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Working paper
Vote-buying and reciprocity
In: NBER working paper series 17411
"While vote-buying is common, little is known about how politicians determine who to target. We argue that vote-buying can be sustained by an internalized norm of reciprocity. Receiving money engenders feelings of obligation. Combining survey data on vote-buying with an experiment-based measure of reciprocity, we show that politicians target reciprocal individuals. Overall, our findings highlight the importance of social preferences in determining political behavior"--National Bureau of Economic Research web site
Vote buying and redistribution
In: Public choice, Band 193, Heft 3-4, S. 315-344
ISSN: 1573-7101
AbstractVote buying is a form of political clientelism involving pre-electoral transfers of money or material benefits from candidates to voters. Despite the presence of secret ballots, vote buying remains a pervasive phenomenon during elections in developing countries. While prior literature has focused on how vote buying is enforced by parties and political candidates and which types of voters are most likely targeted, we know much less about the behavioral spillover effects of vote buying on citizens' demand for redistribution and contributions to the provision of public goods. In this paper, we provide evidence on how vote buying causally affects voters' candidate choice, support for redistribution, and public goods provision. Using data from a laboratory experiment in Kenya, we find that vote buying is a double-edged sword for candidates using clientelist strategies: it attracts votes from those who were offered money and accepted it, but it also leads to negative reactions from those who rejected the offer as well as those who were not offered money. In line with its effect on voting behavior, vote buying has negative effects on subjects' evaluations of the vote-buying candidate. Vote buying significantly reduces individuals' stated preferences for more government spending on police and law enforcement—yet, surprisingly, not on other welfare areas such as unemployment benefits or health. We also find that open ballots—but not vote-buying campaigns—reduce individuals' willingness to contribute to public goods provisions.
Vote-Buying and Growth
In: CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research at ETH Zurich, Working Paper No. 08/94
SSRN
Working paper
Electoral Clientelism and Vote Buying
In: Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics
"Electoral Clientelism and Vote Buying" published on by Oxford University Press.
CONSISTENCY AND VOTE BUYING: INCOME, EDUCATION, AND ATTITUDES ABOUT VOTE BUYING IN INDONESIA
In: Journal of east Asian studies, Band 17, Heft 3, S. 313-329
ISSN: 2234-6643
AbstractThis article examines ambivalence—the simultaneous holding of two or more conflicting values or beliefs about a political issue—among Indonesian citizens' attitudes about vote buying. Using an original survey taken during the 2014 Indonesian elections, we analyse the factors related both to citizens' normative views about vote buying and their willingness to accept gifts from candidates. A large number of citizens demonstrate ambivalence by viewing the practice as unjustified or corrupt and yet expressing willingness to accept money from candidates. We also examine the differential effects of education and income on these attitudes. Consistent with "demand side" theories of vote buying, low income creates economic pressure to accept money but does not influence normative attitudes about vote buying. Education, however, has a broader effect by influencing both normative attitudes and willingness to accept money. We consider implications of these results for Indonesian officials focused on reducing vote-buying behavior.
Vote Buying In Lampung Local Election
Vote buying in elections, both general elections and local elections is a phenomenon in Indonesian politics. Lampung Province has implemented direct elections simultaneously in December 2015 and February 2017. This study explains that vote buying can change voter choice in three regional head elections in Lampung Province. This study was conducted with the object of research residing in Way Kanan District on July 2014, Pringsewu District on February 2016 and Bandar Lampung City on November 2015. This study used a survey approach, using stratified random sampling method. The survey conducted on 662 respondents in each county or district and city object being studied. The results show that voters believe that vote buying will happen in local elections.Voters may be influenced their choice if given relief goods, gifts of money or the provision of project. The thesis in this study is vote buying can change voting choice of voters.
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Remittances and Vote Buying
In: Latin American research review, Band 53, Heft 4, S. 689-707
ISSN: 1542-4278
How does the presence of a large group of remittance recipients in the electorate affect the way
political parties in Latin America plan their vote-buying operations during electoral campaigns?
Existing research claims that remittances bolster the political autonomy of recipients, allowing
them to escape clientelistic networks and making them less attractive targets from the point of view
of party machines. Although in the long run remittances may undermine the effectiveness of
clientelistic inducements, parties still have strong incentives to distribute gifts and favors among
these voters. Cross-national survey evidence and an original list experiment fielded in the
aftermath of El Salvador's 2014 presidential race support the view that remittances alter key
attitudes and patterns of political behavior among recipients in ways that are relevant for the
electoral strategies of party machines. In particular, remittance recipients are appealing targets
for clientelistic exchanges due to the uncertainty of their turnout propensity and their
distributive preferences.
Remittances and vote buying
How does the presence of a large group of remittance recipients in the electorate affect the way political parties in Latin America plan their vote-buying operations during electoral campaigns? Existing research claims that remittances bolster the political autonomy of recipients, allowing them to escape clientelistic networks and making them less attractive targets from the point of view of party machines. Although in the long run remittances may undermine the effectiveness of clientelistic inducements, parties still have strong incentives to distribute gifts and favors among these voters. Cross-national survey evidence and an original list experiment fielded in the aftermath of El Salvador's 2014 presidential race support the view that remittances alter key attitudes and patterns of political behavior among recipients in ways that are relevant for the electoral strategies of party machines. In particular, remittance recipients are appealing targets for clientelistic exchanges due to the uncertainty of their turnout propensity and their distributive preferences.
BASE
Remittances and vote buying
How does the presence of a large group of remittance recipients in the electorate affect the way political parties in Latin America plan their vote-buying operations during electoral campaigns? Existing research claims that remittances bolster the political autonomy of recipients, allowing them to escape clientelistic networks and making them less attractive targets from the point of view of party machines. Although in the long run remittances may undermine the effectiveness of clientelistic inducements, parties still have strong incentives to distribute gifts and favors among these voters. Cross-national survey evidence and an original list experiment fielded in the aftermath of El Salvador's 2014 presidential race support the view that remittances alter key attitudes and patterns of political behavior among recipients in ways that are relevant for the electoral strategies of party machines. In particular, remittance recipients are appealing targets for clientelistic exchanges due to the uncertainty of their turnout propensity and their distributive preferences.
BASE
Libya: Vote‐Buying Claims
In: Africa research bulletin. Political, social and cultural series, Band 58, Heft 3
ISSN: 1467-825X
SSRN
Working paper
Vote Buying and Voter Preferences
In: Social theory and practice: an international and interdisciplinary journal of social philosophy, Band 43, Heft 1, S. 107-124
ISSN: 2154-123X
Vote Buying: General Elections
In: Journal of political economy, Band 116, Heft 2, S. 351-380
ISSN: 1537-534X
Incumbent Advantage, Voter Information and Vote Buying
Results from a new experiment shed light on the effects of voter information on vote buying and incumbent advantage. The treatment provided voters with information about a major spending program and the proposed allocations and promises of mayoral candidates just prior to municipal elections. It left voters more knowledgeable about candidates' proposed policies and increased the salience of spending, but did not affect vote shares and turnout. Treated voters were more likely to be targeted for vote buying. We develop a model of vote buying that accounts for these results. The information raised voter expectations regarding incumbent performance, especially in incumbent strongholds. Incumbents increased vote buying in response. Consistent with this explanation, both knowledge and vote buying impacts were higher in mu-nicipalities with dominant incumbents. Our findings show that, in a political environment where vote buying is the currency of electoral mobilization, incumbent efforts to increase voter welfare may take the form of greater vote buying.
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