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Warlords compete for turf that provides them with rents and 'taxable' resources but they can also offer a semblance of security within their respective territories. This article first examines two economic models of warlord competition. Because such competition takes place through the use of force or the threat of the use of force, more competition typically leads to lower material welfare as resources are wasted on unproductive arming and fighting. This is in contrast to ordinary economic models, in which typically greater competition leads to higher material welfare. Furthermore, rents from oil, diamonds, and even foreign aid crowd out production. In extreme cases this crowding out of ordinary production can be complete, whereby all economic resources can be devoted to the unproductive competition for rents. The article then reviews factors that lead either to actual war or to peace in the shadow of war. Because war is destrucrive, human beings are typically risk averse, and there exist numerous complementarities in production and consumption, we can expect peace in the shadow of war to be most often preferable by all parties. Actual war can take place because of incomplete information about the preferences and capabilities of the adversaries but also, somewhat surprisingly, when the shadow of the future is long.

Im Neoliberalismus werden nicht nur Staatsbetriebe privatisiert, sondern auch die Kriegführung. So übernehmen private Militärunternehmen im Auftrag des Pentagon verstärkt Kampfaufträge. In Afrika verwandeln sich reguläre Armeen in private Bergbauunternehmen. Zur Aufstandsbekämpfung rüsten in Kolumbien und der Türkei Politiker private Paramilitärs aus, die gleichzeitig vom Drogenhandel profitieren. In Afghanistan werden Warlords unter Protektoratsherrschaft mit Regierungsgewalt ausgestattet. "Das Unternehmen Krieg" geht neuen Formen der Kriegsführung nach. Statt "Staatszerfall" und "Chaos", wie in den Medien oft beschworen, zeichnen sich dabei die Konturen einer "Neuen Kriegsordnung" ab. In ihr werden private militärische Akteure von Eliten eingesetzt, um Herrschaft zu sichern. Dabei ist oft nicht mehr ein militärischer Sieg, sondern die Kriegführung selbst das Ziel, um Profite erzielen zu können. Hinterlassen werden Hunderttausende von Opfern und Gesellschaften, in denen Wege zur Emanzipation neu eröffnet werden müssen. Der Sammelband füllt diese Thesen mit Länderkapiteln zu Kolumbien, der Türkei, Mexico, Guatemala, Jugoslawien, Afghanistan, Indonesien, Kongo, Angola und den USA. Die AutorInnen versuchen einen Beitrag zur Information und Diskussion der Neuen Kriege zu leisten und zielen damit nicht zuletzt auf die Anti-kriegs-und die Friedensbewegung ab. Wichtig erscheint dabei insbesondere die Erkenntnis, dass sich die Grenzen zwischen Krieg und Frieden immer weiter verwischen. Wie die im Buch dargestellten Entwicklungen zeigen, ist das Bombardement Bagdads oder Belgrads eben keineswegs die kurzzeitige Unterbrechung eines imaginierten "Friedens" durch den Ausnahmezustand "Krieg". Vielmehr breitet sich in größer werdenden Teilen des Globus ein permanenter Kriegszustand unterschiedlicher Intensität aus, der komplexere Antworten erfordert, als die Forderung nach dem Ende der Bombardierungen. Mit Beiträgen von: Thomas Seibert, Dario Azzellini, Knut Rauchfuss, Matilde Gonzales, Boris Kanzleiter, Dr. Matin Baraki, Henri Myrttinen, Björn Aust, Lisa Rimli, Dieter Drüssel und Volker Eick

This paper documents that the spread of communism in China was partly caused by state failures in the early 20th century. It finds that famines became more frequent after China fell into warlord fragmentation, especially for prefectures with less rugged borders and those facing stronger military threat. The relation between topography and famines holds when using historical border changes to instrument border ruggedness. More people from famine-inflicted prefectures died in the subsequent decades for the communist movement, but not for the Nationalist Army. There is evidence that famines exacerbated rural inequality, which pushed more peasants to the side of the communists.

Post-war democratization has been identified as a crucial mechanism to build peace in war-ridden societies, supposedly allowing belligerents to compete through ballots rather than bullets. A byproduct of this process, however, is that military leaders often become an integral part of the new democratic system, using resources and networks generated from the previous war to dominate the emerging political landscape. The crucial and thus-far overlooked question to be addressed, therefore, is what effect the inclusion of ex-militaries into electoral politics has on post-war security. Can 'warlord democrats' make a positive contribution by shepherding their wartime constituencies to support the building of peace and democracy, or are they likely to use their electoral platforms to sponsor political violence and keep war-affected communities mobilized through aggressive discourses? This important volume, containing a wealth of fresh empirical detail and theoretical insight, and focussing on some of Africa's most high-profile political figures – from Paul Kagame to Riek Machar to Afonso Dhlakama – represents a crucial intervention in the literature of post-war democratization. ; CONTENTS: Introduction: Warlord democrats: wartime investments, democratic returns? / Anders Themnér -- 1. Pompier-pyromanocracy: Mbusa Nyamwisi and the DR Congo's inflammable post-settlement political order / Judith Verweijen -- 2. Apotheosis of a warlord: Paul Kagame / Lars Waldorf -- 3. Discourses of peace and fear: the electoral navigations of Sekou Conneh and Prince Johnson in post-war Liberia / Carrie Manning and Anders Themnér -- 4. Afonso Dhlakama and RENAMO's return to armed conflict since 2013: the politics of reintegration in Mozambique / Alex Vines -- 5. From warlord to drug lord: the life of João Bernardo "Nino" Vieira / Henrik Vigh -- 6. Shape-shifters in the struggle for survival: post-war politics in Sierra Leone / Mimmi Söderberg Kovacs and Ibrahim Bangura -- 7. Riek Machar: warlord-doctor in South Sudan / Johan Brosché and Kristine Höglund -- Conclusion: Ambiguous peacelords: the diminishing returns of post-war democracy / Anders Themnér

