Suchergebnisse

National audience ; L'article examine les conséquences éventuelles des émeutes de 2005 sur la police française, sa conception et son organisation. Il insiste sur le fait que la doctrine politique ayant martelé que le traitement policier des émeutes ayant été un succès éclatant, les demandes de changement ou d'adaptation, et de manière générale toute appréciation négative de la police, n'ont pu être qu'interne à l'organisation, sous la ligne d'observation de la société. Or beaucoup de cadres policiers ont, rétrospectivement, émis un jugement négatif sur l'action de leurs forces durant les émeutes. Rien de cela n'a entraîné de changement majeur. Les affrontements armés à Villiers-le-Bel en 2007 ont, en revanche, diffusé des discours et positions au sein de l'institution appelant une révision générale de la doctrine de maintien de l'ordre. Mais, en dépit de la généralisation de la notion labile de "violences urbaines", les fondamentaux du maintien de l'ordre en banlieue n'ont pas changé depuis le début des années 1980 au moins.

Three weeks of urban riots of October & November, 2005, were an exceptional collective episode of violence, even in France where the tradition of protest is lively. Their scale, their concentration in the time, their spectacular character drew the attention of the international press. We are interested here in the social & structural dimensions of these riots, underlining first the effects of the differences between cities on a demographic plan, on that of the employment situation & housing, as regards to the spatial segregation & discriminations. Taking for reference set the municipalities of more than 65,000 inhabitants except Ile-de-France & the municipalities of more than 25,000 inhabitants in Ile-de-France, that is approximately 210 cities, the article clarifies the social constraints of the emergence of the riots in some of these cities & not in the others. Tables, Graphs, Appendixes. Adapted from the source document.

Le projet "Die Moskauer Prozesse" (2013) de Milo Rau se présente comme une critique subversive face à l'échec démocratique en Russie, au sein de trois procédures pénales concernant des cas de censure, dont l'action des Pussy Riots. La création d'un espace public concret de négociation sociale et politique constitue l'œuvre d'art qui se manifeste par l'organisation d'un procès fictif de trois jours à Moscou avec de vrais acteurs de la société civile. Par ailleurs, il met en œuvre entre 2014 et 2016 une critique de notre temps, qui interrogent les fondements de l'Europe en mêlant le politique et le privé, l'Histoire et des récits biographiques. Doit-on parler dans un cas d'un geste politique qui fait art et dans l'autre d'un geste artistique qui interroge le politique? Ou bien faut-il envisager l'imbrication complexe et constante entre esthétique et politique comme une stratégie plus globale que l'artiste activiste met en œuvre pour dévoiler le réel? ; International audience

Le projet "Die Moskauer Prozesse" (2013) de Milo Rau se présente comme une critique subversive face à l'échec démocratique en Russie, au sein de trois procédures pénales concernant des cas de censure, dont l'action des Pussy Riots. La création d'un espace public concret de négociation sociale et politique constitue l'œuvre d'art qui se manifeste par l'organisation d'un procès fictif de trois jours à Moscou avec de vrais acteurs de la société civile. Par ailleurs, il met en œuvre entre 2014 et 2016 une critique de notre temps, qui interrogent les fondements de l'Europe en mêlant le politique et le privé, l'Histoire et des récits biographiques. Doit-on parler dans un cas d'un geste politique qui fait art et dans l'autre d'un geste artistique qui interroge le politique? Ou bien faut-il envisager l'imbrication complexe et constante entre esthétique et politique comme une stratégie plus globale que l'artiste activiste met en œuvre pour dévoiler le réel? ; International audience

Le projet "Die Moskauer Prozesse" (2013) de Milo Rau se présente comme une critique subversive face à l'échec démocratique en Russie, au sein de trois procédures pénales concernant des cas de censure, dont l'action des Pussy Riots. La création d'un espace public concret de négociation sociale et politique constitue l'œuvre d'art qui se manifeste par l'organisation d'un procès fictif de trois jours à Moscou avec de vrais acteurs de la société civile. Par ailleurs, il met en œuvre entre 2014 et 2016 une critique de notre temps, qui interrogent les fondements de l'Europe en mêlant le politique et le privé, l'Histoire et des récits biographiques. Doit-on parler dans un cas d'un geste politique qui fait art et dans l'autre d'un geste artistique qui interroge le politique? Ou bien faut-il envisager l'imbrication complexe et constante entre esthétique et politique comme une stratégie plus globale que l'artiste activiste met en œuvre pour dévoiler le réel? ; International audience

