Suchergebnisse

Examines the volatility of the international financial market and the danger of provoking a banking and financial crisis in developing countries; recommends national and international financial regulations to minimize the risk.

Economic events & structural problems contributing to the Mexican financial crisis of 1994 are identified. A neoliberal policy was adopted following the crisis of populist politics in the 1980s as the politically correct course, from an international viewpoint. However, it has been impossible to eliminate rent seeking (special interests) in privatization. Special interest groups, eg, local elites, the international banking community, & US interests, have benefited at the expense of the impoverished Mexican population. To resolve the neoliberal crisis, the function of the Mexican state needs to be intelligently reconstructed. 24 References. Adapted from the source document.

After nearly a decade since the 1994 Mexican financial crisis many questions about its causes & treatment remain still unanswered. Both the 1994-1995 Mexican & the 1997-1998 Asian crises are known as the first crises of the globalization era, reflecting the vulnerability of emerging economies tackling financial quandaries. It is extremely important to better evaluate the possibilities of experiencing such crises & the reaction capacity of nations. Emerging economies, whose development usually depends largely on foreign financing & other capital incomes, are particularly fragile to shifts in the behavior of investors. This explains why the topic developed in this article is crucial, as a clear understanding of it prevents from repeating past errors. The authors include political & economic elements in the analysis of the Mexican financial crisis of late 1994. They also stress the relevance of having on hand variables that favor an adequate decision-making. Tables, Figures, Graphs, References. Adapted from the source document.

Effects on external debt, foreign investment, and balance of payments of the extensive economic and financial crisis brought on by the 1994 devaluation of the peso; Mexico. Summary in English.

This article seeks to understand why the Mexican economy ended in three of the last presidential periods with an overvalued exchange rate, high deficits of the current account, unsustainable short term debt, and a financial crisis. The article focuses on the Salinas administration, but shows that a similar logic led to economic crisis in the Echeverria (1970-76) and Lopez Portillo (1976-82) administrations. It is argued that the 1994 crisis is the result of three traps: an international context which allowed a massive entrance of capital flows, the ideology of the state elite, and the incentives provided by the institutional framework. These three traps were also present in the previous two crises. (Rev Econ Polit/DÜI)

This article examines structural breaks in the effect of the unemployment duration for the population of Mexico on the probability of migrating, both internal and internationally. Data from the National Survey of Occupation and Employment for 2007, 2008, and 2010 is used, and estimations are made from both binary and multinomial response models. Furthermore, a Chowtype test is used to estimate structural breaks in the unemployment duration effect after the financial crisis, and sensitivity tests are carried out using different specifications of the migration and unemployment duration variables. The results show that after the crisis the unemployment duration effects on the probability of migrating have been reduced, leading to restrictions on the free mobility of the labor factor

The global financial crisis & the debt crisis of its members in the southern euro zone have clearly shown that the European Union's supranational institutions are neither sufficiently strong nor sufficiently flexible to act forcibly in the face of an emergency. The failures in the supranational system of governance are largely due to the strategy of the "fait accompli." An example of this strategy was the decision to go ahead with the monetary unit before having an agreement on political unity. The EU does not have an instrument to curb pre- & post-contractual opportunism, which has taken Greece, for instance, to the edge of bankruptcy. It is difficult to predict the economic & political consequences of this fiasco in supranational governance. Adapted from the source document.

The paper focuses on the financial and currency crises that took place in the Latin American financial globalization context. It is presented in four sections. A synthetic view of the financial globalization process and the role played by LA is presented in the first section. The second section presents a model encompassing the eighties' and nineties' crises. The position assumed by the IMF is discussed. The third section examines other national financial globalization processes that did not lead to crisis. The "crisis prevention measures", largely based on that experiences, are then commented. Lastly, the fourth section discusses the national paths leading to "segmented financial integration" and presents some reflections about international coordination problems. (Rev Econ Polít/DÜI)

el presente artículo, trata de confrontar los fundamentos e ideas fuerza que caracterizan la globalización como expresión hegemonizada del modelo de desarrollo capitalista en su fase actual, de corte financiero especulativo y con énfasis predominantemente extractivista, con uno de los factores característicos y determinares de la búsqueda y construcción de idearios e imaginarios de paz en Colombia.

This article compares the strategies & policies implemented to solve the bank crises in Mexico (1995) & South Korea (1998). The author maintains that the latter managed its bank crisis more successfully than the former, & explains why. He identifies three factors that contributed to the speedy & successful handling of the crisis in South Korea. (1) He points to the ability of the Korean financial authorities to create consensus for a given strategy & its policies, to implement unpopular measures, to coordinate other authorities, & to resist affected pressure groups. (2) He underlines the Korean government's ability & disposition to quickly admit existing & potential losses in the bank sector during the crisis' initial stages. In the Mexican case, the delay in acknowledging problems in the banking sector led to measures that yielded temporary relief, but did not attack the causes as quickly as expected. (3) The author maintains that in the Korean case, the use of fiscal resources to put the bank sector on a sound basis was straightforward, while in Mexico their use was in several cases discretional, & as a result, the crisis-solving process was politicized & the credibility of the financial authorities was affected; the adopted measures were also affected. 16 Tables, 40 References. Adapted from the source document.

The COVID-19 pandemic in 2020 was a real shock to the entire global community. It hit both the health systems of the infected countries and the economies. Border closures, quarantines for citizens and disruption of production caused economic shock to many organizations. First, the tourism and transport industry suffered, followed by agriculture and mining, and then all other industries. However, the economic crisis also caused some problems in the financial sector: increased risks of non-compliance with loans, cash outs of bank deposits, increased pressure on the insurance market, panic in commodity and securities markets. The purpose of this study is to examine the impact of COVID-19 on the financial system of developed countries. As part of this study, a review of scientific research in the field of pandemics and finances was conducted, how the spread of infection affected the economy, banking, financial markets, and government regulation in the financial sector as a whole.