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This article analyzes the determinants of household riot victimization, based on a unique survey collected in Maharashtra, India. We adopt a multilevel framework that allows neighborhood and district effects to randomly influence household victimization. We find that economically vulnerable households, households living close to unsafe areas, and shop owners are more prone to suffer from riots. Households report lower levels of victimization if they live further from police stations, exhibit higher levels of trust, are able to rely on outside help in times of need and accumulate savings. The results show, however, a double-edge effect of income: wealthier households are better able to cope with the adverse effects of riots, but also have more to lose from riots and are more exposed to opportunistic violence and looting. We find further that affluent neighborhoods and neighborhoods where caste fragmentation is high report higher levels of victimization. Neighborhoods with stronger social interactions experience lower levels of victimization.

My book Leveling Crowds was published in 1996, and around the same time and in succeeding years there was a spate of books on much the same topic, but primarily focused on India. This essay discusses the implications of some of these studies for my chief submissions, and also responds to the comments of some reviews of my book. It is hoped that this postscript will amplify and enrich our investigation of the dynamics of ethnonationalist conflicts in South Asia.

Some of the causes underlying the riots in US cities during the 1960s are linked to instability & fluctuations in the social, political, & economic life of inner-city blacks. Data collected in the 1950s & 1960s by the Center for Political Studies, U of Michigan, are used to examine the role of personal uncertainty in these riots. In an analysis of the survey data only on black Ms, (N not specified) grouped by age (16-29, 30-44, 45+), gamma coefficients are used to summarize attitudinal variables distinguishing riot-prone Ss. Uncertainty is shown to be the most significant attitudinal characteristic distinguishing rioters from nonrioters, & its influence extended across all three age groups. Ss in the youngest group who scored high on the personal uncertainty index were twice as likely as low-scoring counterparts to participate in riots. The investigation offers little support for the "riots-as-protests" explanation of the disturbances. 1 Table, 7 Figures. M. Milburn.

AbstractVarious public administration jobs are described as "impossible," meaning that they have an unpopular or illegitimate client base, stakeholders have conflicting values, and leaders and their agency's mission are continually questioned. Although this framework is widely used, it has also become overgeneralized. The authors propose three theoretical extensions to understanding impossible jobs based on findings from a three‐year multimethod study of riot policing. First, a distinction can be drawn between impossible jobs and impossible tasks. Second, the relationship between impossible jobs and street‐level bureaucracy is clarified; the case of riot police shows that some street‐level bureaucrats face impossible tasks. Third, the authors show that the conceptualization of the client base has been overly static—in some situations, the client base fractures, or grows rapidly, and legitimacy can change in real time.

The popular notion that the Ur riots of the 1960's deprived racial integration of much of its support among whites in the US is examined by comparing att changes in areas with & without riots during each of the yrs 1963 to 1968. It was hyp'ed that any effect of riots would be strongest in areas closest to their occurrence. Data used are from 5 nationwide surveys carried out by the Nat'l Opinion Res Center. Findings offer no support for the notion of a "white backlash" as a result of Ur riots. As measured by the questions in the surveys examined, the trend toward increasing acceptance of integration in housing & Sch's continued. But there is evidence of a riot effect in places & times very close to riots. Although support for integration increased in riot areas immediately following disturbances, the magnitude of these increases was smaller than that found in similar non-riot areas for the same period & in riot areas during yrs in which no riot occurred there. The general trend toward greater a=ceptance of racial integration was neither halted nor reversed by heightened violence. 3 Tables. M. Maxfield.

A time-series analysis of individual level, perceptual data disconfirms the J-curve theory of the black urban riots (i.e., that they arise because a period of progress was followed by a sharp decline) and suggests that ambiguities surrounding black people's perceptions of their economic situation probably led to the frustration that culminated in urban violence.The methodological component of the research deals with such problems of relative deprivation-based research as: (1) the substitution of aggregate, objective-level indicators for perceptual theoretical concepts; (2) the correspondences between objective and perceptual data on both a point-by-point basis and across time-series patterns; (3) the empirical implications of failing to look at important subgroup distinctions; and (4) the crucial assumption of all forms of relative deprivation theory that future expectations of need fulfillment, especially in the period of rising satisfactions, are a function of current levels of need fulfillment. The research calls for modifications in the structure and application of relative deprivation theory in light of the findings in these areas.