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While the nonviolent struggle of Daw Aung San Suu Kyi against the Burmese military government's continuing repression has captured the world's attention, the profound human rights and humanitarian crisis endured by Burma's ethnic minority communities has largely been ignored. ¶ Decades of armed conflict have devastated ethnic minority communities, which make up approximately 35 percent of Burma's population. The Burmese army, or Tatmadaw, has for many years carried out numerous and widespread summary executions, looting, torture, rape and other sexual violence, arbitrary arrests and torture, forced labor, recruitment of child soldiers, and the displacement and demolition of entire villages as part of military operations against ethnic minority armed opposition groups. Civilians bear the brunt of a state of almost perpetual conflict and militarization. ¶ Violations of international human rights and humanitarian law (the laws of war) by the Tatmadaw have been particularly acute in eastern Karen state, which runs along the northwestern border of Thailand. One woman described to Human Rights Watch more than twenty years of Tatmadaw brutality: . One result of the Tatmadaw's brutal behavior has been the creation of large numbers of internally displaced persons (IDPs) and refugees among Burma's ethnic minority communities. Conflict and its consequences have been going on for so long that in many ethnic minority-populated areas, continuous forced relocations and displacement–– interspersed with occasional periods of relative stability––have become a fact of life for generations of poor villagers. ¶ The scale of the IDP problem in Burma is daunting. Estimates suggest that, as of late 2004, as many as 650,000 people were internally displaced in eastern Burma alone. According to a recent survey, 157,000 civilians have been displaced in eastern Burma since the end of 2002, and at least 240 villages destroyed, relocated, or abandoned. The majority of displaced people live in areas controlled by the government, now known as the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), or by various ethnic armed groups that have agreed to ceasefires with the government. But approximately eighty-four thousand displaced people live in zones of ongoing armed conflict, where the worst human rights abuses continue. Many IDPs live in hiding in war zones. Another two million Burmese live in Thailand, including 145,000 refugees living in camps. ¶ Karen State is the location of some of the largest numbers of IDPs in Burma. Since 2002, approximately 100,000 people have been displaced from Karen areas, which include parts of Pegu and Tenasserim Divisions. Though a provisional ceasefire was agreed in December 2003 between the SPDC and the Karen National Union (KNU), sporadic fighting continues. Tatmadaw military operations against the KNU's army, the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), in the first months of 2005 caused numerous deaths and injuries to civilians in poor villages along the Thai border. They also forced many civilians to flee internally or to Thailand. For example, at least 9,000 civilians were displaced in Toungoo District, in the far north of Karen State bordering Karenni State, and in Nyaunglebin District in northwest Karen State, during major Tatmadaw offensives between November 2004 and February 2005. ¶ The majority of Karen IDPs have been forced out of their homes as a direct result of the Tatmadaw's "Four Cuts" counter-insurgency strategy, in which the Burmese army has attempted to defeat armed ethnic groups by denying them access to food, funds, recruits, and information from other insurgent groups. H.T., a twenty-eight year-old Karen from Dooplaya District, described his experience with the Tatmadaw in January 2005: . ¶ This report describes the situation in government-controlled areas, including relocation sites, which are generally not accessible from across the Thailand border. The report identifies two main causes of displacement: • Displacement due to armed conflict as a direct result of fighting, or because armed conflict has undermined human and food security and livelihood options; and • Displacement due to human rights violations, particularly land rights caused by Tatmadaw and militia confiscation of land and other violations of land rights, especially in the context of natural resource extraction, such as logging and mining. Other rights violations, such as forced labor, killings, torture, and rape, also cause displacement. ¶ The report describes patterns of abuse and forced relocation over a period of many years. It documents how serious violations of international humanitarian law and human rights abuses continue to occur in some parts of Karen State, such as Toungoo and Nyaunglebin Districts, while other areas are relatively quiet. It recommends a need to think of new and more realistic answers to the dilemmas faced by IDPs, many of whom may not be able––or may not want––to go home again. ¶ For this report, Human Rights Watch interviewed community leaders, representatives of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), staff at community-based organizations (CBOs), U.N. officials, and many others. Most important, we interviewed forty-six Karen IDPs living in the Papun hills, in mid-late 2003, and along the Thai border, in early 2005. These forty-six individuals altogether were displaced more than one thousand times. Incredibly, five individuals had been forcibly displaced more than one hundred times. One of these five, an elderly woman, first fled to the jungle during World War II, when Japanese soldiers came to her village. ¶ All the interviewees for this report had been farmers and continue to derive most of their food from working their own or others' rice fields. These fields remain susceptible to destruction by Tatmadaw patrols. Displacement often means that new land must be cleared for farming, rather than farmers being able to return to former swidden fields in