The New Cold War. Revolutions, Rigged Elections, and Pipeline
In: Politologija, Band 4(56, S. 153-166
ISSN: 1392-1681
Adapted from the source document.
In: Politologija, Band 4(56, S. 153-166
ISSN: 1392-1681
Adapted from the source document.
This paper deals with the decade of the 2000s in Japan's public diplomacy, and tries to distinguish the newest trends, related to the changes in the post-Cold War world system. The aspect chosen for this comparison is one that concentrates on the aims of public diplomacy. "Aims" in the framework of this paper are understood as the structural segment of the classical definition of public diplomacy, which raises the main question of why public diplomacy is conducted (i.e. what are the main factors in the international community inspiring it), thus giving the basis for its legitimation per se. Regarding this, the paper proposes three main statements that are directly related to the changing aims of Japan's post-Cold War diplomacy in respect of earlier periods. It states that the government's attention to public diplomacy has been increasing since the 2000s; Japan's diplomacy tends to direct its resources towards 'softer' methods (co-optation); 'Traditional' content is complemented (or replaced?) by the 'popular' in Japan's public diplomacy. These changes are closely related to important changes in the majority of the world's countries, in which public diplomacy has developed from a quasi-secret policy related to the intelligence service and information warfare, into fashionable and openly declared activities aimed at increasing a country's attractiveness. This is inspired by increasing international competition, the importance of soft power, and noopolitik, the changing target. [to full text]
BASE
This paper deals with the decade of the 2000s in Japan's public diplomacy, and tries to distinguish the newest trends, related to the changes in the post-Cold War world system. The aspect chosen for this comparison is one that concentrates on the aims of public diplomacy. "Aims" in the framework of this paper are understood as the structural segment of the classical definition of public diplomacy, which raises the main question of why public diplomacy is conducted (i.e. what are the main factors in the international community inspiring it), thus giving the basis for its legitimation per se. Regarding this, the paper proposes three main statements that are directly related to the changing aims of Japan's post-Cold War diplomacy in respect of earlier periods. It states that the government's attention to public diplomacy has been increasing since the 2000s; Japan's diplomacy tends to direct its resources towards 'softer' methods (co-optation); 'Traditional' content is complemented (or replaced?) by the 'popular' in Japan's public diplomacy. These changes are closely related to important changes in the majority of the world's countries, in which public diplomacy has developed from a quasi-secret policy related to the intelligence service and information warfare, into fashionable and openly declared activities aimed at increasing a country's attractiveness. This is inspired by increasing international competition, the importance of soft power, and noopolitik, the changing target. [to full text]
BASE
This paper deals with the decade of the 2000s in Japan's public diplomacy, and tries to distinguish the newest trends, related to the changes in the post-Cold War world system. The aspect chosen for this comparison is one that concentrates on the aims of public diplomacy. "Aims" in the framework of this paper are understood as the structural segment of the classical definition of public diplomacy, which raises the main question of why public diplomacy is conducted (i.e. what are the main factors in the international community inspiring it), thus giving the basis for its legitimation per se. Regarding this, the paper proposes three main statements that are directly related to the changing aims of Japan's post-Cold War diplomacy in respect of earlier periods. It states that the government's attention to public diplomacy has been increasing since the 2000s; Japan's diplomacy tends to direct its resources towards 'softer' methods (co-optation); 'Traditional' content is complemented (or replaced?) by the 'popular' in Japan's public diplomacy. These changes are closely related to important changes in the majority of the world's countries, in which public diplomacy has developed from a quasi-secret policy related to the intelligence service and information warfare, into fashionable and openly declared activities aimed at increasing a country's attractiveness. This is inspired by increasing international competition, the importance of soft power, and noopolitik, the changing target. [to full text]
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In: Politologija, Band 4(56
ISSN: 1392-1681
Adapted from the source document.
