an intergroup and intragroup nature, has been noted in the work of both Roberta Manning and Allan Wildman. Diane Koenker, focusing her research on the period of the 1917 revolutions, has brought out the moderating and integrating effect of the urban setting on Russian workers. These are only a few of the many thought-provoking hypotheses that have been raised.

In the aftermath of the Cronulla riots, schools were faced with the fallout of social conflict, including having to deal with widespread fear and confusion both in their local communities and among students. This was especially the case for schools in the Sutherland Shire and in the local government area (LGA) of Bankstown. Apart from the presence of many young people in the initial riot and the revenge raids, some schools, like churches, had been the target of attacks (Leys and Box, 2005: 1; Daily Telegraph, 2005: 5). Schools were also targeted as places to battle the consequences of cultural division: the then Prime Minister John Howard, in his Australia Day speech just over a month after the riots, complained that the teaching of Australian history in schools needed reform to properly foster the core values that would bind a nation together (Sydney Morning Herald, 2006). At all levels of government, a raft of programs designed to ease local tensions were introduced, many of which focused on young people or on schools (see Board of Studies New South Wales, 2007; Surf Life Saving NSW, 2006).

This article outlines the contexts for understanding the role of schools: both in terms of the spatial dynamics of the 'Shire' and in terms of the changing nature of educational policy. It then focuses on a National Values Education Project (NVEP) involving five schools in south and south-western Sydney as a direct response to the Cronulla riot. It suggests that these contexts produce both a degree of cultural heterogeneity in young people's social lives and a degree of segregation amongst young people in schooling which delimits 'what is possible' in terms of schooling responses to the Cronulla riot.

In the aftermath of the Cronulla riots, schools were faced with the fallout of social conflict, including having to deal with widespread fear and confusion both in their local communities and among students. This was especially the case for schools in the Sutherland Shire and in the local government area (LGA) of Bankstown. Apart from the presence of many young people in the initial riot and the revenge raids, some schools, like churches, had been the target of attacks (Leys and Box, 2005: 1; Daily Telegraph, 2005: 5). Schools were also targeted as places to battle the consequences of cultural division: the then Prime Minister John Howard, in his Australia Day speech just over a month after the riots, complained that the teaching of Australian history in schools needed reform to properly foster the core values that would bind a nation together (Sydney Morning Herald, 2006). At all levels of government, a raft of programs designed to ease local tensions were introduced, many of which focused on young people or on schools (see Board of Studies New South Wales, 2007; Surf Life Saving NSW, 2006). This article outlines the contexts for understanding the role of schools: both in terms of the spatial dynamics of the 'Shire' and in terms of the changing nature of educational policy. It then focuses on a National Values Education Project (NVEP) involving five schools in south and south-western Sydney as a direct response to the Cronulla riot. It suggests that these contexts produce both a degree of cultural heterogeneity in young people's social lives and a degree of segregation amongst young people in schooling which delimits 'what is possible' in terms of schooling responses to the Cronulla riot.

The riots in England in August 2011 comprised one of the most significant events of civil unrest in recent British history. A consensus rapidly emerged, notably within political commentary, print journalism, television and online news media coverage of these five nights of rioting, that these were the riots of the underclass. This article explores how and why the conceptual and perceptual frame of the underclass – a frame through which child poverty and youth unemployment are conceived as consequences of a cocktail of 'bad individual choices', an absence of moral judgement, poor parenting, hereditary or genetic deficiencies, and/or welfare dependency – was mobilised as a means of explaining and containing the meaning of these riots. It briefly traces the longer cultural and political history of the underclass as an abjectifying category and then examines how this framing of the riots was used to generate public consent for the shift from protective liberal forms of welfare to penal neoliberal 'workfare' regimes. In his response to the riots, Paul Gilroy argued that 'one of the worst forms of poverty that's shaped our situation is poverty of the imagination' ( Gilroy 2011 ). Following Gilroy's call for alternative political aesthetics and in order to engender critical sociological perspectives that might contest the downward social mobility and deepening inequalities which neoliberal social and economic policies are affecting, the aim of this article is to fracture the consensus that these were the riots of the underclass. By exposing the underclass as a powerful political myth, it is possible to transform public understandings of poverty and disadvantage and vitalise understandings of neoliberalism as class struggle.

The intense social upheaval that spread through a number of UK cities in the riots and protests of August, 2011 signalled the terrifying speed with which passionate disaffection can turn to uncontained violence. At stake in the dense and volatile debate that ensued, and in the acts of violence themselves, were contests over spaces as well as competing models of democracy, publics and citizenship, including the appropriate use of social media. Within these debates, almost universally, rational deliberative discourse and action is assumed to be the only route to legitimate "civil" society. So what is to be made of the violent physical contest over city squares, streets and property, as well as contests over acts of participation and demonstration played out online through the hundreds of eyewitness videos posted to sites like YouTube and the endless flow of often vitriolic words in blogs, comments spaces and social network sites? This paper uses a video posted to YouTube titled 'Clapham Junction Speaker (London Riots 2011)' to examine the passion and provocation that flowed beyond the city streets to enliven, intensify and sustain forms of protest and civic engagement. We argue that the aggressive and antagonistic tenor of the Speaker's twenty minute monologue, the bitter vitriol that flowed through the comments space, and even the act of posting it constitute significant elements of a generative, 'agonistic' public, to use Chantal Mouffe's term, that operates in multiple spaces and outside of the rationalising discourse demanded by mainstream media and government. This paper develops a richer understanding of these spaces of protest, and the concept of provocation central to these events.

In 2011, the killing of a Black man by a police officer triggered violent riots across England. In a context where ethnic minorities are rarely openly blamed, we examined the lens through which the events were interpreted in the official discourses of the British Prime Minister. A thematic content analysis (Study 1) revealed that, without explicitly blaming ethnic minorities, the discourses built on antagonistic normative references opposing a virtuous majority to threatening minorities. Then, based on online survey data of self‐declared Londoners (N = 223) during the riots, we analyzed (Study 2) how agreement with the discourses related to individuals' ethnocentrism and their understanding of the causes underlying the events. Results of regression analyses showed how agreement with the discourses related to blaming ethnic diversity for the riots and to higher ethnocentrism, especially among individuals least likely to discriminate against minorities (i.e., low in social dominance orientation). Agreement with the discourses was also linked to reduced blame of authorities. To conclude, we discuss the mobilization potential of political discourses on ingroup virtue and outgroup threat.