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1. Introduction -- An Introduction to the Analysis of Power, Voting, and Voting Power -- 2. The Idea of Power -- Power in Game Forms -- A Philosophical View of Power -- Power and Profit in Hierarchical Organizations -- Equivalent Concepts of Power in Voting Games -- Attribution and Social Power -- Power: An Amorphous Term — Diverse Conceptual Approaches -- 3. Formal Analysis of Representation and Voting Procedures -- Proportional Representation and Effective Number of Parties in Finland -- The Relationship Between Voting and Party Strength in an Electoral System -- Manipulation of the Agenda by Strategic Voting: Separable and Nonseparable Preferences -- Order-of-Voting Effects -- Strategic Voting in Multicandidate Elections under Uncertainty and under Risk -- Electoral Rules and Rational Voting: The Effects of Candidate Viability Perceptions on Voting Decisions -- 4. Concepts of Power Measurement -- The Problem of the Right Distribution of Voting Power -- An Axiomated Family of Power Indices for Simple n-Person Games -- Measuring Power in Voting Bodies: Linear Constraints, Spatial Analysis, and a Computer Program -- Modification of the Banzhaf-Coleman Index for Games with A Priori Unions -- Power and Satisfaction in an Ideologically Divided Voting Body -- Power in an Ideological Space -- Measuring Power -- 5. The Empirical Approach -- Party Power and Government Formation: A Case Study -- The Distribution of Power in Specific Decision-Making Bodies -- Political Geography and Political Power -- Regional Power Allocation: The Problem of British Devolution -- The Paradox of Redistribution: Some Theoretical and Empirical Results.

Offers a comprehensive and authoritative account of all aspects of voting in the United States.

Book Cover; Title; Contents; List of figures; List of tables; List of contributors; Series editor's preface; Preface; Acknowledgments; The context of economic voting: an introduction; Political institutions and economic voting; The cost of ruling: a foundation stone for two theories; The economy as context: indirect links between the economy and voters; Economics, politics, and the cost of ruling in advanced industrial democracies: how much does context matter?; Group economic voting: a comparison of the Netherlands and Germany; On a short leash: term limits and the economic voter.

This book presents a collection of papers illustrating the variety of "experimental" methodologies used to study voting. Experimental methods include laboratory experiments in the tradition of political psychology, laboratory experiments with monetary incentives, in the economic tradition, survey experiments (varying survey, question wording, framing or content), as well as various kinds of field experimentation. Topics include the behavior of voters (in particular turnout, vote choice, and strategic voting), the behavior of parties and candidates, and the comparison of electoral rules.--

Preface -- Contents -- Introduction -- 1 Part I: Processing Information About Candidates/Voting Correctly -- 2 Part II: Processing Information About How Others Voters Vote: Impact on the Decision to Vote or to Abstain -- 3 Part III: Processing Information About How Others Voters Vote: The Impact of Polls on Candidate Choice -- 4 Part IV: Methodological Debate and Innovations -- 5 The Future of Voting Experiments -- References -- Part I: Processing Information About Candidates/Voting Correctly -- Deciding Correctly: Variance in the Effective Use of Party Cues -- 1 Theoretical Perspectives

Cover -- Copyright Page -- Title Page -- Dedication -- Contents -- Preface -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- Basic Notation -- Social Choice -- Game Theory -- Game Forms are Voting Rules -- The Quest for Truthful Voting -- Strategyproofness and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem -- Voting Manipulations -- The Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem -- Frequency of Manipulation -- Group Manipulations -- Safe Manipulations -- Irresolute Social Choice Correspondences -- Exercises -- Regaining Truthfulness in Voting -- Domain Restriction -- Single-Peaked Preferences on a Line -- Other Single-Peak Domains -- Dichotomous Preferences -- Complexity Barriers -- Few Candidates and Coalitional Manipulations -- Randomized Voting Rules -- Gibbard's Characterization -- Stronger Impossibility Results -- Output Approximation -- Almost-Strategyproof Rules -- Approximation with Almost-Strategyproof Rules -- Differential Privacy -- Exercises -- Voting and Mechanism Design -- Payments -- The VCG Mechanism -- Range Voting -- Approximation by Randomized Voting Rules -- Facility Location -- Location in a General Metric Space -- Location on a Line -- Location on a Circle -- Other Variations -- Judgment Aggregation -- Formal Framework -- Incentives and Manipulation -- Exercises -- Voting Equilibrium Models -- Simultaneous Voting Games -- Desiderata for Voting Models -- Implementation -- Nash Implementation -- Strong Implementation -- Implementation in Undominated Strategies -- Other Notions of Implementation -- Fallback Strategies -- Truth Bias/Partial Honesty -- Laziness and the Paradox of Voting -- The ``Calculus of Voting'' -- The Expected Value of Voting -- Equilibrium Stability -- Social Networks -- Quantal Response Equilibrium -- Other Equilibrium Models -- Minimax Regret -- Robust Equilibrium -- Iterated Removal of Dominated Strategies -- Exercises.

This collection examines to what extents the economic situation is a decisive factor in dictating how people vote. The book combines theoretical work with empirical research and quantitative analysis.

One of the most actively growing subareas in multi-agent systems is computational social choice theory, which provides a theoretical foundation for preference aggregation and collective decision-making in multi-agent domains. It is concerned with the application of techniques developed in computer science, including complexity analysis and algorithm design, in the study of social choice mechanisms, such as voting. It seeks to import concepts from social choice theory into Artificial Intelligence and computing.People often have to reach a joint decision despite conflicting preferences over the alternatives. This joint decision can be reached by an informal negotiating process or by a carefully specified protocol. Over the course of the past decade or so, computer scientists have also become deeply involved in this study. Within computer science, there is a number of settings where a decision must be made based on the conflicting preferences of multiple parties. The paradigms of computer science give a different and useful perspective on some of the classic problems in economics and related disciplines.A natural and very general approach for deciding among multiple alternatives is to vote on them. Voting is one of the most popular ways of reaching common decisions. As such, the study of elections is an area where fields such as computer science, economics, business, operations research, and political science can be brought together. Social choice theory deals with voting scenarios, in which a set of individuals must select an outcome from a set of alternatives.This book focuses on convergence to pure strategy Nash equilibria in plurality voting games and a number of other positional and non-positional scoring rules. In such games, the voters strategically choose a candidate to vote for, and the winner is determined by the plurality (or other)