Suchergebnisse

Prepared under contract/grant no. FE6AC011 by authority of and for the Federal Election Commission, Clearinghouse on Election Administration. ; "PB-270 727, PB-270 728, PB-270 729." ; May 1977. ; Cover title. ; v. 1. Recommended procurement procedures and a review of current equipment.--v. 2. A summary of state voting equipment laws.--v. 3. A guide for legislative drafting. ; Mode of access: Internet.

This paper reconsiders the division of the literature on electoral competition into models with forward-looking voters and those with backward-looking voters by combining ideas from both strands of the literature. As long as there is no uncertainty about voters' policy preferences and parties can commit in advance to a policy platform but not to a maximal level of rent extraction, voters can limit rents to the same extent as in a purely backward-looking model. At the same time, the policy preferred by the median voter is implemented as in a standard forward-looking model of political competition on an ideological policy dimension. Voters achieve this outcome by following a simple lexicographic voting strategy. They cast their vote in favor of their preferred policy position, but make their vote dependent on the in-cumbent parties' performance in office whenever they are indifferent. When uncertainty about the bliss point of the median voter is introduced into the model, voters have to accept higher rent payments, but they still retain some control over rent extraction.

Book Cover; Title; Contents; List of figures; List of tables; List of contributors; Series editor's preface; Preface; Acknowledgments; The context of economic voting: an introduction; Political institutions and economic voting; The cost of ruling: a foundation stone for two theories; The economy as context: indirect links between the economy and voters; Economics, politics, and the cost of ruling in advanced industrial democracies: how much does context matter?; Group economic voting: a comparison of the Netherlands and Germany; On a short leash: term limits and the economic voter.

AbstractHomophily—the preference for people similar in their characteristics—is a strong determinant of many types of human relationships. It affects, for example, whom we marry and potentially also whom we vote for. We use data on preferential voting from eight (1996–2021) Czech parliamentary elections matched with census and administrative data to identify the effect of homophily on voting behavior. The Czech system of preferential voting is well suited to an analysis of homophilic preferences, as it enables us to filter out preferences for political parties and focus solely on candidates' individual background characteristics. We identify the effect of homophily on a sample of 6,844,538 observations from small municipalities that are not likely to be affected by potential electoral list optimization. We find that a 1 % increase in the share of a municipality's population whose education level or age are the same as the candidate's increases the number of preferential votes the given candidate receives by 0.5% or 0.2% respectively. We also find evidence for strong geographical homophily as living in the municipality substantially increases the number of preferential votes a candidate receives.

The E-voting promises the possibility of convenient, easy and safe way to capture and count the votes in an election. The advancement in the mobile devices, wireless and web technologies given rise to the new application that will make the voting process very easy and efficient. This research project provides the specification and requirements for E-Voting using an Android platform. The authentication is done through the face recognition through the mobile camera application. In this method the voter has to register using the application and the face recognition will be provided once the registration is successful. The e-voting means the voting process in election by using electronic device. The android platform is used to develop an e-voting application. In the proposed method the concept of e-voting application is created using android.On scanning the face, the voter will be asked for the password. Once the authentication is done the voter is made to proceed with the voting process. The main purpose of implementing this concept is to increase the voting percentage. So that the voter is not required to visit the voting center to cast their vote and also to avoid fake voting.

The implications of Internet voting are explored with attention given to the meaning of voting & whether it is important for people to enter a physical, public space to vote. AZ's recent experiment with Internet voting raised questions as to whether it could be accomplished without fear of fraud & whether it increased voter participation, & these questions as well as arguments for & against Internet voting are discussed. It is concluded that the US is experiencing a shift from citizen participation in the public sphere to citizen existence within a "private world of culture consumption" (Habermas 1989 [1962]). The majority of the population unquestioningly accepts the news & products of the mass media, while elites make decisions behind closed doors. 13 References. L. A. Hoffman

What are good voting rules if voting is costly? We analyze this question for the case that an electorate chooses among two alternatives. In a symmetric private value model of voting we show that majority voting with voluntary participation Pareto-dominates majority voting with compulsory participation as well as random decision-making.

The literature on strategic voting has provided evidence that some electors support large parties at the voting booth to avoid wasting their vote on a preferred but uncompetitive smaller party. In this paper we argue that district conditions also elicit reactions from abstainers and other party voters. We find that, when ballot gains and losses from different types of responses to the constituency conditions are taken into account, large parties still benefit moderately from strategic behaviour, while small parties obtain substantial net ballot losses. This result stems from a model that allows for abstention in the choice set of voters, and uses counterfactual simulation to estimate the incidence of district conditions in the Spanish general elections of 2000 and 2008.

AbstractVoting Advice Applications (VAAs) have proliferated in the last decade as part of electoral campaigns in Europe. Several studies have linked the usage of the applications to an increase in voting intention, yet the literature on the factors that make people more likely to be influenced by VAAs is not really developed. This paper tries to contribute to this literature by addressing two key questions: first, how non-institutional forms of political participation influence abstentionism among VAA users and second, how VAA encourages voting intention among these politically engaged abstentionists (activation effect). We first examine (a) whether being engaged in non-institutional forms of participation increases the likelihood of a VAA user declaring him/herself to be a voter and (b) whether being engaged in non-institutional forms of political participation has an effect on the probability of becoming a "voter" after filling in the VAA questionnaire. Our results suggest that the VAA "activation effect" nexus exists and it affects a significant percentage of abstentionist. Those users that have participated in non-institutional forms of participation – such as demonstrations or online petitions – are more likely to declare being voters before filling in the VAA. Among the abstentionists, once they answered the set of 30 key questions, a considerable percent (between 14 and 22 percent depending on the threshold used) declared to have the intention to vote (activation effect). The prevailing profile of the activated user is a young man with tertiary education. The motivational reason for voting a party also matter in increasing the probability that an "activation effect" happens. The competency of the party, its ideology, the candidate presented by the party and the users' self-interest are also good predictors of the "activation effect."