Twenty years after the first 'North African' riots, in the winter of 2011-2012 Brussels was the scene of 'Congolese' demonstrations which some media and political officials qualified as riots. The idea that political conflicts of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) had been transposed to Belgium took hold, while the material damage, despite especially heavy riot suppression measures, seemed to have solidly entrenched the image of the violent demonstrator who only understood the language of the nightstick. Based on an ethnographic study of these demonstrations and research in Congolese communities over the past 10 years, the author takes another look at these two weeks of urban violence to ask, on the one hand whether these demonstrations could be actually qualified as riots, and on the other whether the differential treatment by the State compared to the North African riots may be the expression of a significant ethnicization of public policies. ; Vingt ans après les premières émeutes « maghrébines », Bruxelles a été durant l'hiver 2011-12, le théâtre de manifestations « congolaises » que certains médias et pouvoirs politiques qualifièrent d'émeutes. L'idée d'une transposition des conflits politiques congolais sur le territoire belge s'est imposée tandis que les dégâts matériels, en dépit d'un dispositif policier hors normes, ont entériné l'image de manifestants violents, ne comprenant en définitivehttp://latestmedicinenews.com/ que le langage de la matraque. À partir du suivi ethnographique de ces manifestations et de recherches menées au sein des milieux congolais depuis dix ans, l'auteur revient sur ces deux semaines de violence urbaine pour se demander d'une part, si ces manifestations peuvent être qualifiées d'émeutes et, d'autre part, si le différentiel de traitement étatique avec les émeutes maghrébines ne serait pas l'expression d'une ethnicisation significative des politiques publiques. ; Peer reviewed

Urban riots are often seen as the resultants of frustration caused by the deepening of economic crises or urban problems. Quite on the contrary, we would like to show the importance of political relations in the emergence of such violence. However, the " political explanation " is too often reduced to a " one country " analysis, thus failing to explain the globalisation and the simultaneity of riots, specially conspicuous during the 1989 events. Raising the question of the transnational transmission of the repertory of actions (contestation and coercion), we suggest that the delegitimisation, for a brief moment, of massive coercion by government partly explains how it was possible for a generalisation of protests to occur not only in central and eastern Europe but also in India, the Arab countries and French-speaking Africa. ; Les grands mouvements de contestation qui ont touché quasi-simultanément l'Europe centrale et orientale puis l'URSS, l'Afrique subsaharienne et l'Afrique australe, sont venus s'ajouter à ceux que connaissaient déjà l'Amérique latine, le sous-continent indien et le Maghreb-Machreq. Les années 1989, 1990 et 1991 auront donc été celles de la multiplication à l'échelle mondiale des contestations populaires ouvertes contre des pouvoirs en mal de légitimité.

Urban riots are often seen as the resultants of frustration caused by the deepening of economic crises or urban problems. Quite on the contrary, we would like to show the importance of political relations in the emergence of such violence. However, the " political explanation " is too often reduced to a " one country " analysis, thus failing to explain the globalisation and the simultaneity of riots, specially conspicuous during the 1989 events. Raising the question of the transnational transmission of the repertory of actions (contestation and coercion), we suggest that the delegitimisation, for a brief moment, of massive coercion by government partly explains how it was possible for a generalisation of protests to occur not only in central and eastern Europe but also in India, the Arab countries and French-speaking Africa. ; Les grands mouvements de contestation qui ont touché quasi-simultanément l'Europe centrale et orientale puis l'URSS, l'Afrique subsaharienne et l'Afrique australe, sont venus s'ajouter à ceux que connaissaient déjà l'Amérique latine, le sous-continent indien et le Maghreb-Machreq. Les années 1989, 1990 et 1991 auront donc été celles de la multiplication à l'échelle mondiale des contestations populaires ouvertes contre des pouvoirs en mal de légitimité.

