When disaffection on political parties and politicians is pervasive, most argue whether it could be possible, thanks to the Internet – and Information and Communication Technologies in general – forget the mainstream political system and let the citizenry express their own opinion, debate in virtual agorae and vote their representatives and policy choices directly. In other words, the claim is whether the actual intermediaries can be replaced by citizen networks or, in the limit, just be overridden.Our aim in the following lines is to (1) explain that some dire (socioeconomic) changes are actually taking place,(2) why these socioeconomic changes are taking place and (3) infer, from this, what conditions shall take place in the future for (4) another wave of changes to happen that could eventually a much acclaimed new (e-)democracy. In a last section, we will discuss that despite lack of data, the trend seems to be just in the direction of the impoverishment of democracy, partly due to the weakening of political institutions.
Summary:1. COMPETENT BODIES TO DECIDE THE PROCESS OF SINGLE READING. 1.1 The competences of the Table and the limits of the enabling circumstances. 1.2 The procedural conditions of the decision of the Full House. 2. THE PROCEDURAL MOMENT OF THE DECISION TO OPT FOR A SINGLE READING: AN ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL. 3. HOW TO MAKE THE DECISION TO PROCEED WITH SINGLE READING. 3.1 The value of parliamentary precedent. 3.2 The dichotomy simple majority vs reinforced majority. 4. CONCLUSIONS. 5. Bibliography.AbstractThe article 150 of the Rules of Congress of Deputies establishes that, if proposed by the Table of the House, and once heard by the all Party Assembly, the Full House can agree to process an initiative directly and in a single reading. We will also analyse, on one hand, whether the option to choose this abbreviated legal channel is simply a political judgement which the Full House should adopt, and thus comply or not with the task which the Parliamentary Rules has entrusted to the Table of the House. On the other hand we will study whether the Full House can finally decide to process a particular initiative through this legal channel or if the previous proposal to the Table of the House is necessary, and whether this governmental body should comply -with the production of a strictly techno/juridical judgement- to the proposals established by juridical order for the processing of a legislative initiative using the procedure of a single reading. For this reason we will study whether the proposal for process by single reading by the Table is obligatory or not, even in the case in which after being seen by the all Party Assembly it is verified that the Plenary will vote in majority in favour of implementing this abbreviated legislative procedure. Also, we will undertake a detailed analysis of the procedural moment in which the process of an initiative with a single reading should be decided, and thus present alternative solutions which, to our judgement, are more appropriate and compatible with the current Parliamentary Rules. Finally, we will undertake an exhaustive examination of the value acquired by the parliamentary precedent in this type of abbreviated legislative procedure and show the level of relevance reached by the existing dichotomy between simple and absolute parliamentary majorities with respect to decision making relative to the adoption of this legal channel. ; El artículo 150 del Reglamento del Congreso de los Diputados establece que, cuando la naturaleza de un proyecto o proposición de ley tomada en consideración lo aconseje o la simplicidad de su formulación lo permita, el Pleno de la Cámara, a propuesta de la Mesa, oída la Junta de Portavoces, podrá acordar que se tramite directamente y en lectura única. En este trabajo se analiza, de una parte, si la decisión de optar por este cauce procesal abreviado es un juicio meramente político que debe adoptar el órgano plenario y, si al hacerlo de ese modo, se está dando cumplimiento o no al cometido que el Reglamento Parlamentario encomienda a la Mesa de la Cámara. Concretamente, examinamos si para que el Pleno pueda finalmente decidir que la tramitación de una concreta iniciativa sea a través de esta vía procesal extraordinaria es inexcusable la propuesta previa de la Mesa de la Cámara y si este órgano de gobierno puede y debe revisar la concurrencia de los presupuestos habilitantes previstos por el Reglamento Parlamentario antes de hacer la propuesta. Proponemos al respecto una reinterpretación del alcance de esta facultad de la Mesa separándonos del criterio doctrinal mayoritario. Asimismo, acometemos un análisis detallado de la fase del procedimiento en la que se debe decidir la tramitación de una iniciativa por el procedimiento en lectura única para, seguidamente, plantear aquellas soluciones alternativas que, en nuestro criterio, resultan más oportunas y compatibles con la actual redacción del Reglamento Parlamentario. Finalmente se analiza si la decisión que adopta cada una de las Cámaras acerca de la tramitación de una iniciativa legislativa por esta vía procesal abreviada en un determinado momento y ante la concurrencia de unas concretas circunstancias vincula o no a la otra Cámara con respecto a esa misma iniciativa. Estudiaremos, asimismo, el valor que adquiere el precedente parlamentario en relación a otras iniciativas de similar condición y pondremos de manifiesto la relevancia que alcanza la dicotomía existente entre mayorías simples y reforzadas con respecto a la toma de decisiones relativas a la adopción de este cauce procesal extraordinario.
