Suchergebnisse

De senaste valen är det fler väljare som röstar på ett annat parti än det de gillar bäst, och ett skäl till detta kan vara strategi. I denna rapport analyseras förväntningar, olika strate­gi­ska skäl för röstning och väljarströmmar i riksdagsvalet 2018. Kristdemokraterna står fort­farande ut som ett parti som gynnas av strategisk röstning. En förklaring till detta års uppgång är ett lagom osäkert läge runt spärren i valkampanjens slutskede och fokus på regeringsskifte. Samtidigt var det få som "kastade bort" sina röster och vänster­blocket lyckades denna gång lyckades koordinera sina röster bättre än 2014. Analyserna tyder också på en förhållandevis stor grupp röstade strategiskt på Socialdemokraterna. I valet 2018 röstade 15 procent av väljarkåren på ett annat parti än de eller det parti de sade sig gilla bäst. ; Many Swedes vote for another party than the one he or she likes most, and one reason for this is strategic considerations. This report investigates voters' expectations, reasons to vote strategically and party support shifting in the 2018 Swedish general election. In line with the most recent elections, the small right-wing party Christian Democrats benefited from high shares of strategic votes. This behavior was associated with the party's clear focus on shifting government and having opinion poll levels just at the four percent electoral threshold. Relatively few "wasted" their votes on parties that did finally not reach the electoral threshold. In particular, left-wing voters managed to coordinate their votes better than in the previous election (2014). The analyses also indicate that a relatively large share voted strategically for the Social Democrats. In the 2018 Swedish General Election, 15 percent of the electorate voted for another party than the party or parties they said they preferred.

This study takes its starting -point in the Swedish referendum about a membership in the European monetary union. The purpose of the study is to explain the differences that became visible during the EMU-referendum, by thoroughly explore macro-factors & their importance to the voting against a membership at a municipal level. In earlier pursued research concerning voting behaviour & public opinion differences general explanations appear which work as an initial position for this study, the creation of three alternative explanation models & the macro factors to be tested. This study has a statistical design & its intention is to study macro-factors in the 290 municipals of Sweden through collecting material from several sources. The material has been compiled to analytical aggregate data & will be analysed through bivariate- & multivariate regressions. The result shows that the differences that became visible concerning the EMU-referendum can be explained from economic factors & economic structural differences between the municipals. Tables, Figures, References. Adapted from the source document.

In Sweden, there is a consensus that Swedish membership of substantial parts of the European Union (EU) entails cooperation that at least in parts implies supranationalism. Due to this consensus one may assume that there is also some sort of common understanding of the concept of supranationalism. However, while many researchers includes majority voting in their definition of supranationalism, this is rejected outright by others. As shown, both sides have a point and this article, therefore, suggests that three dimensions are noteworthy when it comes to supranationalism: (1) when states have transferred the right to exercise public power to an organization the states cannot make decisions alone, (2) the institution is autonomous and makes binding decisions, (3) the decisions taken by the institution have effective precedence over national ones. Adapted from the source document.

In 1973, the Swedish Centre party managed to attract 25.1 per cent of the votes in that year's election. A quarter of a century later the once agrarian party hovered precariously close to the four per cent election threshold. During the long & unbroken decline, the party was a member of the center-right bloc -- yet was intermittently drawn to the Social Democrats. Throughout, it retained a strong focus on countryside, agrarian & environmental issues (with a particular emphasis on the decommissioning of nuclear power plants). By the late 1990s it was clear that the party's electoral strategy needed an urgent & comprehensive overhaul. In this effort we analyze this overhaul (including a rejection of left-leaning tendencies); its structural antecedents; its intrinsic success potential; & its, & the party's, future prospects. Adapted from the source document.

The theory of social choice has recently benefited much from advances within the power index approach in game theory. One may start from the classical Wicksell framework of a unanimity regime & proceed to state the advantages of deviations from his model. A case can be stated for quantitative voting using some majority voting scheme, as it empowers the choice participants, also providing for blocking power. The power distinctions generated from the power index framework may be applied to the institutional evolution of the Council of Ministers with the EC or EU. It allows one to state in a concise manner the comparative advantages & disadvantages of alternative regimes for the European Community or Union. Tables, Figures, Appendixes, References. Adapted from the source document.