As part of its "War on Terror", the United States (US) provided immense sums of money and advanced equipment to Afghan warlords in order to defeat and dismantle the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. Nearly two decades after the 2001 US-led intervention in Afghanistan that toppled the Taliban regime, the US continues supporting the warlords in various ways. As the intervention was also aimed at establishing a functioning state and reconstruction of the war-torn country, the US needed the support of local warlords to achieve its goals. However, over time, warlords and warlordism became a major challenge to the post-Taliban state-building project and in many ways undermined the overall security and the state monopoly on violence. These warlords, who had been mostly expelled and defeated by the Taliban regime, returned under the aegis of the B52 bombers, recaptured parts of the country and reestablished their fiefdoms with US support and resources. They not only resist giving up the power and prestige they have accumulated over the past few years, but also hamper the effort to improve governance and enact necessary reforms in the country. In addition, many of them run their private militias and have been accused of serious human rights abuses as well as drug trafficking, arms smuggling, illegal mining and extortion in the areas under their control or influence. In many ways, they challenge the government authority and have become a major hurdle to the country's emerging from lawlessness and anarchy. This paper explores the emergence and re-emergence of warlords in Afghanistan as well as the evolution of chaos and anarchy in the country, especially after the US-led intervention of late 2001. It also analyzes the impact of the post-9/11 US support to Afghan warlords and its negative consequences for the overall stability and the US-led state-building process in Afghanistan.

Die vorliegende Arbeit unternimmt eine Analyse des Zusammenhangs von Politik und Militär im zeitgeschichtlichen politischen Diskurs anhand der Fo-tografie THE SITUATION ROOM. Hierbei wird es vor allem um die Verflechtungen zwischen ›9/11‹, dem ›war on terror‹ und der gegenwärtigen US-amerikanischen Politik gehen. Zudem werden die ikonologischen Besonder-heiten dieser Fotografie als wichtiges zeitgeschichtliches Zeugnis herausge-arbeitet. Mit Bezug auf theoretische Ansätze aus dem Bereich der Visual Studies und unter Verwendung der Konzepte des ›Feldherrenblicks‹ und des ›actuarial gaze‹ soll unsere Analyse die These stützen, dass die strategische Kommunikation der Obama-Regierung auf die Konstruktion beziehungsweise den Erhalt einer ›threat society‹ abzielt. ; This article analyses the way politics and the military are interconnected in contemporary political discourse by means of the popular photography THE SITUATION ROOM. By doing so, the interdependency of ›9/11‹, the ›war on terror‹, and US American politics will be carved out. Furthermore, the iconological characteristics of the photography will be proven to be an important testimonial of contemporary history. Based on the theoretical concepts of the ›Feldherrenblick‹ and the ›actuarial gaze‹, our analysis supports the thesis that the strategic communication of the Obama administration aims for the creation or rather the maintenance of a ›threat society‹.

Includes bibliographical references. ; This research thesis is a critique of the main explanations of regional integration in West Africa. In critiquing West African regional integration, this research introduces and integrates the growing literature on the concept of warlords with theory of regional integration. The main explanations of West African regional integration are functionalism and federalism respectively. The critique in this study is informed by the practical lack of successful regional integration in West Africa, i.e. the failure to merge West African states and establish regional co-operation through regional integration. With regards to West African regional integration, the conventional, also known as the traditional view, argues and maintains that on practical and theoretical levels, integrationist approaches are inherently inappropriate to such integration because they ignore complex realities faced by states that are integrating or wish to integrate. According to the conventional argument, these realities include forces such as globalisation, the nature of North-South trade relations, the colonial experience, which today is responsible for the chaotic social-political and economic landscape in regions such as West Africa This landscape is characterised by economically, politically and institutionally weak countries.