Issue ownership theory argues that when a voter considers a party to be the most competent amongst others to deal with an issue (that is, the party 'owns' the issue), chances are the voter will vote for that party. Recent work has shown that perceptions of issue ownership are dynamic: they are affected by the media coverage of party messages. However, based on the broad literature on partisan bias, we predict that parties' efforts to change issue ownership perceptions will have a difficult time breaching the perceptual screen created by a voter's party preference. Using two separate experiments with a similar design we show that the effect of partisan issue messages on issue competence is moderated by party preference. The effect of issue messages is reinforced when people already like a party, and blocked when people dislike a party. Adapted from the source document.
In spatial models of political competition in democracies, citizens vote for the party or candidate that is the closest to their own ideological position, while in valence models, voters decide on the basis of non-policy factors, such as competence. What remains unclear, however, is whether citizens in authoritarian regimes use spatial or valence considerations to guide their decisions to participate in politics. This study uses data from the 2015 Chinese Urban Governance Survey to measure the ideology of Chinese citizens, and estimates an empirical stochastic model to explore how Chinese citizens use ideological distance and valence to determine how they want to participate in politics. The results show that valence issues, such as perceived government competence, play a larger role in political participation than ideology.
There has been much talk of valence, consensus or competence politics but little theoretical explanation or empirical investigation of how this has arisen. In this article I argue that British political competition has become competence-based because the major parties and the electorate have converged on the dominant left–right dimension of British voting behaviour. As a result, commonly cited core vote explanations for party polarisation have only limited application. The electorate has converged on left–right issues, narrowing the policy space and the available positional strategies of political parties. A different pattern is found for the issue of Europe, and this is interpreted in light of possible causal mechanisms. The article offers a formal model for a rise in valence politics as parties and voters converge, and the implications are discussed for theories of party competition. I argue in favour of competence and salience-based theories of party strategy in place of a reliance on traditional spatial models.
In: Green , J 2007 , ' When voters and parties agree: Valence issues and party competition ' Political Studies , vol 55 , no. 3 , pp. 629-655 . DOI:10.1111/j.1467-9248.2007.00671.x
AbstractContrary to conventional wisdom, globalization strengthens the linkage between the economy (across-border benchmarked measures) and vote choice, thereby facilitating electoral accountability by enriching the information available to the public. In the pre-globalization era, ordinary citizens had difficulty assessing domestic economic conditions in a comparative setting, in part because they were less exposed to information concerning other countries' economic performance. However, globalization has provided citizens with excellent sources for comparisons in the form of media coverage. Moreover, openness results in a reduction in relative variance of exogenous rather than competence shocks. Using media-guided comparisons from 29 countries since the 1980s, this study finds that relative economic performance significantly affects citizens' vote choices when their economy is highly integrated into the world market.
Using questionnaire data from 11 European countries (N = approximately 300 respondents each) in 1989, the nature of issue evaluation & voting choice in national elections is examined. Comparative analyses reveal a similar pattern across nations with regard to lack of faith in political parties to address important issues. It is suggested that although vote choice correlates with the degree a party is perceived as competent, noncorrelated voting does not increase with political information or awareness. While the conclusions suggest that issue evaluation & vote choice can lack rational foundation, that is not sufficient reason to attribute voting outcome strictly to emotional factors. 8 Tables, 14 References. L. Baker
On August 18, 1972, the International Court of Justice delivered its Judgment in the Appeal Relating to the Jurisdiction of the ICAO Council (India v. Pakistan) in which:(a) By thirteen votes to three, it rejected Pakistan's objections on the question of its competence, and found that it had jurisdiction to entertain India's appeal from a series of decisions of the ICAO Council which had found that the Council had jurisdiction to entertain the application and complaint made before the Council by Pakistan on March 3, 1971, the details of the application and complaint being given below.(b) By fourteen votes to two, it held the ICAO Council to be competent to entertain the above-mentioned application and complaint.
Indonesia has been attempting to develope democratic political system throught the country. One among instruments to achieve this is through implementing direct vote. Direct vote is expected to be able to promote democratic local governance as well as prime public services. In implementation, direct vote should be conducted so as not to upset the ultimate goals of autonomy policy. This is due to some potential threats which may intervene, or even destroy the process. The threats are comprised of three forms: first, the transition state of local people toward democracy without reliable political structure and political figures; second, plural societies in terms of ethnics, race, languange and religion—this may trigger internal conflicts; and third, excessive political marketing – a local public figure may publicly be voted for his/her "engineered appeals" not for his/her competence. Despite these, if political societies are able to manage the three unfavorable environments wisely, the ultimate goals of local autonomy may eventually be achieved.
Indonesia has been attemping to develope democratic political system throught the country. One among instruments to achieve this is through implementing direct vote. Direct vote is expected to be able to promote democratic local governance as well as prime public service. In implementation, direct vote should be conducted so as not to upset the ultimate goals of autonomy policy. This is due some potential threats which may intervene, or even destroy the process. The threats are comprised of three forms: fisrt, the transition state of local people toward democracy without reliable political structure and political figures; second, plural societies in terms of ethnics, race, languange and religion—yhis may trigger internal conflict; and third, excessive political marketing – a local public figure may publicly be voted for his/her "engineered appeals" not for his/her competence. Despite these, if political societies are able to manage the three unfavorable environments wisely, the ultimate goals of local autonomy may eventually be achieved.