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The purpose of the article is to analyze ESP in the context of different modes of governance. Assuming that ESP is a unique and multidimensional product of dynamic political, technological, and social processes and ideas coordinated by the EU, its member states as well as non-member ones and implemented in an international environment, there are some research questions to be answered. First, is there any particular mode of governance that should be applied to the analysis of ESP implementation? Second, in what way the EU introduced space policy and space assets to the European agenda? Third, how ESP can be framed within the overall process of European integration? A qualitative research approach has been applied as well as theoretic apparatus embedded in European integration studies and political science. The main finding of the article is that the most promising way of governance within ESP is experimentalist governance. The originality of the article results from the application of the newly established experimentalist governance theory to an analysis of the increasingly important segment of EU activity.

AbstractMichael Zürn'sTheory of Global Governanceis an original, bold, and compelling argument regarding the causes of change in global governance. A core argument is that legitimation problems trigger changes in global governance. This contribution addresses two core features of the argument. Although I am persuaded that legitimacy matters, there are times when: legitimacy appears to be given too much credit to the relative neglect of other factors; other times when the lack of legitimacy has little discernible impact on the working of global governance; and unanswered questions about how the legitimacy of global governance relates to the legitimacy of the international order of which it is a part. The second feature is what counts as change in global governance. Zürn reduces change to either deepening or decline, overlooking the possible how of global governance. In contrast to Zürn's map of global governance that is dominated by hierarchies in the form of international organizations, an alternative map locates multiple modes of governance: hierarchies, markets, and networks. The kinds of legitimation problems that Zürn identifies, I argue, can help explain some of the movement from hierarchical to other modes of global governance.

AbstractA Theory of Global Governance is a long awaited book that finally theorizes the increasing authority of international institutions and the conflicts emerging from it. With its focus on reflexive deference as a basis for international authority it covers important elements of global governance but also leaves some critical blind spots regarding the forms of super- and subordination. In our engagement with Michael Zürn's book we propose to conceptualize international authority as a subcategory of international rule instead of its essence and to investigate various forms of rule by way of analyzing the resistance they provoke instead of institutionalized mandates.

AbstractTwo recent books consider the future of trade governance.Consent and Tradeproposes reforms to trade agreements so that states can consent more freely to their terms.On Trade Justicedefends reforms to the World Trade Organization, arguing that multilateralism is the foundation for a "new global deal" on trade. Each book describes trade's distinctive features and proposes a principle to regulate both trade and trade governance.Consent and Tradedefends a principle of respect for state consent in trade agreements.On Trade Justiceoffers a theory of trade justice that requires nonexploitation. Consent and nonexploitation are important principles for economic exchanges. However, trade governance and trade itself are different forms of cooperation, with different agents and different interests at stake. Consent and nonexploitation are less compelling as principles for trade governance than for trade itself. Both books understate the conflict between their principles for trade governance and liberal justice.

One of the most important features of the multi-level governance research programme is the parallel conceptualisation of the vertical and the horizontal relationships within multi-level governance systems. Different systems of multi-level governance are characterised by the relationships between political institutions on the same level (Are there many task-specific organisations?) and by the relationship between different levels (On which level do we see political communities?). By conceptualising scale and community in a substitutive way as Hooghe and Marks in tendency do, some of the potentials are lost. I put forward the suggestion that treating the two dimensions as independent would allow for an even fuller picture of the dynamics of politics in multi-level governance systems.

The commentary returns to the beginning of the career of multilevel governance as a distinct perspective on the European Union and European integration. At the time, multilevel governance allowed a generation of students to overcome the stylised debates between Liberal Intergovernmentalism and Neofunctionalism on how to best capture the 'nature of the beast'. At the same time, multilevel governance still privileged the role of public authorities over economic and societal actors. While subsequent studies broadened the focus to include the social partners or public interest groups, Hooghe and Marks have retained their public authority bias. The commentary argues that the focus on multilevel government rather than multilevel governance has increased the scope or applicability of Hooghe and Marks' approach, both within the European Union and beyond. At the same time, the government bias has prevented the multilevel governance approach from unlocking its full explanatory potential.

Governments are facing increasingly complex policy challenges, ranging from climate change, demographic pressures, rising inequalities and discontent, to the global health crisis that countries are presently confronting. Successful responses require more integrated approaches to policy making at all levels of government, so that economic, social and environmental actions reinforce each other rather than compete. They also require effective coordination across levels of government to manage shared responsibilities, mutual dependence and common challenges. This commentary highlights the progress in the multi-level governance concept since its first use, and focuses on some current dynamics driving multi-level governance, in particular the trend towards differentiated subnational governance. It then highlights that the way multi-level governance systems are designed has a direct impact on policy outcomes, hence the imperative to strengthen multi-level governance systems. The commentary offers insight into how the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development is tacking this imperative to best support countries in their development processes.

AbstractAlthough scholarly interest in populism has increased as populist parties have risen across Europe, the subnational level has been largely overlooked. This article adopts an original subnational focus and explores an unlikely but increasingly prevalent political agenda: the combination of technocracy and populism. We focus on technocratic populism as a political and governance strategy at the municipal level and assess how the interaction of populism and technocracy plays out empirically in relation to administration and public policies and how the tensions and synergies between technocracy and populism are solved at the local level. The article argues that the local level is especially prone to this kind of intersection between technocratic and populist ideology. While the article is mainly an exercise in concept development, two illustrative cases at the city level, namely the Movimento 5 Stelle (M5S, Five Star Movement) in Rome and the Akce nespokojených občanů (ANO, Action of Dissatisfied Citizens) in Prague are used to support the argument.

The rapid globalization of money, goods, services, taxation, knowledge, people, political ideas, digitalization, and especially pathogens and ecological pollutants has intensified, along with rising inequality, multipolarity, protectionism, isolationism and geopolitical tensions. Together these factors present new challenges to 21st century global governance led by the systemically significant states which make up the Group of Twenty (G20). G20 governance has expanded in response, but with more success on its old, incompletely globalized economic agenda than on its newer, more globalized digitalization, health pandemics and climate change agendas. The most recent G20 summit in Osaka, Japan on 28–29 June 2019 did make advances on tax and digitalization but not on the looming health risks and the existential threat of climate change. Preparations for the Saudi Arabian-hosted Riyadh summit, to be held on 21–22 November 2020, have made some progress on the latter amidst the unprecedented crisis posed by the COVID-19 pandemic. The crisis shows that the G20's architecture needs to be further strengthened by institutionalizing G20 environment and health ministers' meetings; inviting the executive heads of the United Nations (UN) bodies for climate change, biodiversity, the environment and health, as well as the leaders of key outside countries, to the summits; giving the UN and World Health Organization the same G20 status as the International Monetary Fund and World Bank; and holding a second annual summit at the UN each September focused on the sustainable development goals.