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The present-day standard textbook narrative on the history of growth theory usually takes Robert Solow's 1956 contribution as a key starting point, which was extended by David Cass and Tjalling Koopmans in 1965 by introducing an intertemporal maximization problem that defines the saving ratio in the economy. However, the road connecting Solow to the Ramsey-Cass-Koopmans model is not so straightforward. We argue that in order to understand Koopmans's contribution, we have to go to the activity analysis literature that started before Solow 1956 and never had him as a central reference. We stress the role played by Edmond Malinvaud, with whom Koopmans interacted closely, and take his travel from the French milieu of mathematical economics to the Cowles Commission in 1950-51 and back to France as a guiding line. The rise of turnpike theory in the end of the 1950s generated a debate on the choice criteria of growth programs, opposing the productive efficiency typical of these models to the utilitarian approach supported by Malinvaud and Koopmans. The Vatican Conference of 1963, where Koopmans presented a first version of his 1965 model, was embedded in this debate. We argue that Malinvaud's (and Koopmans's) contributions were crucial to steer the activity analysis literature toward a utilitarian analysis of growth paths.

AbstractFor a multidimensional criteria space to have an additive utility function, the strong condition of independence among the co‐ordinates (also known as separability) must be satisfied. However, if we are allowed to transform the criteria space into another, then a theorem due to Kolmogorov implies that we can, even in the absence of independence, transform the space into one that has a continuous additive utility function. Since this transformation is complex, it has only theoretical significance. However, certain related results from neurocomputing theory are quite practical and signify that there exists some scope for neurocomputing in multi‐criteria decision analysis.

This book reflects the challenges in utility industries and provides solutions from a managerial perspective. It features insights from managers, researchers, professionals in utility-related banking, consulting, and public and supranational organizations.

We present an analogy between joint cumulative probability distributions and a class of multiattribute utility functions, which we call attribute dominance utility functions. Attribute dominance utility functions permit assessing multiattribute utility functions using common techniques of joint probability assessment such as marginal-conditional assessments and the method of copulas. By itself, this class of utility functions appears in many cases of decision analysis practice. Furthermore, we show that many functional forms of multiattribute utility function can be decomposed into attribute dominance utility functions that are easier to elicit. We introduce the notion of utility inference analogous to Bayes' rule for probability inference and provide a graphic representation of attribute dominance utility functions, which we call utility diagrams.

Happiness and Utility brings together experts on utilitarianism to explore the concept of happiness within the utilitarian tradition, situating it in earlier eighteenth-century thinkers and working through some of its developments at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries. Drawing on a range of philosophical and historical approaches to the study of the central idea of utilitarianism, the chapters provide a rich set of insights into a founding component of ethics and modern political and economic thought, as well as political and economic practice. In doing so, the chapters examine the multiple dimensions of utilitarianism and the contested interpretations of this standard for judgement in morality and public policy.

Originally published in 1967. In the past half-century, Utilitarianism has fallen out of favor among professional philosophers, except in such "amended" forms as "Ideal" and "Rule" Utilitarianism. Professor Narveson contends that amendments and qualifications are unnecessary and misguided, and that a careful interpretation and application of the original theory, as advocated by Bentham, the Mills, and Sidgwick, obviates any need for modification. Drawing on the analytical work of such influential recent thinkers as Stevenson, Toulmin, Hare, Nowell-Smith, and Baier, the author attempts to draw a more careful and detailed picture than has previously been offered of the logical status and workings of the Principle of Utility. He then turns to the traditional objections to the theory as developed by such respected thinkers as Ross, Frankena, Hart, and Rawls and attempts to show how Utilitarianism can account for our undoubted obligations in the areas of punishment, promising, distributive justice, and the other principal moral convictions of mankind. He contends that the Principle of Utility implies whatever is recognized to be clearly true in these convictions and that it leaves room to doubt whatever is doubtful in them. Narveson concludes with a rationally forceful proof of the Principle of Utility. In the course of this argument, which draws on the most widely accepted recent findings in analytical ethics, Narveson discovers an essential identity between the ethical outlooks of Kant and of Mill, which are traditionally held to be antithetical. Both thinkers, he shows, center on the principle that the interests of others are to be regarded as equal in value to one's own. A new view of Mill's celebrated "proof of utilitarianism" is developed in the course of the discussion.

Auctions are considered with a (non-symmetric) independent-private-value model of valuations. It shall be demonstrated that a utility equivalence principle holds for an agent if and only if she has constant absolute risk aversion.

AbstractIn expected utility many results have been derived that give necessary and/or sufficient conditions for a multivariate utility function to be decomposable into lower‐dimensional functions. In particular, multilinear, multiplicative and additive decompositions have been widely discussed. These utility functions can be more easily assessed in practical situations.In this paper we present a theory of decomposition in the context of nonadditive expected utility such as anticipated utility or Choquet expected utility. We show that many of the results used in conventional expected utility carry over to these more general frameworks.If preferences over lotteries depend only on the marginal probability distributions, then in expected utility the utility function is additively decomposable. We show that in anticipated utility the marginality condition implies not only that the utility function is additively decomposable but also that the distortion function is the identity function. We further demonstrate that a decision maker who is bivariate risk neutral has a utility function that is additively decomposable and a distortion function q for which q(½) = ½.

AbstractThe construction of a multiattribute utility function is significantly simplified if it is possible to decompose the function into lower‐order utility assessments. When every attribute is utility independent of its complement, we have a powerful property that reduces the functional form into a multilinear combination of single‐attribute functions. We propose a natural extension to the multilinear form requiring the milder set of independence conditions: every attribute is utility independent of a subset of the attributes in its complement. We introduce a graph, which we call the bidirectional utility diagram, to facilitate the elicitation of these utility independence conditions. We also define a class of bidirectional diagrams, which we refer to as the canonical form. We show how this canonical representation leads to tractable functional forms of utility functions that may appeal to the decision analyst and can be used in practice. We also discuss situations where a canonical form does not exist. We then present an iterative approach to determine the lower‐order utility assessments that are required for a given set of utility independence assertions. We conclude with some extensions of this graph‐based approach to independence relations of the form: a subset of the attributes is utility independent of another subset. Copyright © 2010 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.