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Everywhere you turn these days, it's cyber-this and cyber-that. Never mind that this prefix is fungible at best and takes on whatever meaning the speaker imbues it with in that moment, it seems the easiest was to show that you are hip to emerging technologies in warfare is to liberally sprinkle the word "cyber" into any document of context. Before we can properly employ emerging technologies in armed conflict we must learn to speak intelligently about the conduct of military operations in and from cyberspace. So what do you do? How do you even begin? Here are five simple suggestions from a newly-minted MOC Warfighter with a background in cyberspace operations. This site displays abstracts of MOC Warfighter articles. Department of Defense CAC-authenticated users may download full copies of the articles at this site. Others may request copies of specified articles by contacting the MOC Warfighter administrator.

Faced with relentless technological aggression that imperils democracy, how can Western nations fight back? Before the cyber age, foreign interference in democratic politics played out in a comparatively narrow arena. The rapid expansion of cyberspace has radically altered this situation. The hacking activities of Russian military agents in the 2016 US presidential election and other major incidents demonstrate the sophisticated offensive strategies pursued by geopolitical adversaries. The West is winning the technology race--yet losing the larger contest over cybersecurity. Lucas Kello reveals the failures of present policy to prevent cyberattacks and other forms of technological aggression. Drawing upon case studies and interviews with decision-makers, he develops a bold new approach: a concentrated and coordinated response strategy that targets adversaries' interests and so recaptures the initiative. Striking Back provides an original solution to national security challenges in our era of intense technological rivalry.

This article presents the ethical issues using offensive cyberspace operations. Previously enshrouded in secrecy, and now becoming the new norm, countries are using them to achieve their strategic interests. Russia has conducted offensive operations targeting Estonia, Georgia and the Ukraine; Hamas was targeting Israeli targets; and Iran has been targeting U.S. targets. The response has varied; Estonia and Georgia struggled with the attacks and were unable to respond while Ukraine tried to respond but it was inefficient. Israel's response on Hamas offensive operations was an air strike on a building with Hamas Cyber-operatives. Iran shot down a U.S. Drone over the Strait of Hormuz, and the U.S. initially intended to respond with kinetic capabilities in the form of missile strikes. However, in the last minute, the U.S. chose to respond with offensive cyberspace operations targeting the Iranian missile systems. This last-minute change of response choosing between kinetic or cyber capabilities shows a need to further investigate how offensive cyberspace operations can be used against which targets from an ethical perspective. This article applies anticipatory ethical analysis on U.S. offensive operations in the "Global Hawk"-case when Iran shot down a U.S. drone over the Strait of Hormuz. Anticipatory ethical analysis looks at emerging technologies and their potential consequences. Offensive cyberspace operations present a range of possibilities, which include lowering the risk of harm to cyber operatives' lives belonging to the responding nation. However, a response can also be kinetic. Therefore, the analysis of the "Global Hawk"-case is compared with the Israeli-air strike of the building of Hamas Cyber-operatives. The authors argue that applying anticipatory ethical analysis on offensive operations and kinetic operations assist decision makers in choosing response actions to re-establish deterrence.

"From two former military officers and award-winning authors, a chillingly authentic, geopolitical thriller that imagines a naval clash between the US and China in the South China Sea in 2034 -- and the path from there to a nightmarish global conflagration. On March 12, 2034, US Navy Commodore Sarah Hunt is on the bridge of her flagship, the guided missile destroyer USS John Paul Jones conducting a routine freedom of navigation patrol in the South China Sea when her ship detects an unflagged trawler in clear distress, smoke billowing from its bridge. On that same day, US Marine aviator Major Chris "Wedge" Mitchell is flying an F35E Lightning over the Strait of Hormuz, testing a new stealth technology as he flirts with Iranian airspace. By the end of that day, Wedge will be an Iranian prisoner, and Sarah Hunt's destroyer will lie at the bottom of the sea, sunk by the Chinese Navy. Iran and China have clearly coordinated their moves, which involve the use of powerful new forms of cyber weaponry that render US ships and planes defenseless. In a single day, America's faith in its military's strategic pre-eminence is in tatters. A new, terrifying era is at hand. So begins a disturbingly plausible work of speculative fiction, co-authored by an award-winning novelist and decorated Marine veteran and the former commander of NATO, a legendary admiral who has spent much of his career strategically out maneuvering America's most tenacious adversaries . Written with a powerful blend of geopolitical sophistication and literary, human empathy, 2034 takes us inside the minds of a global cast of characters - Americans, Chinese, Iranians, Russians, Indians - as a series of arrogant miscalculations on all sides leads the world into an intensifying international storm. In the end, China and the United States will have paid a staggering cost, one that forever alters the global balance of power. Everything in 2034 is an imaginative extrapolation from present-day facts on the ground combined with the authors' years working at the highest and most classified levels of national security. Sometimes it takes a brilliant work of fiction to illuminate the most dire of warnings: 2034 is all too close at hand, and this cautionary tale presents the reader a dark yet possible future that we must do all we can to avoid"--

Approaching Military Revolutions -- The Epistemology of RMA -- A Paradigm Shift -- Understanding (1): Piercing the Fog of War in Fluid Spaces -- Understanding (2): Fluidifying the Solid? -- Waging War in Network-centric Conditions -- Striking in Network-centric Conditions.

