Suchergebnisse

Das Aufdecken geheimer Informationen durch Insider wird oft kritisch gesehen, mitunter sogar strafrechtlich verfolgt. Auch demokratische Rechtsstaaten tun sich mit Whistleblowing schwer.

By skipping managers and appealing directly to politicians, whistleblowers can play a critical role in revealing organizational information. However, the protection of whistleblowers can affect managers' abilities to provide employees with incentives to exert effort. This paper explores this tradeoff with a model of agency decision-making under incomplete information. In the game, an employee's effort determines a project's quality, and a manager chooses whether to approve the project and discipline the employee. The employee and politician wish for only "good" projects to be approved. By whistleblowing, an employee reveals the quality to a politician outside of the organization, who may override the manager's decision. A key finding is that from the politician's perspective, the benefits of whistleblower protections depend on the preferences of the manager. If the manager is inclined toward approving projects, then the costs of lower employee effort may outweigh the informational benefits of whistleblowing. The optimal policy may then be to ban whistleblowing. By contrast, when the manager is inclined toward rejecting projects, whistleblower protections prevent him or her from suppressing effort and are unambiguously beneficial.

The author analyses different systems of whistleblowing from a criminal point of view. After giving a short overview of different systems of legislation dealing with whistleblowing, the author focuses on the question, under which circumstances the whistleblower commits a crime, an offence or a misdemeanour in the German law system by going outside, revealing wrongdoing. The examination ends with an addendum about questions concerning German criminal procedure law.

Durch die Förderung von Whistleblowing erhofft man sich eine erhöhte Aufdeckung und Verhinderung von Manipulationshandlungen. In dieser Arbeit wird gezeigt, dass (mehr) Whistleblowing nicht unbedingt zu Letzterem führt. Dazu wird ein Spiel modelliert, in dem ein Manager seine Manipulationswahrscheinlichkeit und ein Prüfer seine mit Kosten verbundenen Aufdeckungsbemühungen bestimmt. Es zeigt sich, dass eine wahrscheinlichere Nachprüfungsaufdeckung einen reduzierenden Effekt auf die Manipulationswahrscheinlichkeit besitzt. Eine wahrscheinlichere Aufdeckung vor der eigentlichen Prüfung kann allerdings je nach Kostenfunktion des Prüfers unterschiedliche Auswirkungen haben. Selbst wenn mehr Whistleblowing nicht zu einer Verringerung der Manipulationswahrscheinlichkeit führt, kann es dennoch die Gesamtwohlfahrt steigern.

The aim of this chapter is to take a general account of the past and current practices, experiences and challenges of whistleblowing legislation and whistleblower protection in Hungary. The emphasis will be put on the critical analysis of the currently effective regulatory environment of whistleblowing and whistleblower protection in Hungary, with specific regard to labour law aspects. Furthermore, the context, prospects and basic requirements of the future implementation of the EU Directive will also be highlighted. In this vein, Section 2 sketches the historical, societal and constitutional context. Section 3, as the central part of this study, examines in detail the currently effective legislative framework of whistleblowing in Hungary. Section 4 deals specifically with the labour law-related aspects of whistleblowing, while Section 5 takes a brief look into other related fields of law (including anti-discrimination, criminal law, and trade secrets). Section 6 considers recent and relevant critical opinions and motions for reform. Section 7 looks into the possible challenges and the main tentative tasks of the upcoming transposition of the Directive into Hungarian law. Finally, Section 8 draws some broad, general conclusions. ; The project is co-financed by the Governments of Czechia, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia through Visegrad Grants from International Visegrad Fund. The mission of the Fund is to advance ideas for sustainable regional cooperation in Central Europe.

eingereicht von Alina Stockinger ; Universität Linz, Diplomarbeit, 2020 ; (VLID)5270560