sustainable rotation after fallow swiddens have regained their fertility. Over time, the disruption of traditional agricultural practices has seriously undermined livelihoods and caused encroachment by swidden farmers into primary forest, rather than rotating their plots in secondary forest customarily used for swidden agriculture. ¶ Many IDPs have been displaced for some time, and live alongside others who are not–– or have not recently been––displaced. Their needs may therefore be similar to those of other vulnerable populations in peri-urban and rural Burma. ¶ The main problems identified by interviewees were lack of consistent access to food; insufficient income and livelihood problems; human rights abuses and poor physical security related to displacement and fighting; lack of access to education and health services; and, finally, the problem of landmines, which destroy both land and their victims' lives. Their primary need is to be able to farm properly, without disturbance, and thus improve income and food security, as well as better access to education and health services. All wanted to, as one interviewee put it, "live in peace and with justice." Most of these problems are linked to longer-term structural problems, and can only be addressed in the context of socio-economic––and above all political––solutions to Burma's protracted ethnic conflicts. ¶ The findings of this report caution against assuming that all IDPs necessarily want to return "home." Returning home can be a problematic concept for people who have been on the move for long periods of time. Many IDPs may wish to return home, if it still exists, but others may want to stay put or resettle elsewhere. Some who have returned home or have otherwise resettled still face major problems, while others have not. Some have not moved and built new lives in the place to which they were displaced, often in the jungle hills or in a relocation site. ¶ Thus, those providing assistance should avoid taking a one-size-fits all approach to meeting the needs of IDPs. Instead, the focus should be on individual choice and the needs of specific communities. Indeed, the U.N. Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement, which summarize existing international law as it applies to IDPs, make choice the touchstone. Competent authorities have a duty to "establish conditions, as well as provide the means" to allow voluntary resettlement and integration in the place to which people are displaced, if that is their choice. ¶ An understanding of long-term patterns of forced displacement should inform the design of humanitarian, development, and socio-political interventions on behalf of the displaced. One aspect that deserves careful consideration is the effect of ceasefires on the human rights situation and on displacement. Over the past decade many armed ethnic groups have entered into ceasefires with the military government in Rangoon. In some parts of the country, ceasefires have meant a reduction in the most severe forms of human rights abuses, though this has not usually led to greater respect for other basic rights, such as freedom of expression or the right to due process of law. But in many cases, ceasefires have been quietly accompanied by the reemergence of local civil society actors. This has been one of the most important, yet under-studied, aspects of the ceasefires in Burma. ¶ The SPDC and KNU agreed to an informal ceasefire in December 2003. In some parts of Karen State, the situation began to stabilize. Across the whole of Tenasserim Division, and much of lower and western Karen State, there has been less fighting and fewer of the most severe type of human rights violations, such as extrajudicial executions and torture, than before. Some IDPs are beginning to return from hiding places in the jungle and from relocation sites to build more permanent houses and grow crops other than swidden rice. However, the Tatmadaw continues its aggressive use of forced labor, especially on road-building projects, land confiscation, and arbitrary taxation in many areas. It has recently stepped up attacks on a variety of armed ethnic groups. Under the right conditions, a ceasefire between the SPDC and the KNU could deliver a substantial improvement in the human rights situation, creating the space in which local and international organizations can begin to address the urgent needs of Karen IDPs. But the situation may yet return to guerilla warfare and full-scale counterinsurgency. ¶ Many of the ceasefires are now under threat. Since the purging of General Khin Nyunt last October, hard-liners in the SPDC have attempted to undermine ceasefires agreed between Rangoon and several armed ethnic groups since 1989. In mid-2005, the future of these ceasefires looks more and more uncertain. .

The failure of successive U.S. administrations to distinguish between core and peripheral national security interests lies at the heart of much of the trouble that we now face.
Nowhere is this failure of discernment clearer than in the Biden administration's 2022 National Security Strategy, which laid out an ambitious two front Cold War strategy that seeks to simultaneously staunch China's rise in the East while countering Russian revanchism in the West. It defines the emerging world order as one in which "Democracies and autocracies are engaged in a contest to show which system of governance can best deliver for their people and the world."
Close observers of U.S. foreign policy over the past three years might be forgiven for wondering whether the administration has succeeded in achieving any of the particular goals it has set for itself. But in fairness to the Biden administration, such failures have become commonplace over the past 30 years.
The journalist and editor Lewis Lapham noted as far back as 2002 that, "The makers of America's foreign policy over the course of the previous fifty years have embraced a dream of power almost as vainglorious as the one that rallied the disciples of Osama bin Laden to the banner of jihad."