In France, since the 2000s, weekly urban riots, and almost daily sometimes, sign accentuation so quantitative as qualitative of the ghettoization of marginalized sectors of cities. It is in particular in the complexes of the massive urbanization of the years 1950-1970, the grands ensembles d'habitat, that the phenomenon of modern ghetto can define itself. In spite of undeniable qualities of comfort and size of housing, with regard to the pre-war standards, numerous characteristics of production, populating and management engendered a defective housing environment. This one was able at first to arouse the boredom, the stress and the marginalization compared with the environment. From 1970s, increasing social tensions developed with the spatial concentration of the households most in socioeconomic difficulties. The analysis of the fate of territories of complexes in a scale wider than that of the most degraded internal sectors, as that of their little town of membership (seven studied little towns of grands ensembles), shows that the diverse aspects of the ghettoization confront under convergent forms in these sectors in spite of higher urban attributes (activities, developments and diverse equipments). The processes of material, economic, social and symbolic degradation which know these towns evoke an urban social decline, a notion from which is approached the social segregation which is a multi-form causal phenomenon. The extension of the scale of apprehension of the social degradation of spaces allows an advanced analysis, between its ideological and political frame, its social motivations and the multiplicity of its appearances, at the institutional level and the social practices. The social and urban segregation of the least qualified categories is then translated by their marginalization of the socioeconomic system, by their spatial banishment in little valued and badly managed zones, by their uneven access to the equipments of integration and social advancement as well as by the stigmatization of their ...

In France, since the 2000s, weekly urban riots, and almost daily sometimes, sign accentuation so quantitative as qualitative of the ghettoization of marginalized sectors of cities. It is in particular in the complexes of the massive urbanization of the years 1950-1970, the grands ensembles d'habitat, that the phenomenon of modern ghetto can define itself. In spite of undeniable qualities of comfort and size of housing, with regard to the pre-war standards, numerous characteristics of production, populating and management engendered a defective housing environment. This one was able at first to arouse the boredom, the stress and the marginalization compared with the environment. From 1970s, increasing social tensions developed with the spatial concentration of the households most in socioeconomic difficulties. The analysis of the fate of territories of complexes in a scale wider than that of the most degraded internal sectors, as that of their little town of membership (seven studied little towns of grands ensembles), shows that the diverse aspects of the ghettoization confront under convergent forms in these sectors in spite of higher urban attributes (activities, developments and diverse equipments). The processes of material, economic, social and symbolic degradation which know these towns evoke an urban social decline, a notion from which is approached the social segregation which is a multi-form causal phenomenon. The extension of the scale of apprehension of the social degradation of spaces allows an advanced analysis, between its ideological and political frame, its social motivations and the multiplicity of its appearances, at the institutional level and the social practices. The social and urban segregation of the least qualified categories is then translated by their marginalization of the socioeconomic system, by their spatial banishment in little valued and badly managed zones, by their uneven access to the equipments of integration and social advancement as well as by the stigmatization of their ...

Three weeks of urban riots of October and November, 2005, were an exceptional collective episode of violence, even in France where the tradition of protest is lively. Their scale, their concentration in the time, their spectacular character drew the attention of the international press. We are interested here in the social and structural dimensions of these riots, underlining first the effects of the differences between cities on a demographic plan, on that of the employment situation and housing, as regards to the spatial segregation and discriminations. Taking for reference set the municipalities of more than 65 000 inhabitants except Île-de-France and the municipalities of more than 25 000 inhabitants in Île-de-France, that is approximately 210 cities, the article clarifies the social constraints of the emergence of the riots in some of these cities and not in the others. ; Les trois semaines d'émeutes urbaines d'octobre et novembre 2005 constituèrent un épisode de violence collective exceptionnel, même en France où la tradition protestataire est vive. Leur ampleur, leur concentration dans le temps, leur caractère spectaculaire ont attiré l'attention de la presse internationale. On s'est intéressé ici aux dimensions sociales et structurelles de ces émeutes, en commençant par souligner les effets des différences entre les villes sur le plan démographique, sur celui de la situation de l'emploi et du logement, s'agissant de la ségrégation spatiale et des discriminations. Prenant pour ensemble de référence les communes de plus de 65 000 habitants hors Île-de-France et les communes de plus de 25 000 habitants en Île-de-France, soit environ 210 villes, l'article précise les déterminants sociaux de l'émergence des émeutes dans certaines de ces communes et pas dans les autres.