Among all former Soviet Central Asian republics Tajikistan alone has suffered Complete state failure in the course of post-communist transition. The contraction of central government during the final years of perestroika, and especially in the course of a short but brutal 1992 civil war, has produced a situation where large segments of the population have had to depend on various strongmen as far as their livelihood, security and often very existence are concerned. The 1997 Peace Agreement put an end to the civil conflict and led to a degree of stabilisation at the macro-political level, but it did not eliminate a plethora of military cliques who periodically challenged the authority of President Emomali Rahmonov's regime and jeopardised the process of national reconciliation. Headlines in the Western media such as 'Peace lies in hands of brutal warlords' and 'Robber barons flouting the authority of a weak government are tipping the former Soviet republic of Tajikistan back into chaos' adequately reflected the situation on the ground at the time. Seven years later Tajikistan still has plenty of wa rlords fighting 'bitter battles for the control over regional and local economic resources and opportunities'. Arguably, they are not as powerful and ubiquitous as in neighbouring Afghanistan, yet their sheer endurance and continuing influence warrant a closer look into the phenomenon of warlordism in Tajikistan.

Among all former Soviet Central Asian republics Tajikistan alone has suffered Complete state failure in the course of post-communist transition. The contraction of central government during the final years of perestroika, and especially in the course of a short but brutal 1992 civil war, has produced a situation where large segments of the population have had to depend on various strongmen as far as their livelihood, security and often very existence are concerned. The 1997 Peace Agreement put an end to the civil conflict and led to a degree of stabilisation at the macro-political level, but it did not eliminate a plethora of military cliques who periodically challenged the authority of President Emomali Rahmonov's regime and jeopardised the process of national reconciliation. Headlines in the Western media such as 'Peace lies in hands of brutal warlords' and 'Robber barons flouting the authority of a weak government are tipping the former Soviet republic of Tajikistan back into chaos' adequately reflected the situation on the ground at the time. Seven years later Tajikistan still has plenty of wa rlords fighting 'bitter battles for the control over regional and local economic resources and opportunities'. Arguably, they are not as powerful and ubiquitous as in neighbouring Afghanistan, yet their sheer endurance and continuing influence warrant a closer look into the phenomenon of warlordism in Tajikistan.

As America's de facto co-belligerents who often share the same battlespace in the fight against the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, the presence and activity of Iraq's Shia warlords and their militias have an impact on U.S. interests and policies at both the strategic and operational levels. The objective of this monograph is to provide a better understanding of the Shia militia phenomenon and to highlight the factors with which U.S. policymakers and U.S. Army planners and commanders will have to deal with respect to operations in Iraq. ; https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1449/thumbnail.jpg

The history of the Basmachi movement has occupied a prominent place in the construction of a collective past in Soviet and post-Soviet Tajikistan. This article traces the evolution of its representations in the dominant narrative from the 1950s to the present day. It argues that official discourse in contemporary Tajikistan situates the Basmachis in the mould of a national struggle against Turkic oppression, rather than portraying them, in the manner of earlier prevalent models, as part of a class-based or anti-colonialist resistance. Among many public counter-narratives, the one focusing on the local appeal of the Basmachi leaders has the greatest potential to challenge the government-sponsored reading of Tajikistan's past and thus the image of a unified nation it seeks to support.

The history of the Basmachi movement has occupied a prominent place in the construction of a collective past in Soviet and post-Soviet Tajikistan. This article traces the evolution of its representations in the dominant narrative from the 1950s to the present day. It argues that official discourse in contemporary Tajikistan situates the Basmachis in the mould of a national struggle against Turkic oppression, rather than portraying them, in the manner of earlier prevalent models, as part of a class-based or anti-colonialist resistance. Among many public counter-narratives, the one focusing on the local appeal of the Basmachi leaders has the greatest potential to challenge the government-sponsored reading of Tajikistan's past and thus the image of a unified nation it seeks to support.

Though denigrated by later generations, Cao Cao was a military and political hero of China, restoring a measure of order from the ruins of Later Han. From historical records and his own writings, this book reinterprets his life and achievements.

Post–civil war democracies are characterized by intense electoral competition. To ensure continued political relevance, ex-military-turned-politicians, or "warlord democrats" (WDs), can either engage in a rhetoric of fear or ease societal tensions by employing a rhetoric of peace. WDs' choice of rhetoric can have a profound impact on durable peace by altering societal discourses concerning the legitimacy of using violence. A key question is therefore: Why do some WDs employ a rhetoric of fear, and others a rhetoric of peace, when running for office? We argue that the choice of rhetoric is a function of the patrimonial endowments WDs possess; if WDs lack the resources and social networks needed to distribute patronage, they may instead use a rhetoric of fear to rally voters. To highlight the explanatory value of this proposition, we compare two Liberian WDs who ran for the Senate in 2005—Adolphus Dolo and Prince Johnson.

This paper provides a heuristic to determine the potential effects of violent non-state actors (VNSAs) on stability. It classifies VNSAs by type, categorizing groups as either clientelist, communal, or corporate. It finds that corporate VNSAs, those organized around a shared but non-ascriptive identity, such as membership in a guild or society, generally behave in a manner that is most likely to create stability. This hypothesis is supported through an in-depth examination of the Civil Defense Forces, a corporate VNSA that played a crucial role during the 1991-2002 Sierra Leone Civil War.