In the 20 years since Lapham wrote those words, the U.S. has stumbled into multiple foreign policy disasters, including but not limited to the needless and counterproductive regime change operations in Libya and Syria, the failed nation-building enterprises in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the current NATO-Russia standoff in Ukraine.
Surely then, the time has arrived for a policy of retrenchment and a shift toward an approach based on a hemispheric conception of U.S. national security.
The old way of doing business has failed: Eighty years after the end of the Second World War, the U.S. has nearly 800 military bases and outposts spanning the globe; an annual national security budget of over $1 trillion; and formal bilateral defense commitments to 69 countries.
Still more, the U.S. has seemingly committed itself to the security and prosperity of countries to which it is not treaty bound, such as Israel and Ukraine.
The dangers of American overextension and Washington's desire to remake the world in its self-image have been apparent for decades.
For generations, revered analysts and thinkers across a wide range of the political spectrum — including George F. Kennan, George Ball, William Pfaff, Reinhold Niebuhr, Walter Lippmann, Ronald Steel, Jack Matlock, Chas Freeman and John Mearsheimer — have been sounding the alarm.
Yet our professional political class has been unwilling or unable to consider common-sense alternatives to the so-called "grand strategy" of American global hegemony laid out by Paul Wolfowitz in 1992.
It was then, as under secretary for policy at the Pentagon, that Wolfowitz authored the Defense Planning Guidance, which posited that "If necessary, the United States must be prepared to take unilateral action" in order "to prevent the re-emergence of a new rival."
The new defense strategy, wrote Wolfowitz,
"….requires that we endeavor to prevent any hostile power from dominating a region whose resources would, under consolidated control, be sufficient to generate global power. These regions include Western Europe, East Asia, the territory of the former Soviet Union, and Southwest Asia."
In a curious twist of history, though Wolfowitz's doctrine was savaged by the press and publicly disavowed by the administration at the time, in the years that followed, little by little (under Bill Clinton) and then all at once (under George W. Bush) his vision became the cornerstone of U.S. national security policy. In the same way that George Kennan's Long Telegram set the template for U.S. policy during the 40-year Cold War, Wolfowitz's doctrine of global primacy set the agenda for the post-Cold War world.
Thirty years of Wolfowitz has been more than enough, thank you.
As the world continues to evolve and the center of gravity moves from the North Atlantic to Eurasia and the Global South, Washington would surely be better served if it abandoned its global pretensions and focused on securing its own neighborhood in the Western Hemisphere.
The U.S. can and should pursue a national security policy that abjures the costly strategy of U.S. military forward presence and brings American troops home. After all, as the decorated US Army Colonel (ret.) Douglas Macgregor has pointed out, "Forward presence actually discourages 'allies' and 'partners' from taking full responsibility for their own defense. In an age dominated by precision guided intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance-strike systems any forward presence force — aerospace, maritime, or ground — risks annihilation in the opening phase of any peer or near-peer enemy attack."
As has been said many times over, Europe is plenty capable of looking after itself both economically and militarily. Eighty years after the end of the Second World War, the U.S. should finally cede guardianship over matters relating to European security. Recall that as far back as 1958, President Dwight D. Eisenhower expressed his frustration with Europe's stubborn unwillingness to look after itself. According to the historian William R. Keylor, Eisenhower believed it was high time to to "wean" the Allies from their excessive dependence on the U.S. "and encourage them to make better efforts of their own."
The benefits of a less Euro-centric security policy are only too clear in light of current events. Given the emerging geopolitical realities in Asia, the U.S. might usefully rethink its posture in Europe. One way to signal to the Europeans that the time has come for them to stand on their own would be to open for the first time in NATO's history the position of Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR) to non-Americans. While a full withdrawal from the alliance seems highly unlikely in the near to medium term, other options remain, such as drawing down the number of U.S. military personnel in Europe, currently estimated at 100,000. Such a shift would perhaps allay Russia's fears (and belligerence) regarding the North Atlantic alliance, and could provide an opening for the Europeans to at long last craft a new, comprehensive security architecture that takes into account the security interests of all of Europe.
Indeed, such a shift would allow the U.S. to deploy its resources to the Western Hemisphere. One way to do so would be to use the 2020 U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA) as a framework to implement mutual defense provisions between the three nations - with an eye toward expanding it to other strategically relevant countries, such as Panama and Colombia.
A hemispheric alliance stretching from the Arctic to the Panama Canal might reasonably be coupled with a New Marshall Plan for Latin America in order to win hearts and minds and to help address the scourge of drug and human trafficking that has long afflicted the region. After all, shouldn't securing the American border take priority over securing Ukraine's?
