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While usually discussed as a cause of crime, guns also may protect against it. Firearm ownership is difficult to measure, but all sources agree that millions of Americans have guns for defense. Although existing research is not in complete agreement, defensive gun ownership appears to increase with fear of crime and with concerns about collective security. How often victims use guns against offenders is controversial; some data suggest that armed resistance is rare, while other data suggest that it is very common. The data showing that firearm defense is rare also indicate that it is often successful.

Firearm ownership is difficult to measure, but all sources agree that millions of Americans have guns for defense. Defensive gun ownership appears to increase with fear of crime & with concerns about collective security. How often victims use guns against offenders is controversial; some data suggest that armed resistance is rare, but successful, while other data suggest that it is very common. 3 Tables, 1 Figure. Adapted from the source document.

The United Nations, the United States, and other interested governments have sought to minimize the proliferation of nuclear weapons. North Korea's apparent attempts to begin production of nuclear materials clearly undermine the goal of non-proliferation. Moreover, the introduction of nuclear weapons onto the Korean peninsula, a site of continued political and military tension, has added a threat of potential nuclear conflict. This Article investigates the history of the Korean crisis and places North Korea's attempt to withdraw from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in the context of the international non-proliferation regime and policy. The author then examines the present collective security system and the evolution of the concept of self-defense in international law, concluding that the traditional concept of self-defense is inadequate to deal with the problem presented by a nuclear threat. In response to this crisis, the author suggests that the United States first pursue a peaceful, diplomatic solution. Economic sanctions, imposed both by the United Nations and by the United States unilaterally, are the next proposed route. As a last resort, the author proposes that the United States should respond to North Korean hostilities by increasing its military presence in the Western Pacific and by executing a preventive strike against North Korean nuclear facilities.

Addressing both scholars of international law and political science as well as decision makers involved in cybersecurity policy, the book tackles the most important and intricate legal issues that a state faces when considering a reaction to a malicious cyber operation conducted by an adversarial state. While often invoked in political debates and widely analysed in international legal scholarship, self-defence and countermeasures will often remain unavailable to states in situations of cyber emergency due to the pervasive problem of reliable and timely attribution of cyber operations to state actors. Analysing the legal questions surrounding attribution in detail, the book presents the necessity defence as an evidently available alternative. However, the shortcomings of the doctrine as based in customary international law that render it problematic as a remedy for states are examined in-depth. In light of this, the book concludes by outlining a special emergency regime for cyberspace.

This article examines to what extent States' right to self-defence should be applied in the outer space. The concept of self-defence within international regulations remains debatable. Brought by the existing reality in international system, this article analyses and suggests in further details that the act of States' right for self-defence should be limited to the act of militarization and not weaponization in the outer space. The argument in this article is carried by the perspective of realism that argues the structure of international system as an anarchy in which states are naturally competing one and another for the purpose of power due to the effect of living within power stratification. Consequently, if states are allowed to exercise their right to self-defence without any limitation, the context of selfdefence becomes broader and will constitute a threat towards international peace and security. Therefore, the right of states to self-defence should be limited within the context of outer space to support only military purpose without any form space-to-space, space-to-earth, or earth-to-space weapons.

Spanish criminal legislation belongs to the group of countries that classify self-defense as reasons which exclude criminal liability, while the criminal law literature in this country accepts so called dualistic conception of self-defense, although there is no unique attitude on the legal nature of this institute. It is very interesting that the legal practice, in spite of basic theory conception that any legal property can represent the object of attack, in a number of cases is rejecting the possibility for perpetrator to cite self-defense for violation of honor. There is a governing attitude that it is not relevant for the existence of attack as a condition for applying the Article 20. p. 4 of the Criminal Code of Spain the circumstance whether the action of the aggressor has been executed with the guilt. When it comes to unlawfulness of the attack, some authors support the attitude that very individual criminal unlawfulness of the aggressor's action can be discussed. Big part of the work was devoted to provoked defense, that is, 'absence of enough provocation by the victim'. Related to condition of simultaneousness of attack and defense, we did not accept the conception according to which in some cases it is acceptable to violate or endanger legal properties of the aggressor after termination of the attack. Further, the condition of defense necessity depends in big part on establishing 'the necessity of rational use of means for the effect of preventing or rejecting the attack' (Article 20. p. 4 of the Criminal Code of Spain). At the end, although legislator in Spain does not explicitly require so called defense mood as a condition for excluding criminal liability, there is a unique conception of both theory and practice on necessity of existence of the self-defense subjective element. ; Špansko krivično zakonodavstvo pripada grupi zemalja koje nužnu odbranu svrstavaju u osnove koji isključuju krivičnu odgovornost, dok krivičnopravna literatura u ovoj zemlji prihvata tzv. dualističko shvatanje nužne odbrane, iako o pravnoj prirodi ovog instituta ne postoji jedinstveno mišljenje. Interesantno je da sudska praksa uprkos načelnom stanovištu teorije da svako pravno dobro može biti objekt napada, u velikom broju slučajeva odbacuje mogućnost da se zbog povrede časti učinilac pozove na nužnu odbranu. Preovladava mišljenje, prema kome za postojanje napada kao uslova za primenu člana 20. stav 4 Krivičnog zakonika Španije, nema značaja okolnost da li je radnja napadača preduzeta sa krivicom. U pogledu protivpravnosti napada, pojedini autori zastupaju stav da se može govoriti o posebnoj krivičnoj protivpravnosti radnje koju preduzima napadač. Veliki deo rada posvećen je isprovociranoj odbrani, tj. 'izostanku dovoljne provokacije od strane napadnutog'. U vezi sa uslovom istovremenosti napada i odbrane, nismo prihvatili stanovište prema kome je u pojedinim slučajevima dozvoljeno povrediti ili ugroziti pravna dobra napadača posle okončanja napada. Dalje, uslov neophodnosti odbrane u velikoj meri zavisi od utvrđivanja 'neophodnosti racionalne upotrebe sredstava radi sprečavanja ili odbijanja napada' (član 20. stav 4 Krivičnog zakonika Španije). Na kraju, iako zakonodavac u Španiji ne zahteva izričito tzv. odbrambenu volju kao uslov za isključenje krivične odgovornosti, jedinstveno je mišljenje teorije i prakse o neophodnosti postojanja subjektivnog elementa nužne odbrane.