Search results

In previous editions of the Journal of Contemporary European Research, we reported on the set-up and progress of the interdisciplinary research project "The European Union and Global Multilateral Governance" (see Vol. 4, No. 1; Vol. 5, No. 1). This third and final research note presents some of the key-results of the project and suggests future areas for research.

This is the second of a series of research notes articles dealing with a research project funded by the University of Leuven. The first part was published in the JCER Volume 4 Issue 1 and third part will be published in a future issue of the JCER.

This is the first of a series of research notes articles dealing with a research project funded by the University of Leuven. The second and third parts will be published in future issues of the JCER.

The tuna resources of the Western and Central Pacific (WCP) are the world's largest and most valuable fisheries of their type and are of significant economic importance to the Pacific Island countries (PICs), through whose waters of national jurisdiction the tuna migrate. Two major concerns exist with the current governance of the fishery. First, PICs are receiving only a small share of the resource rents from the tuna fisheries. Second, current management structure of the fisheries will not ensure the long-term sustainability of the resources. The paper presents a simple model to argue for increased resource taxation as a means of raising tax revenues and improving sustainability of the resource. Such an outcome is only possible when a single policy-maker has the prerogative to set taxes so that the government acts as a Stakelberg leader in this game. Institutional mechanisms to engender cooperation between PIC governments and with distant water fishing nations (DWFNs) to achieve the espoused outcomes of the model are also presented.

The tuna resources of the Western and Central Pacific (WCP) are the world's largest and most valuable fisheries of their type and are of significant economic importance to the Pacific Island countries (PICs), through whose waters of national jurisdiction the tuna migrate. Two major concerns exist with the current governance of the fishery. First, PICs are receiving only a small share of the resource rents from the tuna fisheries. Second, current management structure of the fisheries will not ensure the long-term sustainability of the resources. The paper presents a simple model to argue for increased resource taxation as a means of raising tax revenues and improving sustainability of the resource. Such an outcome is only possible when a single policy-maker has the prerogative to set taxes so that the government acts as a Stakelberg leader in this game. Institutional mechanisms to engender cooperation between PIC governments and with distant water fishing nations (DWFNs) to achieve the espoused outcomes of the model are also presented.