There is little doubt that proposals such as these will give rise to accusations of promoting isolationism — or worse. So be it.
The fact is that U.S. national security strategy has too often left us at the mercy of client states from Taiwan to Ukraine to Georgia to Israel: States that are all too eager to leverage, with the relentless agitation of their large and well-funded domestic lobbies, American largess and military might in disputes that have little if anything to do with the actual security of the United States.
A hemispheric posture would allow the U.S. to finally, three decades after the end of the Cold War, redirect our sorely needed resources back to where they belong: the American people.

Thématique du numéro : Grandes questions urbaines et régionales ; International audience ; Ten years ago, the SRU law initiated an ambivalent reform of the railway system of passenger transport in France. It preserves the monopoly of operation of the historical operator, but transfers the political responsibility for organizing the regional railway system to the regions. The economic theory suggests that the monopoly led to a revenue capture. With the surplus accounts method, which will be displayed on the SNCF-TER billing account, we can show that, on this initial stage, the Infrastructure Manager (RFF) has been the main beneficiary of the total available surplus, far ahead from the passenger who might benefit from the rail regionalization. The effect on local communities is more equivocal. If the regions have been able to control the border price of the operating subsidy, tolls excepted, they had to yield significant benefits for the rolling stock modernization. A more detailed approach shows how each region is a particular "TER economic model" ruled by a specific mode of governance. ; Il y a dix ans, la loi SRU a ouvert une réforme ambivalente du système ferroviaire de transport de voyageurs en France. Elle préserve le monopole d'exploitation de l'opérateur historique, mais confie aux Régions la responsabilité d'autorité organisatrice. La théorie économique suggère que le monopole conduit à une capture de rente. Par la méthode des comptes de surplus, que nous déployons sur le compte de facturation SNCF-TER, nous montrons qu'en cette phase initiale, RFF est le principal bénéficiaire du surplus total disponible, loin devant les voyageurs tendanciellement bénéficiaires de la régionalisation ferroviaire. L'effet sur les collectivités publiques est plus équivoque. Si les Régions ont su maîtriser la frontière de prix de la subvention d'exploitation, hors péages, elles ont dû céder d'importants avantages au titre de la modernisation du matériel roulant. Une approche plus fine montre combien chaque Région constitue ...

The issue of the health of in and out of work people has become important in the countries belonging to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). One of the least visible categories of workers are those who are unemployed or not in employment. The aim of the thesis is to understand the lived experience of unemployment and/or non-employment in order to target the way these people are anchored in a society, particularly here in France, and the healthprocess that can emerge from it. The thesis favours the perspective of the clinical psychosociology of work, focused on the understanding of symbolic and material exchanges that transform social and individual realities (Clot & Lhuilier, 2006 ; Lhuilier, 2006). A collaborative research was conducted in a priority area of the city policy with political and social actors and inhabitants, and more specifically within two associative groups, one cultural (voluntary work activities) of eight people and the other artistic (wood sculpture) of six people. The data collection was carried out through 52 repeated semi-directive interviews with unemployed volunteer members, 38 non-directive interviews with social and political actors and residents, 172 direct and participatory observation sessions within the associations, and the adaptation of the Inventory of the Activity System (Curie, Hajjar, Marquié & Roques, 1990) so that unemployed subjects could describe their spheres of life themselves. The material was analyzed using the grounded theory (Paillé, 2017). Our research discusses the theories of normativity (Canguilhem, 1966) and creativity (Winnicott, 1971) in order to shed light on the health process. In this thesis, we are going to present the career path of the 14 people as well as the group dynamic that is favourable or unfavourable to maintaining the health of unemployed people. Our results show that deficiencies (safety, needs, prevention.) linked to the environment, especially here at work, can be harmful to physical, psychological and physiological health. And that the performance of a significant activity can be the source of perceived and proven satisfactory health. The artistic association seems to represent more of an endo and exogenous