Three weeks of urban riots of October and November, 2005, were an exceptional collective episode of violence, even in France where the tradition of protest is lively. Their scale, their concentration in the time, their spectacular character drew the attention of the international press. We are interested here in the social and structural dimensions of these riots, underlining first the effects of the differences between cities on a demographic plan, on that of the employment situation and housing, as regards to the spatial segregation and discriminations. Taking for reference set the municipalities of more than 65 000 inhabitants except Île-de-France and the municipalities of more than 25 000 inhabitants in Île-de-France, that is approximately 210 cities, the article clarifies the social constraints of the emergence of the riots in some of these cities and not in the others. ; Les trois semaines d'émeutes urbaines d'octobre et novembre 2005 constituèrent un épisode de violence collective exceptionnel, même en France où la tradition protestataire est vive. Leur ampleur, leur concentration dans le temps, leur caractère spectaculaire ont attiré l'attention de la presse internationale. On s'est intéressé ici aux dimensions sociales et structurelles de ces émeutes, en commençant par souligner les effets des différences entre les villes sur le plan démographique, sur celui de la situation de l'emploi et du logement, s'agissant de la ségrégation spatiale et des discriminations. Prenant pour ensemble de référence les communes de plus de 65 000 habitants hors Île-de-France et les communes de plus de 25 000 habitants en Île-de-France, soit environ 210 villes, l'article précise les déterminants sociaux de l'émergence des émeutes dans certaines de ces communes et pas dans les autres.

In Nigeria, numerous journalists and scientists associate renewed religious, ethnic or economic conflicts with the return to the civil administration of 1999. The veiled war in the Niger delta, recurrence of the urban riots, the politico-religious confrontations in the northern states and on the plateau, as well as electoral violence, seem to indicate a decline of territorial control by the federal state, of increasing competition between competing juridical systems (federal law vs. Islamic law), of non-legal privatization of national police forces, and the rise of vigilant militia in the Niger delta, regularly defying federal armed forces. A comparison between the elections of 1999 and those of 2007 will be indicative, the first ones considered largely transparent, while the last elections were marked by innumerous irregularities, conflicts and several hundreds of deaths. An introduction on this issues theme of Nigeria under the reign of Obasanjo, who brought back democracy to the country, but did not change the nature of the existing conflicts. In certain cases (the delta area, and the plateau state), those were exacerbated because of the part played by newly elected officials, who are the governors and council presidents of local governments. Adapted from the source document.

« Civilizing » the suburbs. Logic and efficacy conditions of state schemes for the regulation of violence in french low-income districts At the beginning of the 80s, the rise in juvenile « delinquency » and the appearance of « urban riots » led governmental agencies to draw up various plans designed to curb violence through both prevention and repression. This article seeks to understand the logic producing behaviour regarded as violent, through the prism of analysis offered by the efficacy conditions of these plans. Only through an analysis of informal social configurations such as « youth groups » can delinquency and urban violence phenomena be explained. The sensitivity of delinquency statistics to the policy of keeping adolescents busy – anti-« hot summer » operations, raising the school-leaving age and vocational internships – shows that the informal institution active in the production of violence is indeed the « youth group » based on the logic of prestige and « street culture », as its members' leisurely strolls through their districts offer numerous opportunities for asserting and measuring up their positions, sometimes in illegal and violent ways. The formation of low-income districts with large families giving little attention to their children's schooling and having to face, after 1974, the specific difficulties of the unskilled labour market contributed between 1960 and 1980 to preparing the conditions of a possible generalization of the adolescent « street culture » and the emergence of the « problem of the suburbs ». ; À la fin des années soixante-dix, l'accroissement de la « délinquance » des jeunes et l'apparition « d'émeutes urbaines » amenèrent les pouvoirs publics à mettre en place des dispositifs administratifs variés de contrôle de la violence alliant prévention et répression. L'objet de l'article est de comprendre, en utilisant le prisme d'analyse offert par les conditions d'efficacité de ces dispositifs, quelles sont les logiques d'engendrement des comportements considérés comme violents. ...