The Biafra war as an event offers a variety of angles from which it could be analysed, though this topic, apart from the dimensions of genocide or humanitarian crises, has never been much in the interest of scholars. On the one hand, it could be related to the lack of real facts as many figures and stories were fabricated during the war; on the other hand, as John K. Wa'Njogu would say, any story from Africa is not interesting if it is not an exceptional and aberrational news level. However, there have been several partly related articles about mass communication, propaganda and public relations during the Biafra war, but most of them have been taking the Western point of view, at the same time misjudging the role of the Biafran leader Ojukwu and his input in forming the propaganda apparatus by using approved propaganda guidelines from the West and adapting it to local realities. According to Scot Macdonald, the Biafra war was a war of images fought in the court of public opinion, which was won by Biafra, though the war was lost in the military and political arena. Ojukwu fairly quickly recognized the importance of controlling information and the power of messages delivered via mass communication channels, while Nigerian officials had never fully grasped the importance of this coverage. Therefore, Ojukwu built a team from local and Western professional propagandists and PR specialists whose main task was to find a proper angle of propaganda that could help to win this asymmetric war. The first attempts to use political emancipation of the oppressed people, religious, pogrom and genocide angles had limited success, but the image of starving and dying children was a very new angle, which, with the help of mass communication, helped to deliver the message to a much broader public arena. [.]
BASE
The Biafra war as an event offers a variety of angles from which it could be analysed, though this topic, apart from the dimensions of genocide or humanitarian crises, has never been much in the interest of scholars. On the one hand, it could be related to the lack of real facts as many figures and stories were fabricated during the war; on the other hand, as John K. Wa'Njogu would say, any story from Africa is not interesting if it is not an exceptional and aberrational news level. However, there have been several partly related articles about mass communication, propaganda and public relations during the Biafra war, but most of them have been taking the Western point of view, at the same time misjudging the role of the Biafran leader Ojukwu and his input in forming the propaganda apparatus by using approved propaganda guidelines from the West and adapting it to local realities. According to Scot Macdonald, the Biafra war was a war of images fought in the court of public opinion, which was won by Biafra, though the war was lost in the military and political arena. Ojukwu fairly quickly recognized the importance of controlling information and the power of messages delivered via mass communication channels, while Nigerian officials had never fully grasped the importance of this coverage. Therefore, Ojukwu built a team from local and Western professional propagandists and PR specialists whose main task was to find a proper angle of propaganda that could help to win this asymmetric war. The first attempts to use political emancipation of the oppressed people, religious, pogrom and genocide angles had limited success, but the image of starving and dying children was a very new angle, which, with the help of mass communication, helped to deliver the message to a much broader public arena. [.]
BASE
The Biafra war as an event offers a variety of angles from which it could be analysed, though this topic, apart from the dimensions of genocide or humanitarian crises, has never been much in the interest of scholars. On the one hand, it could be related to the lack of real facts as many figures and stories were fabricated during the war; on the other hand, as John K. Wa'Njogu would say, any story from Africa is not interesting if it is not an exceptional and aberrational news level. However, there have been several partly related articles about mass communication, propaganda and public relations during the Biafra war, but most of them have been taking the Western point of view, at the same time misjudging the role of the Biafran leader Ojukwu and his input in forming the propaganda apparatus by using approved propaganda guidelines from the West and adapting it to local realities. According to Scot Macdonald, the Biafra war was a war of images fought in the court of public opinion, which was won by Biafra, though the war was lost in the military and political arena. Ojukwu fairly quickly recognized the importance of controlling information and the power of messages delivered via mass communication channels, while Nigerian officials had never fully grasped the importance of this coverage. Therefore, Ojukwu built a team from local and Western professional propagandists and PR specialists whose main task was to find a proper angle of propaganda that could help to win this asymmetric war. The first attempts to use political emancipation of the oppressed people, religious, pogrom and genocide angles had limited success, but the image of starving and dying children was a very new angle, which, with the help of mass communication, helped to deliver the message to a much broader public arena. [.]
BASE
The Biafra war as an event offers a variety of angles from which it could be analysed, though this topic, apart from the dimensions of genocide or humanitarian crises, has never been much in the interest of scholars. On the one hand, it could be related to the lack of real facts as many figures and stories were fabricated during the war; on the other hand, as John K. Wa'Njogu would say, any story from Africa is not interesting if it is not an exceptional and aberrational news level. However, there have been several partly related articles about mass communication, propaganda and public relations during the Biafra war, but most of them have been taking the Western point of view, at the same time misjudging the role of the Biafran leader Ojukwu and his input in forming the propaganda apparatus by using approved propaganda guidelines from the West and adapting it to local realities. According to Scot Macdonald, the Biafra war was a war of images fought in the court of public opinion, which was won by Biafra, though the war was lost in the military and political arena. Ojukwu fairly quickly recognized the importance of controlling information and the power of messages delivered via mass communication channels, while Nigerian officials had never fully grasped the importance of this coverage. Therefore, Ojukwu built a team from local and Western professional propagandists and PR specialists whose main task was to find a proper angle of propaganda that could help to win this asymmetric war. The first attempts to use political emancipation of the oppressed people, religious, pogrom and genocide angles had limited success, but the image of starving and dying children was a very new angle, which, with the help of mass communication, helped to deliver the message to a much broader public arena. [.]