The municipal election of 1934 gave the Nazi party over 30 per cent of the votes in Tärendö municipality which led to six mandates in the municipal council and the chairmanship for the local Nazi politician. The Nazi party held its position as a municipal political force still until the end of Second World War with a popular vote of over 12 per cent in the election 1944 to the parliament. In comparison to other municipalities in the Swedish Tornio valley this was an exceptional political expression by the citizens. In the article we compare Tärendö toward Pajala from different perspectives of institutional, the mobilization of political movement and political leadership. The article tries to answer: how come that the Nazi party was successful in Tärendö but not in Pajala, despite the short distance and the cultural, social and market similarities between the two municipalities? The results show that institutional structure can only explain in margin the differences in Nazi voting. The main reason behind Nazi voting in Tärendö was the interaction between the mobilization of the political movements and the character of the local political leadership.

The literature highlights how climate change might challenge the definitions of wine geographical indications (GIs) in Europe. The central issue addressed in this thesis is whether European GI viticultural systems could tackle climate change via initiating adaptive institutional change processes to relax the constraints imposed by GI production standards. To do so, drawing from institutional economics theory and literature on cooperatives and collective brand, we developed a novel agent-based model (ABM) representing an abstract GI wine production system in the European Union (EU). Using illustrative data, our model allows testing different impact scenarios driven by climate change, spatial heterogeneity, and alternative institutional settings (i.e., voting mechanism). We used the model to explore individual and collective components of climate resilience and the relationship between economic agents and their environment. We compared the average output of 100 simulations for each of the 12 different climate-landscape-institution scenarios. The inclusion of endogenous institutional change led to considerable variations in all target variables, including the emergence of complex/chaotic behaviours. It enabled the system to reduce farm exits, increase profitability and collective brand value. We showed how landscape heterogeneity has a twofold role in the climate resilience of the system. It increases individual adaptability but obstructs collective adaptive capacity through institutional change. The two different voting mechanisms considered (i.e., relative and absolute majority) did not produce any discernible result. The study highlights the importance of policies oriented to strengthening investments in intangibles and facilitating GI rule amendments, especially in sectors where cooperatives predominate due to poor intangible investments capability and other issues connected to member heterogeneity.

This article analyses how the Swedish sports movement's democratic processes – and democratic fostering mission – has been described in policies from the late 19th century until the beginning of the 21st century. The strong and long-standing rhetoric of the sports movement as a 'school in democracy' is the background for this analysis. I particularly draw attention to the club level of the sports movement and how democracy has been discussed in that context. The analysis draws on previous research and analyses, including data such as government reports, sport manifest declarations and magazines. Theoretically, I utilise Ahrne and Papakosta's resource mobilization theory, as applied to non-profit membership organizations. One of the article's main findings is that 'democracy' and 'popular movement' were concepts that the leading representatives of the sports movement failed to use in the late-1800s and up until the 1920s. This was related to the fact that many leaders in the Swedish sports movement were of a bourgeois background and were strongly skeptical about parliamentary democracy (including general and equal voting rights, which were implemented in Sweden in 1921). Later on, since the 1970s, there has been an emphasising of the importance of the democratic decision-making processes within the sports movement and its democratic fostering dimensions. In accordance with Ahrne's and Papakosta's resource mobilization theory, my analysis shows that by the early 21st century the sports movement's democratic institutions and processes had become a symbolic asset, and an effective tool in the struggle for Swedish democracy.

The constitutional development & the parliamentarianism in Sweden since 1970 can schematically be divided into two periods. The first period was 1970-1990. The second was initiated in 1990. 1970-1990 stands out as a 'classical' period to the new constitution with its unicameral system & exact proportional representation above a 4 per cent threshold. The formation of government was mainly based on blocs with sharp opposition, although in combination with negotiating parliamentarianism in the Riksdag. In their years of parliamentary majority, 1976-1982 & 1991-1994, the right-wing patties introduced considerable constitutional changes which the social democrats in opposing position accepted. From 1990 & onwards, it is above all the disrupting EU dimension which generates new constitutional changes concerning the politico-economic institutions. The European influence in legal matters is regulated, as are the EU-processes between government & parliament. Moreover, the electoral period is extended by one year & an element of personalized voting is introduced. Both the vote of censure & the instrument of consultative referendum attain a partially new constitutional character through the development of praxis. One can also identify a series of minority governments (right-wing 1991-1994 & social democratic since 1994) with prolonged partial coalitions grounded on different issues, & with all the parties of the Parliament involved in different areas. The EU dimension is central in this respect too. The constitutional changes, the new form of parliamentarianism & the EU processes strengthen the government. In this period too, questions can be raised regarding the role of the opposition in Swedish parliamentarianism. References. Adapted from the source document.