PATTERNS OF PRESIDENTIAL INFLUENCE ON THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE APPOINTMENT PROCESS
In: Presidential studies quarterly, Band 14, Heft 4, S. 538-547
ISSN: 0360-4918
THIS STUDY ANALYZES THE IMPACT THAT PRESIDENTS CAN HAVE ON THE DECISIONAL OUTPUT OF THEIR APPOINTEES TO THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS. PRESIDENTIAL IMPACT MAY BE INFLUENCED BY A NUMBER OF FACTORS: THE EXECUTIVE'S DESIRE TO BASE APPOINTMENTS PRIMARILY ON IDEOLOGICAL CRITERIA; THE NUMBER OF JUDGES HE IS PERMITTED TO APPOINT; THE DEGREE TO WHICH HE CAN USE HIS POLITICAL SKILLS IN SUPPORT OF HIS NOMINEES; AND THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL CLIMATE INTO WHICH THE NEW JUDGES ENTER. THE EMPIRICAL DATA COMPILED ON THE VOTING BEHAVIOR OF THE VARIOUS PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTEES DEMONSTRATES THAT FEDERAL DISTRICT JUDGES APPOINTED BY DEMOCRATIC PRESIDENTS WERE COMPARATIVELY MORE LIBERAL THAN THOSE CHOSEN BY REPUBLICAN PRESIDENTS. THE FINDINGS ALSO INDICATE THAT POLITICALLY POWERFUL PRESIDENTS WHO SHOWED A PERSONAL INTEREST IN THEIR DISTRICT COURT SELECTIONS HAD A GREATER IMPACT ON THE JUDICIARY THAN PRESIDENTS WHO LACKED THE WILL, THE OPPORTUNITY OR THE POWER TO PACK THE JUDICIARY.