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I conceptualize the informal outlines of a new voting system/mechanism that is more holistic and democratically just; the proposed alternative would incorporate (gender) quotas amongst other fundamental, important aspects. This conceptual outline seeks to resolve the primary (intellectual) obstacles for the adoption of quotas in their current form which, I contend, is their discordance with mainstream conceptions of democratic justice. More precisely, the conceptualized voting system/mechanism seeks to increase the sophistication of preference-specification in voting procedures (thereby presenting an alternative to the prevailing, privileged paradigm of geospatial-constituency representation). I do not present results in the conventional sense; no data was analysed, no experiments run, and no software implemented. A rationale is provided for why this proposed voting system/mechanism, in addition to potentially solving/tackling some problems identified by feminist scholarship, could also solve an even larger class of fundamental political and democratic problems related to intersectionality (e.g., race, ethnicity, income, class, caste, disability, sexuality, education, age, occupation etc.) through enhancing the translation, representation, and implementation of voters' interests. In terms of conclusions within the paper, they are largely intermediate conclusions as they relate to the investigation of problems as well as the informal conceptual outline of the proposed voting system/mechanism.

Disparities in voter turnout have increased significantly over the past four decades. Members of historically oppressed groups, those who are low-income, and or who have lower levels of education vote at significantly lower rates than white, wealthy and or more educated community members. These disparities correlate directly to political power and the eventual allocation of resources by elected officials. Therefore, eliminating these disparities through targeted voter engagement with client groups is particularly important for the profession of social work. This article describes the conceptualization of voter engagement as a three-legged stool, consisting of voter registration, regular voting, and basing voting decisions on self-interest. Without attention to all three legs, the potential for generating political power collapses, resulting in minimal influence on elected officials.

When considering the merits of deliberative democracy, it is important to look into the experience of the American jury system. The jury has demonstrated the potential for citizen deliberation to play a central role in longstanding governmental institutions, but it has also played an unrecognized role in promoting civic engagement. Building on previous research demonstrating how jury service spurs increased electoral participation after jury service, we present results from a three‐wave panel survey that show that a subjectively rewarding jury experience can spur broader civic engagement beyond voting. Given the value of the jury as both a model of deliberation and an engine of civic spirit, we consider the potential value of creating citizen juries to improve the initiative process, which currently lacks the citizen deliberation that is essential for any effective direct democratic processes.

A study of the 1962 Congressional election in the 5th district of Ga. C. Weltner, a `moderate' who supported J. F. Kennedy in the election, beat J. C. Davis, an old-line conservative segregationist in the Democratic primary run-off. Weltner's victory was - r'ed to Md educ, Md income, & ratio of managers to laborers in Fulton County, but +r'ed in DeKaIb County. In both counties, his election was + r'ed to the % of Negro vote. Lc white supported the conservative in the primary, but gave the moderate Democrat their vote when opposed by a conservative Republican in the general election. Hs whites appeared to support the moderate Democrat in the primary, more than the Lc whites, but this support was not manifest in the general election. While the relation of SE factors with voting is present, the relationship is weaker in the inter-party election, attesting to the impact of partisanship. G. Speal.

Showing up to cast a vote in an election in the United States in the 18th and 19th centuries was a very different experience from the one with which we are familiar today. The occasion of casting a vote was a celebratory one, often attended by much food and drink. Voting was also a public act. In some cases, it was a matter of providing a signature under a candidate's name, or vocally calling out one's support for a particular candidate. Voter intimidation, often involving acts of violence, was common. Even when votes were cast on paper ballots, the standard was that a voting process was fair when "a man of ordinary courage" could make it to the voting window. The rowdy and dangerous atmosphere involved in casting a vote was offered as a weighty reason that the right to vote should be denied to women. In fact, the practice of voting was so corrupt, that one theory explaining the mysterious death of Edgar Allen Poe was that he was the victim of "cooping"—the practice of kidnapping less fortunate (often homeless) members of society, getting them drunk, and forcing them to vote repeatedly for a particular candidate.

THE STUDY REEXAMINES SCHULMAN AND POMPER'S FINDINGS THAT THE AMERICAN ELECTORATE IS BECOMING INCREASINGLY ISSUE-ORIENTED IN THEIR VOTING BEHAVIOR. WHILE NOTING THAT ISSUE VOTING WAS ABNORMALLY HIGH IN THE '64 AND '72 ELECTIONS, THE AUTHORS CONFIRM THAT COMPARISON OF EFFECTS ON VOTER CHOICES OF ISSUES, PARTISANSHIP, AND CANDIDATE EVALUATIONS SHOWS THAT ISSUES HAVE BEEN GAINING IMPORTANCE.