BASE
The Biafra war as an event offers a variety of angles from which it could be analysed, though this topic, apart from the dimensions of genocide or humanitarian crises, has never been much in the interest of scholars. On the one hand, it could be related to the lack of real facts as many figures and stories were fabricated during the war; on the other hand, as John K. Wa'Njogu would say, any story from Africa is not interesting if it is not an exceptional and aberrational news level. However, there have been several partly related articles about mass communication, propaganda and public relations during the Biafra war, but most of them have been taking the Western point of view, at the same time misjudging the role of the Biafran leader Ojukwu and his input in forming the propaganda apparatus by using approved propaganda guidelines from the West and adapting it to local realities. According to Scot Macdonald, the Biafra war was a war of images fought in the court of public opinion, which was won by Biafra, though the war was lost in the military and political arena. Ojukwu fairly quickly recognized the importance of controlling information and the power of messages delivered via mass communication channels, while Nigerian officials had never fully grasped the importance of this coverage. Therefore, Ojukwu built a team from local and Western professional propagandists and PR specialists whose main task was to find a proper angle of propaganda that could help to win this asymmetric war. The first attempts to use political emancipation of the oppressed people, religious, pogrom and genocide angles had limited success, but the image of starving and dying children was a very new angle, which, with the help of mass communication, helped to deliver the message to a much broader public arena. [.]
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In: Acta historica Universitatis Klaipedensis 40
The article focuses on the controversies of WWII, how the intertwining of history and politics impacts evaluation of the events of the war, the emphasis that is placed on historical memory and the possibilities of "forgetfulness", and politicization of the holocaust memory. On the basis of diaries and contemporary notes, the situation in German-occupied Lithuania, episodes of the holocaust, the activities of the Lithuanian police battalions, and the actions of the Soviet Army in occupied German territory is analyzed.
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The article focuses on the controversies of WWII, how the intertwining of history and politics impacts evaluation of the events of the war, the emphasis that is placed on historical memory and the possibilities of "forgetfulness", and politicization of the holocaust memory. On the basis of diaries and contemporary notes, the situation in German-occupied Lithuania, episodes of the holocaust, the activities of the Lithuanian police battalions, and the actions of the Soviet Army in occupied German territory is analyzed.
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The aim of the study is to reveal direct links of the partisans from the Lokys unit with the earlier military, paramilitary, self-defence or police formations, which were set up and existed during the pre-war times of Independent Lithuania as well as the period of the Nazi occupation. It is testified by direct participation of around one third of the unit members (113 out of 320 partisans) in the activities of armed formations that existed in earlier times. These people, who acquired the basics of military preparedness and armed resistance in earlier times, made up the core of the leadership of the Lokys unit until the end of the armed anti-Soviet resistance. It was only at the end of the guerrilla war that a part of the sub-units subordinate to the unit were led by the individuals who did not belong to armed structures in earlier times and acquired the required knowledge and skills in the after-war guerrilla fights. In quantitative terms, they took the dominant role among the armed fighters from around 1948; during the whole period of existence of the Lokys unit (1944–1958) they accounted for about two thirds of the fighters in its sub-units (208 out of 320 partisans).
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The aim of the study is to reveal direct links of the partisans from the Lokys unit with the earlier military, paramilitary, self-defence or police formations, which were set up and existed during the pre-war times of Independent Lithuania as well as the period of the Nazi occupation. It is testified by direct participation of around one third of the unit members (113 out of 320 partisans) in the activities of armed formations that existed in earlier times. These people, who acquired the basics of military preparedness and armed resistance in earlier times, made up the core of the leadership of the Lokys unit until the end of the armed anti-Soviet resistance. It was only at the end of the guerrilla war that a part of the sub-units subordinate to the unit were led by the individuals who did not belong to armed structures in earlier times and acquired the required knowledge and skills in the after-war guerrilla fights. In quantitative terms, they took the dominant role among the armed fighters from around 1948; during the whole period of existence of the Lokys unit (1944–1958) they accounted for about two thirds of the fighters in its sub-units (208 out of 320 partisans).
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