Suchergebnisse

ObjectiveThis article evaluates the voting experience in the first election using cumulative voting for the Board of Trustees in Port Chester, New York. A growing number of local jurisdictions in the United States are using cumulative voting for multimember elections. While the Port Chester election included some other new features in addition to cumulative voting, the village implemented an extensive voter education program to prepare voters and candidates for the election.MethodsWe conducted an exit poll of 1,946 Port Chester voters in June 2010, more than half of the voters in the local election. We used a variety of survey questions to measure voting experience and voting behavior. We also examined election returns for Port Chester, including the 2010 and 2013 elections using cumulative voting.ResultsWe find that the voter education program helped inform residents about casting a ballot with cumulative voting. Port Chester voters, and Hispanic voters in particular, reported a positive experience in the 2010 election. A large majority of voters also indicated that they understood cumulative voting and cast all of the votes allotted to them. Finally, we find evidence of strategic use of cumulative voting in order to help elect a candidate of one's choice.ConclusionsOur results indicate that voters are capable of effectively participating in elections with cumulative voting. Communities that are weighing the adoption of cumulative voting for local elections should also be prepared to implement a parallel voter education effort.

A form of elitism undermines much writing on voter competence. The elitist move occurs when an author uses a self-serving worldview as the basis for evaluating voters. Such elitism is apparent in widely cited measures of "political knowledge" & in common claims about what voters should know. The elitist move typically limits the credibility & practical relevance of the analysis by leading writers to draw unreliable conclusions about voter competence. I propose a more constructive way of thinking about what voters know. Its chief virtue is its consistency with basic facts about the relationship between information & choice. Figures. Adapted from the source document.

A long research tradition in behavioral political science evaluates the performance of democracy by examining voter competence. This literature got its start arguing that voters' lack of information undermines a defense of democracy rooted in electoral accountability. A more recent literature deepens the debate, with some authors claiming that voters effectively use cues to substitute for information about candidates and policies, and other authors claiming that voters are insufficiently rational to do so. We argue that, regardless of its conclusions about voter competence, this literature's single-minded focus on voter behavior is misguided. We use a sequence of formal models to show that traditional intuitions are incomplete because they ignore the effect that changes in voter behavior have on the equilibrium behavior of politicians. When this strategic interaction is taken into account, increases in voter information or voter rationality sometimes make democratic performance better and sometimes make democratic performance worse. One simply cannot assess the implications of voter characteristics for democratic performance without also studying how those characteristics affect the behavior of politicians.

This study, based on the two-wave questionnaire data collected from legislative candidates in Iowa, attempts to test the "congratulation-rationalization effect," a highly provocative hypothesis that John Kingdon formulated regarding politicians' beliefs about voters. The hypothesis asserts that winning candidates tend to develop complimentary beliefs about voters while losing candidates tend to develop beliefs deprecating to voters. The results of analysis indicate, however, no significant difference between winners and losers in terms of the direction and magnitude of changes in their beliefs about voters, suggesting that the hypothesis is invalid. When the hypothesis is reformulated in terms of "dissonance states" rather than "election outcomes," the evidence is strongly supportive. Among winners, those who perceive a high degree of dissonance more than those who perceive little dissonance tend to change their beliefs about voters in a favorable direction. Conversely, among losers, those who perceive a high degree of dissonance more than those who perceive little dissonance tend to change their beliefs in an unfavorable direction. Therefore, the "congratulation-rationalization" hypothesis can be sustained only if cast in direct dissonance terms.