resource for the unemployed, as it promotes the circulation of affects, the development of the power to act and would contribute to maintaining a balance between spheres of life as well as the creation of new vital and social norms. The cultural association seems to present endogenous deficiencies, where the group would withdraw into the collective, thus preventing everyone from developing their "being in the world" and the creation of new norms of life. On a political level, the consideration of urban policy leads to negativity around a 'public text' in the cultural association which is a source of individual and group impediments, while in the artistic association the subversion of negativity leads to a 'hidden text' which is a source of development. This research will help us to set up health consultations at work, in unemployment, and also helps to modify the medium and long term objectives of both associations. ; La question de la santé des personnes en emploi et hors emploi est devenue importante dans les pays de l'Organisation de Coopération et de Développement Économiques (OCDE). Les personnes en situation de chômage ou de non-emploi constituent une des catégories de travailleurs les moins visibles. La thèse a pour objectif de comprendre l'expérience vécue du chômage et/ou du non-emploi afin de cibler la manière dont les personnes s'ancrent dans une société, notamment ici française, ainsi que le processus de santé qui peut s'en dégager. La thèse privilégie la perspective de la psychosociologie clinique du travail, axée sur la compréhension des échanges symboliques et matériels, qui transforment les réalités sociales et individuelles (Clot & Lhuilier, 2006 ; Lhuilier, 2006). Une recherche collaborative a été réalisée dans un quartier prioritaire de la politique de la ville auprès des acteurs politiques, sociaux et des habitants, et plus spécifiquement au sein deux groupes associatifs, un culturel (activités d'aide et de bénévolat) auprès de huit personnes et l'autre artistique (sculpture sur bois) auprès de six personnes. Le recueil de données a été réalisé via 52 entretiens semi-directifs répétés auprès des adhérents- bénévoles sans emploi, 38 entretiens non-directifs auprès des acteurs sociaux, politiques et habitants, 172 séances d'observations directes et participantes au sein des associations, et l'adaptation de l'Inventaire du Système des Activités (Curie, Hajjar, Marquié & Roques, 1990) afin que les sujets sans emploi puissent décrire eux-mêmes leurs sphères de vie. Le matériau a été analysé via la théorisation ancrée (Paillé, 2017). Notre recherche discute les théories de la normativité (Canguilhem, 1966) et de la créativité (Winnicott, 1971) afin d'éclairer le processus de santé. Nous proposons dans cette thèse de présenter le parcours des 14 personnes ainsi que les dynamiques groupales favorables ou non au maintien de la santé des personnes sans emploi. Nos résultats montrent que les carences (sécurités, besoins, préventions.) liées à un environnement, notamment ici professionnel, peuvent être dommageables pour la santé physique, psychique et physiologique. Et, que la réalisation d'une activité significative peut être à la source d'une santé perçue et éprouvée satisfaisante. L'association artistique semble plus représenter une ressource endo et exogène pour les personnes sans emploi car elle favorise la circulation d'affects, le développement du pouvoir d'agir et contribuerait à maintenir un équilibre entre les sphères de vie ainsi que la création de nouvelles normes vitales et sociales. L'association culturelle semble présenter des carences endogènes, où le groupe serait refermé sur le collectif empêchant ainsi chacun d'y développer son « être au monde » et la création de nouvelles normes de vie. Sur le plan politique, la prise en compte de la politique de la ville engendre une négativité autour d'un « texte public » dans l'association culturelle source d'empêchement individuel et groupal alors que dans l'association artistique la subversion de la négativité engendre un « texte caché » source de développement. Cette recherche va nous aider à mettre en place des consultations santé au travail, au chômage et aussi elle participera à la modification des objectifs, à moyen et long terme, des deux associations.

Die Corona-Pandemie hat auch im kulturellen Bereich tiefe Wunden hinterlassen und einen enormen Wandel angestoßen. Was braucht die Kunst nach der Krise? Welche Konzepte der Kulturförderung waren und sind hilfreich? Das interdisziplinäre Team von Wissenschaftler*innen um Wolfgang Schneider analysiert in zwölf thematischen Teilstudien Wirkmechanismen und Potenziale kulturpolitischer Instrumentarien. Dabei fokussieren sie auf die Aspekte der künstlerischen Produktion, des Produktions- und Spielbetriebs, der Radiuserweiterung sowie der Kultur- und Förderpolitik. Ausgehend von dieser umfassenden Bestandsaufnahme formulieren sie Handlungsempfehlungen für eine zukunftsgerichtete Theaterlandschaft.

