Institutional performance and vote buying in India
In: Studies in comparative international development: SCID, Band 53, Heft 1, S. 90-110
ISSN: 1936-6167
790 Ergebnisse
Sortierung:
In: Studies in comparative international development: SCID, Band 53, Heft 1, S. 90-110
ISSN: 1936-6167
World Affairs Online
In: Studies in comparative international development: SCID, Band 53, Heft 1, S. 90-110
ISSN: 1936-6167
In: Public choice, Band 65, Heft 3
ISSN: 1573-7101
In: A – One- Day Public Hearing on Vote Buying and Improving Electoral Processes in Nigeria, December 10, 2018
SSRN
Working paper
In: Journal of public administration, finance and law, Heft 20, S. 79-129
ISSN: 2285-3499
In: Working Paper Series No. 3, Band Institute
SSRN
Working paper
SSRN
Working paper
In: The Journal of Theoretical Politics
SSRN
In: Public choice, Band 65, Heft 3, S. 281, 287
ISSN: 0048-5829
In: Electoral Studies, Band 27, Heft 4
Vote buying and political intimidation are characteristic dimensions of African election campaigns. According to survey-based estimates, almost one out of five Nigerians is personally exposed to vote buying and almost one in ten experiences threats of electoral violence. But when, as commonly happens, campaign irregularities are targeted at the rural poor, effects are concentrated. These effects are as follows: violence reduces turnout; and vote buying enhances partisan loyalty. But, perhaps because most citizens condemn campaign manipulation as wrong, compliance with the wishes of politicians is not assured. Defection from threats and agreements is more common than compliance, especially where voters are cross-pressured from both sides of the partisan divide. [Copyright 2008 Elsevier Ltd.]
In: Electoral Studies, Band 27, Heft 4, S. 621-632
Vote buying and political intimidation are characteristic dimensions of African election campaigns. According to survey-based estimates, almost one out of five Nigerians is personally exposed to vote buying and almost one in ten experiences threats of electoral violence. But when, as commonly happens, campaign irregularities are targeted at the rural poor, effects are concentrated. These effects are as follows: violence reduces turnout; and vote buying enhances partisan loyalty. But, perhaps because most citizens condemn campaign manipulation as wrong, compliance with the wishes of politicians is not assured. Defection from threats and agreements is more common than compliance, especially where voters are cross-pressured from both sides of the partisan divide. [Copyright 2008 Elsevier Ltd.]
In: American journal of political science, Band 60, Heft 2, S. 436-455
ISSN: 1540-5907
Studies of clientelism typically assume that political machines distribute rewards to persuade or mobilize the existing electorate. We argue that rewards not only influence actions of the electorate, but can also shape its composition. Across the world, machines employ "voter buying" to import outsiders into their districts. Voter buying demonstrates how clientelism can underpin electoral fraud, and it offers an explanation of why machines deliver rewards when they cannot monitor vote choices. Our analyses suggest that voter buying dramatically influences municipal elections in Brazil. A regression discontinuity design suggests that voter audits—which undermined voter buying—decreased the electorate by 12 percentage points and reduced the likelihood of mayoral reelection by 18 percentage points. Consistent with voter buying, these effects are significantly greater in municipalities with large voter inflows, and where neighboring municipalities had large voter outflows. Findings are robust to an alternative research design using a different data set.
Studies of clientelism typically assume that political machines distribute rewards to persuade or mobilize the existing electorate. We argue that rewards not only influence actions of the electorate, but can also shape its composition. Across the world, machines employ "voter buying" to import outsiders into their districts. Voter buying demonstrates how clientelism can underpin electoral fraud, and it offers an explanation of why machines deliver rewards when they cannot monitor vote choices. Our analyses suggest that voter buying dramatically influences municipal elections in Brazil. A regression discontinuity design suggests that voter audits—which undermined voter buying—decreased the electorate by 12 percentage points and reduced the likelihood of mayoral reelection by 18 percentage points. Consistent with voter buying, these effects are significantly greater in municipalities with large voter inflows, and where neighboring municipalities had large voter outflows. Findings are robust to an alternative research design using a different data set.
BASE
In: Latin American politics and society, Band 65, Heft 3, S. 1-19
ISSN: 1548-2456
ABSTRACTElectoral contests in Latin America are often characterized by attempts by political parties to sway the outcome of elections using vote buying—a practice that seems to persist during elections throughout the region. This article examines how clientelist parties' use of vote buying is jointly shaped by two voter traits: poverty and partisanship. We hypothesize that clientelist parties pursue a mixed strategy, broadly targeting their core voters but also poor swing voters. While most of the existing evidence comes from single-country studies, this study adds cross-national evidence from multilevel regressions of survey data from 22 Latin American countries. Empirically, we find that poverty matters mainly for swing voters. For partisans, the effect of poverty on vote buying is weaker. These results suggest that poverty plays an important role in vote-buying strategies—but also that partisanship moderates clientelistic parties' vote-buying strategies during electoral campaigns.
In: Corporate governance: an international review, Band 15, Heft 5, S. 969-978
ISSN: 1467-8683
Corporate vote‐buying has received significant attention in the last decade, in several legal cases that illustrate the fine line between legitimate use of vote harnessing as a useful corporate strategic tool on one hand, and its negative connotations as a potential instrument of fraud that attempts to disfranchise shareholders on the other hand. After a brief outline of the legal history of corporate vote‐buying and the rationale for the courts' vigilance on this practice, in both the United States and the United Kingdom, we outline some strategic reasons for vote‐buying that might make it a useful option in certain circumstances. Lastly we discuss key principles that a board of directors should bear in mind when engaging in corporate vote‐buying, so that it can employ the practice productively and legitimately, keeping in mind shareholders' best interests and avoiding potentially costly and destructive legal challenges.