This paper provides a general view about how especially vulnerable people are able to vote nowadays in Spain. It begins with a brief overview of the general regime governing voting in Spain & how votes are emitted. It then examines the normative guidelines affecting the vote for the disabled in more specific detail: access for voters with special mobility needs (direct or by post); special procedures of direct voting for disabled people unable to vote unaided; special procedures enabling the blind to use using braille so they can vote directly; & the special procedure for remote voting by persons whose disablement prevents them from personally filing the corresponding application. Finally, by way of conclusion the paper adds some critical considerations. References. Adapted from the source document.

Most electronic voting schemes aim at providing verifiability: voters should trust the result without having to rely on some authorities. Actually, even a prominent voting system like Helios cannot fully achieve verifiability since a dishonest bulletin board may add ballots. This problem is called ballot stuffing. In this paper we give a definition of verifiability in the computational model to account for a malicious bulletin board that may add ballots. Next, we provide a generic construction that transforms a voting scheme that is verifiable against an honest bulletin board and an honest registration authority (weak verifiability) into a verifiable voting scheme under the weaker trust assumption that the registration authority and the bulletin board are not simultaneously dishonest (strong verifiability). This construction simply adds a registration authority that sends private credentials to the voters, and publishes the corresponding public credentials. We further provide simple and natural criteria that imply weak verifiability. As an application of these criteria, we formally prove the latest variant of Helios by Bernhard, Pereira and Warinschi weakly verifiable. By applying our generic construction we obtain a Helios-like scheme that has ballot privacy and strong verifiability (and thus prevents ballot stuffing). The resulting voting scheme, Helios-C, retains the simplicity of Helios and has been implemented and tested.

Most electronic voting schemes aim at providing verifiability: voters should trust the result without having to rely on some authorities. Actually, even a prominent voting system like Helios cannot fully achieve verifiability since a dishonest bulletin board may add ballots. This problem is called ballot stuffing. In this paper we give a definition of verifiability in the computational model to account for a malicious bulletin board that may add ballots. Next, we provide a generic construction that transforms a voting scheme that is verifiable against an honest bulletin board and an honest registration authority (weak verifiability) into a verifiable voting scheme under the weaker trust assumption that the registration authority and the bulletin board are not simultaneously dishonest (strong verifiability). This construction simply adds a registration authority that sends private credentials to the voters, and publishes the corresponding public credentials. We further provide simple and natural criteria that imply weak verifiability. As an application of these criteria, we formally prove the latest variant of Helios by Bernhard, Pereira and Warinschi weakly verifiable. By applying our generic construction we obtain a Helios-like scheme that has ballot privacy and strong verifiability (and thus prevents ballot stuffing). The resulting voting scheme, Helios-C, retains the simplicity of Helios and has been implemented and tested.

Most electronic voting schemes aim at providing verifiability: voters should trust the result without having to rely on some authorities. Actually, even a prominent voting system like Helios cannot fully achieve verifiability since a dishonest bulletin board may add ballots. This problem is called ballot stuffing. In this paper we give a definition of verifiability in the computational model to account for a malicious bulletin board that may add ballots. Next, we provide a generic construction that transforms a voting scheme that is verifiable against an honest bulletin board and an honest registration authority (weak verifiability) into a verifiable voting scheme under the weaker trust assumption that the registration authority and the bulletin board are not simultaneously dishonest (strong verifiability). This construction simply adds a registration authority that sends private credentials to the voters, and publishes the corresponding public credentials. We further provide simple and natural criteria that imply weak verifiability. As an application of these criteria, we formally prove the latest variant of Helios by Bernhard, Pereira and Warinschi weakly verifiable. By applying our generic construction we obtain a Helios-like scheme that has ballot privacy and strong verifiability (and thus prevents ballot stuffing). The resulting voting scheme, Helios-C, retains the simplicity of Helios and has been implemented and tested.

We build a political economy model where individuals differ in the extent of the behavioral bias they exhibit when voting first over social long-term care (LTC) insurance and then choosing the amount of LTC annuities. LTC annuities provide a larger return if dependent than if healthy. We study the majority voting equilibrium under three types of behavioral biases: myopia, optimism and sophisticated procrastination. Optimists and myopics similarly under-estimate their own dependency risk both when voting and when buying LTC annuities. They differ in that optimists know the correct average dependency risk (that determines the return of both social and private insurance), while myopics also under-estimate this average risk (and thus over-estimate the insurance return). Sophisticated procrastinators act as if they under-estimated their own risk when buying annuities, but anticipate this bias at the time of voting. We obtain that the stylized observation of lack of LTC insurance is compatible with agents being optimistic or myopic, but not sophisticated procrastinators. Increasing the difference in return across dependency states for the LTC annuity is detrimental to sophisticated voters and to very biased myopic and optimist voters. Finally, less myopic individuals may end up worse off, at the majority-voting equilibrium, than more myopic agents, casting some doubt on the usefulness of information campaigns.