This handbook offers an up-to-date analysis of the African agenda for conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding; the challenges and opportunities facing the AU and RECs? efforts in achieving a Pax Africana; and the role of external actors including the United Nations (UN) and former colonial powers Britain and France, but also key (non-African) troop contributing countries in these efforts. Building on the late Kenyan scholar Ali Mazrui?s concept of Pax Africana - Africans taking responsibility for the maintenance of peace and security on their own continent - the authors argue that the transformation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) into the AU in 2002, was a concrete step towards the realisation of an African-wrought vision of continental peace and prosperity, and has since witnessed the creation of a set of institutions - together known as the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) - for more robust conflict management

The real security interests law/secured transactions has gone through crucial changes following a series of several reforms which has affected it. If the subject matter has undoubtedly been modernized, it is obvious that the real security interests law/secured transactions is still lacking of general consistency which is linked simultaneously to the large numbers of proposal on security interests and to the insufficiency of federative rules which come to govern the whole. Actually, the problem poses the question to know if it is possible and conceivable to put forward a base of more sophisticated general rules, or even a general law, and according to what methods? The interrogation underlines the efficacy of ohada real securities law in regard to the inadequacy between the objectives of the African legislator and the means used by him to achieve them. In other words, it is admitted to question on the way of a reinforcement of the actual real securities law in sight of a greatest efficacy. In regard to the international experiences, the answer of these questioning is found, in our opinion, in a reform more ambitious of the ohada real securities law which is going to lead to the adoption of a functional approach as it was observed in States with the same juridical culture of ours. In concrete terms, it is important to give back, through this functional conception of securities interest, coherence, and simplicity, in sum, efficacy to ohada real securities law likewise to bring it closer to the population and to the socio-economic realities of ohada member States while revealing the international economic stakes. ; Le droit des sûretés réelles a fait l'objet de profondes mutations à la suite de plusieurs réformes successives qui viennent de l'affecter. Si la matière s'est indubitablement modernisée, il reste qu'elle souffre d'un manque de cohérence globale qui tient tout à la fois à la trop grande offre de sûretés et à l'insuffisance de règles fédératrices venant régir l'ensemble. La question se pose alors de savoir ...

Trotz unterschiedlicher Entwicklungslinien und Rationalitäten besitzen die Sozialwissenschaften, die steuerungstechnischen politischen Systemtheorien und die Wirtschafts- und Ingenieurwissenschaften im Hinblick auf den Umgang mit Komplexität disziplinübergreifend große Analogien. Dies zeigt der Band anhand komparatistischer Analysen der einzelnen Disziplinen. Die Zusammenhänge werden dabei durch präzise Zusammenfassungen und praktische Randbemerkungen sowie durch Abbildungen und zahlreiche Beispiele aus der Praxis für alle Disziplinen übergreifend anschaulich gemacht.Das Buch richtet sich zugleich an Sozial- und Politikwissenschaftler wie an Ingenieure. Der Aufbau des Werks ermöglicht dabei auch den disziplinspezifischen Einsatz in der jeweiligen Lehre bzw. Weiterbildung.Dr. Günter Rittmann hat Elektro-/Nachrichtentechnik studiert und nach über 30-jähriger Berufstätigkeit ein Zweitstudium in Politikwissenschaft absolviert

This paper aims to ascertain the effects of convergence in governance on investment decisions among a sample of 43 developing countries, using dynamic system GMM estimations. In an increasingly interdependent economic world, regions with good governance are considered to be areas of higher investment, as a result of further integration and collaborative action among member states. Since its foundation, in 1992, Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) countries have gone through a transition process and, to a large extent, this is about institutional transformation. Good governance institutions are an assurance to guarantee property rights and minimize transaction costs, thus creating an environment conducive to investment and growth. In this paper, we investigate the impact of BSEC on its member countries regarding convergence of governance institutions. We show that convergence has occurred within the region with respect to bureaucratic quality, control over corruption, law and order, internal conflict, ethnic tensions, but not to government stability and democratic accountability. The paper also calculates how much capital accumulation the region would gain by reaching the average institutional standards of the EU-12. This study is the first attempt in the BSEC region to investigate the link between regionalization and institutional convergence, at the same time as to quantify its economic impact through investment.

This paper aims to ascertain the effects of convergence in governance on investment decisions among a sample of 43 developing countries, using dynamic system GMM estimations. In an increasingly interdependent economic world, regions with good governance are considered to be areas of higher investment, as a result of further integration and collaborative action among member states. Since its foundation, in 1992, Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) countries have gone through a transition process and, to a large extent, this is about institutional transformation. Good governance institutions are an assurance to guarantee property rights and minimize transaction costs, thus creating an environment conducive to investment and growth. In this paper, we investigate the impact of BSEC on its member countries regarding convergence of governance institutions. We show that convergence has occurred within the region with respect to bureaucratic quality, control over corruption, law and order, internal conflict, ethnic tensions, but not to government stability and democratic accountability. The paper also calculates how much capital accumulation the region would gain by reaching the average institutional standards of the EU-12. This study is the first attempt in the BSEC region to investigate the link between regionalization and institutional convergence, at the same time as to quantify its economic impact through investment.

