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We examine the consequences of vote buying, assuming this practice were allowed and free of stigma. Two parties competing in a binary election may purchase votes in a sequential bidding game via up-front binding payments and/or campaign promises (platforms) that are contingent upon the outcome of the election. We analyze the role of the parties' budget constraints and voter preferences. For instance, if only campaign promises are allowed, then the winning party depends not only on the relative size of the budgets, but also on the excess support of the party with the a priori majority, where the excess support is measured in terms of the (minimal) total utility of supporting voters who are in excess of the majority needed to win. If up front vote buying is permitted, and voters care directly about how they vote (as a legislator would), then the determination of the winning party depends on a weighted comparison of the two parties' budgets plus half of the total utility of their supporting voters. These results suggest that vote buying can lead to an inefficient party winning in equilibrium. We find that under some circumstances, if parties budgets are raised through donations, then vote buying can be efficient. Finally, we provide some results on vote buying in the face of uncertainty.

This study investigates the concept of vote buying, with a particular focus on its usage in research on clientelism. Vote buying is often poorly defined. Such conceptual ambiguity may distort descriptive findings and threaten the validity of causal claims. Qualitative analysis suggests that researchers often employ the concept of vote buying differently, and regressions from Nigeria and Mexico suggest that using alternative definitions can yield divergent empirical results. This diverse usage also poses the risk of conceptual stretching, because scholars often use vote buying to describe other phenomena. To improve future research, analysts should pay close attention to the conceptualization of vote buying. [Copyright Elsevier Ltd.]

While vote-buying is common, little is known about how politicians determine who to target. We argue that vote-buying can be sustained by an internalized norm of reciprocity. Receiving money engenders feelings of obligation. Combining survey data on vote-buying with an experiment-based measure of reciprocity, we show that politicians target reciprocal individuals. Overall, our findings highlight the importance of social preferences in determining political behavior.

Vote-buying is widely used by parties in developing countries to influence the outcome of elections. We examine the impact of vote-buying on growth. We consider a model with a poverty trap where redistribution can promote growth. We show that vote-buying contributes to the persistence of poverty as taxed wealthy people buy votes from poor people. We then show that there exists a democratic constitution that breaks vote buying and promotes growth. Such a constitution involves rotating agenda setting, a taxpayer-protection rule and repeated voting. The latter rule makes vote buying prohibitively costly.

"While vote-buying is common, little is known about how politicians determine who to target. We argue that vote-buying can be sustained by an internalized norm of reciprocity. Receiving money engenders feelings of obligation. Combining survey data on vote-buying with an experiment-based measure of reciprocity, we show that politicians target reciprocal individuals. Overall, our findings highlight the importance of social preferences in determining political behavior"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site

AbstractVote buying is a form of political clientelism involving pre-electoral transfers of money or material benefits from candidates to voters. Despite the presence of secret ballots, vote buying remains a pervasive phenomenon during elections in developing countries. While prior literature has focused on how vote buying is enforced by parties and political candidates and which types of voters are most likely targeted, we know much less about the behavioral spillover effects of vote buying on citizens' demand for redistribution and contributions to the provision of public goods. In this paper, we provide evidence on how vote buying causally affects voters' candidate choice, support for redistribution, and public goods provision. Using data from a laboratory experiment in Kenya, we find that vote buying is a double-edged sword for candidates using clientelist strategies: it attracts votes from those who were offered money and accepted it, but it also leads to negative reactions from those who rejected the offer as well as those who were not offered money. In line with its effect on voting behavior, vote buying has negative effects on subjects' evaluations of the vote-buying candidate. Vote buying significantly reduces individuals' stated preferences for more government spending on police and law enforcement—yet, surprisingly, not on other welfare areas such as unemployment benefits or health. We also find that open ballots—but not vote-buying campaigns—reduce individuals' willingness to contribute to public goods provisions.

AbstractThis article examines ambivalence—the simultaneous holding of two or more conflicting values or beliefs about a political issue—among Indonesian citizens' attitudes about vote buying. Using an original survey taken during the 2014 Indonesian elections, we analyse the factors related both to citizens' normative views about vote buying and their willingness to accept gifts from candidates. A large number of citizens demonstrate ambivalence by viewing the practice as unjustified or corrupt and yet expressing willingness to accept money from candidates. We also examine the differential effects of education and income on these attitudes. Consistent with "demand side" theories of vote buying, low income creates economic pressure to accept money but does not influence normative attitudes about vote buying. Education, however, has a broader effect by influencing both normative attitudes and willingness to accept money. We consider implications of these results for Indonesian officials focused on reducing vote-buying behavior.

Vote buying in elections, both general elections and local elections is a phenomenon in Indonesian politics. Lampung Province has implemented direct elections simultaneously in December 2015 and February 2017. This study explains that vote buying can change voter choice in three regional head elections in Lampung Province. This study was conducted with the object of research residing in Way Kanan District on July 2014, Pringsewu District on February 2016 and Bandar Lampung City on November 2015. This study used a survey approach, using stratified random sampling method. The survey conducted on 662 respondents in each county or district and city object being studied. The results show that voters believe that vote buying will happen in local elections.Voters may be influenced their choice if given relief goods, gifts of money or the provision of project. The thesis in this study is vote buying can change voting choice of voters.

How does the presence of a large group of remittance recipients in the electorate affect the way
political parties in Latin America plan their vote-buying operations during electoral campaigns?
Existing research claims that remittances bolster the political autonomy of recipients, allowing
them to escape clientelistic networks and making them less attractive targets from the point of view
of party machines. Although in the long run remittances may undermine the effectiveness of
clientelistic inducements, parties still have strong incentives to distribute gifts and favors among
these voters. Cross-national survey evidence and an original list experiment fielded in the
aftermath of El Salvador's 2014 presidential race support the view that remittances alter key
attitudes and patterns of political behavior among recipients in ways that are relevant for the
electoral strategies of party machines. In particular, remittance recipients are appealing targets
for clientelistic exchanges due to the uncertainty of their turnout propensity and their
distributive preferences.