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In addition to its functional adaptation to the new challenges & first steps toward security cooperation with postcommunist countries, NATO offered full membership to the Czech Republic, Hungary, & Poland in Madrid on 8 July 1997. A privileged security relationship & other benefits are to overcome Russia's opposition. Readiness to admit other applicants later on should avert another partition of Europe. The initial admission of only three new members ought to prevent a possible dilution of the Atlantic Alliance & to limit the costs of expansion. A legal analysis of the enlargement process yields but few interesting insights; NATO tends to avoid detailed legal commitments, preferring "soft law" instead. Adapted from the source document.

So far literature on power & sanctions has not paid much attention to 'positive economic sanctions.' In this article the author distinguishes between three different functions of economic incentives. He argues that they can be seen as face-savers, payments, & signals. Moreover, he examines the effectiveness of positive economic sanctions in negotiations between Bonn & Moscow over the terms of German unification. Although German economic incentives were not the key to Gorbachev's acceptance of unified Germany's membership in NATO, they provide a partial explanation of why Gorbachev changed his mind over the issue. They were particularly important as signals that helped to develop trust between the parties. This implies that it was not so much the amount of positive sanctions that was crucial but the way in which they were delivered. Adapted from the source document.

The Potsdam Agreement of 2 August 1945 concluded by the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union & the US being the main victorious powers of the WWII has entailed far-reaching consequences as if it had been a definite peace treaty, in spite of its questionable legal base for Germany. Specifically, the sequestration of its territories east of the Oder & Neisse rivers & the expulsion of the German inhabitants of these areas & of Eastern Europe determined at Potsdam has never been revoked nor reversed. The Potsdam mode of unilateral decisions taken by the victorious powers is no more applicable to today's practice. The most recent decisions by the International Law Commission of the United Nations are likely to question the legality of the Potsdam Agreement & its results. Adapted from the source document.

In Germany there are unique political-party foundations the scope of which has been extended since the early 1960s to auxiliary activities in the realm of German developmental policies. The author explains the function of the foundations' activities within the developing states: local groups are supported in overcoming obstacles to democratization & in creating institutions for the rule of law as well as open economies, ie, social market systems. At the center of these activities, however, are programs for the training of political & social leaders, for the creation of social & cultural organizations & for building up self-help. Referring to the specific activities of the Christian-democratic Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, the author gives details about the areas & successes of the foundations' developmental work. He concludes by presenting the broad spectrum of its partner organizations in Africa, Asia, & Latin America. Adapted from the source document.

It is one of the most important foreign policy goals of united Germany to achieve a politically & economically stable environment. To promote this goal, Germany advocated the construction of a pan-European order of peace & security. After 1992, due to a changed international framework & to new domestic priorities, the German government corrected its ambitious pan-European policy. Henceforth, it favored the earliest possible incorporation of its direct eastern neighbors into the western alliance. As a result of the re-directed policy, Germany supported NATO enlargement & -- at the same time -- tried to maintain a good relationship with Russia. Germany's foreign policy is closely connected with the aim to promote stability by democratization. Judged by this standard, the whole process of NATO enlargement seems to be dysfunctional & fatally flawed. Adapted from the source document.