The Council of Europe, created in 1949, is the oldest European political organization yet it is the most misunderstood. However, it plays an active role in shaping human rights policies, democratic regimes and the rule of law in Europe. Although all the decision-making power is in the hands of the member States, the Council of Europe progressively gains political leverage by generating a whole corpus of treaties and a set ofimplementation policies, putting serious constraints on the States which ratify them. The most famous is the European Court of Human Rights. This treaty not only deals with human rights policies but also relates to the organization of the territory, minority rights and languages as well as newer social issues such as bioethics, cybercrime and terrorism.The Council of Europe was the best suited European organization to integrate Central and Eastern Europe States (CEES) after the fall of the Berlin Wall, and to help them make the transition to democratic institutions, respectful of the fundamental European values in order to be able to join the European Union. These widenings continued to the Russian Federation and Caucasus.Since the integration of 10 CEES between 2004 and 2007 within the European Union, the Council of Europe has been confronted with a deep identity crisis which force the institution into redefining its position and its role in the construction of Europe, in a context of increasingly sharp ideological confrontation between Russia and European Union State members. ; Le Conseil de l'Europe, créé en 1949, est la plus ancienne des organisations politiques européennes bien qu'elle soit méconnue. Son rôle est pourtant déterminant dans les domaines des droits de l'homme, de la démocratie pluraliste et de la prééminence du droit en Europe. Fonctionnant sur le mode classique d'une organisation intergouvernementale laissant tout le pouvoir de décision aux Etats membres, le Conseil de l'Europea pu progressivement générer tout un corpus de traités contraignants pour les Etats qui les ratifient, et a su développer plusieurs mécanismes de suivi pour les faire respecter, dont le plus célèbre est la Cour européenne des droits de l'homme. Au-delà des droits de l'homme stricto sensu, une partie de ces traités concerne l'organisation du territoire, le droit des minorités et de leurs langues, ou certains problèmes de société nouveaux(bioéthique, cybercriminalité, terrorisme).Le Conseil de l'Europe s'est ainsi trouvée être l'organisation la mieux placée pour accueillir les Pays d'Europe Centrale et Orientale (PECO) après la chute du Mur de Berlin, et pour les aider à se démocratiser et à respecter les valeurs européennes fondamentales pour pouvoir ensuite intégrer l'Union européenne. Ces élargissements se sont poursuivis jusqu'à la Fédération de Russie et le Caucase.Depuis les élargissements de l'Union européenne à dix PECO en 2004 et 2007, le Conseil de l'Europe est confronté à une profonde crise identitaire qui l'oblige à redéfinir sa place et son rôle dans la construction européenne, dans un contexte d'affrontement idéologique de plus en plus vif entre la Russie et les Etats membres de l'Union européenne.

The Council of Europe, created in 1949, is the oldest European political organization yet it is the most misunderstood. However, it plays an active role in shaping human rights policies, democratic regimes and the rule of law in Europe. Although all the decision-making power is in the hands of the member States, the Council of Europe progressively gains political leverage by generating a whole corpus of treaties and a set ofimplementation policies, putting serious constraints on the States which ratify them. The most famous is the European Court of Human Rights. This treaty not only deals with human rights policies but also relates to the organization of the territory, minority rights and languages as well as newer social issues such as bioethics, cybercrime and terrorism.The Council of Europe was the best suited European organization to integrate Central and Eastern Europe States (CEES) after the fall of the Berlin Wall, and to help them make the transition to democratic institutions, respectful of the fundamental European values in order to be able to join the European Union. These widenings continued to the Russian Federation and Caucasus.Since the integration of 10 CEES between 2004 and 2007 within the European Union, the Council of Europe has been confronted with a deep identity crisis which force the institution into redefining its position and its role in the construction of Europe, in a context of increasingly sharp ideological confrontation between Russia and European Union State members. ; Le Conseil de l'Europe, créé en 1949, est la plus ancienne des organisations politiques européennes bien qu'elle soit méconnue. Son rôle est pourtant déterminant dans les domaines des droits de l'homme, de la démocratie pluraliste et de la prééminence du droit en Europe. Fonctionnant sur le mode classique d'une organisation intergouvernementale laissant tout le pouvoir de décision aux Etats membres, le Conseil de l'Europea pu progressivement générer tout un corpus de traités contraignants pour les Etats qui les ...

Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio's successful visit to Washington between 9 and 11 April testified to a deepening of the US-Japan alliance and important strategic shifts across the First Island Chain, which includes archipelagos stretching from the Kurils up in Northeast Asia down to the Japanese archipelago, Taiwan, the Philippines, all the way south to the Malay peninsula in Southeast Asia.