Are cyber operations as revolutionary as the headlines suggest? Do they compel rival states and alter international politics? By examining cyber strategy as a contemporary form of political warfare and covert action, this book demonstrates that the digital domain complements rather than replaces traditional instruments of power.

Cyber-attacks have increased since the 1988-Morris worm and can target any connected device from any place in the world. In 2010, Stuxnet received a lot of attention as the first cyber-weapon. Its targets were the Iranian nuclear enrichment centrifuges. Nation states are developing cyberspace capabilities to conduct offensive cyberspace operations. Academic researchers have been calling for a more transparent discussion on offensive capabilities and have pointed out the positive impact researchers had during the development of nuclear capabilities. Shrouded in secrecy, the development of offensive capabilities used for operations makes it difficult to conduct research. Therefore, one way to mitigate this is to conduct a systematic review of the current state of research in offensive cyberspace operations. The systematic review method makes it possible to establish certain inclusion and exclusion criteria and systematically go through academic articles to identify the contents, thoughts and research focus of academic researchers. Six scientific databases were queried and 87 articles were read and clustered. The first insight is that, based on the results of the queried databases, research about offensive cyberspace operations is limited. The resulting clusters are a general cluster about cyberspace operations, followed by research in policy, decision-making, governance, capabilities, levels, models, training, deterrence and international affairs. These are then further grouped into: a) general cyberspace operations; b) deterrence; c) international affairs; d) modelling, simulation and training. The article concludes that research into offensive cyberspace operations is maturing as more information is becoming public. Secondly, current research lists some good basic ideas regarding effects which can be achieved through offensive cyberspace operations, how they should be conducted, and related tools, techniques and procedures. However, discrepancies in research efforts exist, with the majority of research coming primarily from the western world. In addition, secrecy and the resulting limited access to information, coupled with research being either too technically focused or too qualitatively focused, show that there still remains room for research in this field. Finally, some directions for future research are examined.

Intro -- Foreword -- Abstract -- Introduction -- 1. Background -- 1.1. Articles, News Items, Blogs -- 1.2. Western Studies -- 1.3. Ukrainian Studies -- 1.4. The "Ideological Problem" of Russian Historiography -- 2. The Crimean Internet in Figures: 2011-2014 -- 3. The Russian "Information Warfare Machine". The Main Actors -- 4. Russia's Activity. The Channels of Information Influence (October-December 2013) -- 4.1. Internet Forums -- 4.2. The GRU and Facebook -- 4.3. The Twitter of "Crimean Events" -- 4.4. The Blocking of Facebook -- 4.5. The Nationwide Anti-Ukrainian Campaign in Russia: The Crimean Dimension -- 5. The Ukrainian Response. Countermeasures Against Foreign Information Influence -- Conclusions -- References -- Appendix -- Short Biography of the Author.

Government, industry, and academia need better tools to explore threats, opportunities, and human interactions in cyberspace. The interactive exercises called cyber wargames are a powerful way to solve complex problems in a digital environment that involves both cooperation and conflict. Cyber Wargaming is the first book to provide both the theories and practical examples needed to successfully build, play, and learn from these interactive exercises. The contributors to this book explain what cyber wargames are, how they work, and why they offer insights that other methods cannot match. The lessons learned are not merely artifacts of these games - they also shed light on how people interpret and interact with cyberspace in real life. This book covers topics such as cyber action during conventional war, information effects in conflict scenarios, individual versus group decision-making, the intersection of cyber conflicts and nuclear crises, business resilience, emerging technologies, and more.

The aim of this article is to present how Chinese strategies are manifested into offensive cyberspace operations targeting Sweden. It is commonly known that People's Republic of China (PRC, and in this definition the meaning of thegovernment and its military), uses five-year plans (FYP) for social and economic steering strategy of their country. This has been going on since 1953 until today. In 2015, the national strategic plan Made in China 2025 (中国制造2025) was launched by Le Keqiang, the Premier of the State Council of PRC. The main goal with this plan is to strengthen the economic development. In addition, Chinese military strategists noted the importance of information warfare and intelligence during military operations. This article is based on open sources: the official English translated version of the 13th Five-year plan (FYP) and other reporting on cyberspace operations linked to the PRC. A number of cases are presented to highlight the link between the PRC FYP and their targets. Next, the current situation in Sweden is presented and how the country is targeted by PRC-linked activities, both in and through cyberspace, but also military infiltration on academia. The results show that Sweden has been, and is continuously the target of offensive cyberspace operations. In parallel, the country is also the target of military infiltration on the academia, and direct investment strategies such as Huawei attempting to compete for the 5G frequency actions arranged by the Swedish Post and Telecom Authority. In conclusion, Sweden will continue to experience cyberespionage from PRC on all levels and on all domains; science, technology, IP and privacy information theft. Previously unveiled cyberspace operations cases in this article have proven to be a convenient strategy for the PRC to reduce its research and development gap in several ways; innovatively, financially and to shortening the time-to-market (TTM).