This is part and parcel of a shift in favour of a "Strategy of Denial", as per the thinking of then US Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Force Development Elbridge Colby, a key policymaker under the Trump administration.[1] According to Colby, the US would double its efforts at balancing China, enlist US allies and partners across the First Island Chain to buttress deterrence capabilities towards the People's Republic – including in Taiwan – and avoid a potentially domino-like process of subordination to Beijing. These efforts revolve around Japan's ability to shoulder more security responsibilities, a strengthened and more seamless US-Japan alliance – including joint operational planning over a Taiwan crisis scenario and the restructuring of portions of the US military planning to Japan – and a set of geopolitical minilaterals, within which the US-Japan alliance plays a key role.US-Japan(-Philippines) cooperation in the security domain
Japan's three strategic documents from December 2022 and the joint statements by Japan and the US in 2023 suggest that the transpacific allies are indeed working in lockstep in the security domain, with deterrence and coercive diplomacy vis-à-vis China high in policymakers' minds. According to these documents, Japan is about to shoulder more security responsibilities as it militarises and embraces offensive strike capabilities. In the process, Japan would ease US fatigue and work side-by-side to buttress its military and diplomatic projection – an aspect emphasised by Kishida in his speech to a joint session of the US Congress. Interestingly, Kishida's visit coincided with a trilateral Japan-Philippines-US summit, which attested to the strategic outreaches of both Washington and Tokyo to interlock the US hub-and-spokes system across the First Island Chain.
Japan's minilateral diplomacy aimed at purposeful multi-layered security ententes, often on an ad hoc basis, has worked in concert with the US government's regional efforts. The aim has been to balance China militarily, counter its regional and global diplomatic and economic influence, and do so "by taking full advantage of comprehensive national power, including diplomatic, defence, economic, technological, and intelligence/information capabilities", as per Japan's 2022 National Security Strategy.[2]
This whole-of-government grand strategy walked side-by-side with the US concept of an "integrated deterrence" that leveraged allies' capabilities, including basing rights and access for the aforementioned strategic objectives. The force posture and – to all effects – military doctrine changes in Japan have gone hand in hand with increases of US basing rights in both Japan and the Philippines and through enhanced bilateral military cooperation with Manila.Developments in the Taiwan Strait and the creation of the MLR
While underplayed by government actors, especially so now that US-China relations have (to some extent) stabilised and public reassurances are gaining more traction, the Taiwan-specific aspects of these strategic changes are worthy of note.
From a geopolitical standpoint, Japan and the US benefit from the preservation of the status quo across the Taiwan Strait because it bottles up China's advancement into the seas within the First Island Chain and facilitates the tracking of Chinese military assets venturing beyond it, including intercontinental ballistic missiles, ships and submarines. In fact, as mentioned, the Japanese government has been discreetly overhauling its security regime, military doctrine and force posture to preserve a modicum of military balance of power, even just asymmetrically, to deter Chinese aggression.
In parallel, the US government has been providing Taiwan with weapons, training and ways to bolster resilience along its newfound emphasis on asymmetric deterrence across the First Island Chain, while eliciting coalition-building with and among third parties, including NATO allies.
Japan's interlinkage of its own security with Taiwan's is evident in US-Japan alliance developments in 2023. On 11 January 2023, the Japan-US "2+2" meeting of foreign and defence ministers was held in Washington during which both governments announced that "the 12th Marine Regiment w[ould] be reorganized into the 12th Marine Littoral Regiment by 2025", a move aimed at "strengthen[ing] alliance deterrence and response capabilities by positioning more versatile, resilient, and mobile forces with increased intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, anti-ship, and transportation capabilities".[3] This initiative dovetailed with the expansion of the US-Philippines Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement to allow for four new US bases in key spots across the First Island Chain, thus increasing from five to nine, with more possibly in store to allow for rotational deployments.
Effectively, the Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR), made up of ca. 1,800-2,000 servicemen, will split into smaller teams of 50-100 soldiers to allow for intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) of Chinese activities across the East and South China Seas by deploying unmanned surface, underwater and aerial vehicles. Hence, in a contingency, these US amphibious teams in Japanese and the Philippines' territory may distribute maritime operations (that is, disperse lethal forces) through anti-ship missiles and low-altitude defence systems, all while theoretically hopping from island to island every 48 to 72 hours to avoid Chinese attacks, while continuing to conduct ISR and fight. These so-called "stand-in forces", which will have to rely on Japanese military and/or civilian facilities (and, potentially, on Japan's direct military involvement), may well disrupt a Chinese blockade or amphibious landing on Taiwan and facilitate logistical support to the self-governed island. Finally, and in connection to that, a Japan-Philippines Reciprocal Access Agreement, which is currently under negotiation, would strengthen the Tokyo-Manila security side of the newly born trilateral.Enlisting the Republic of Korea
Aside from the US-Japan alliance preparations for a Taiwan contingency and coordination with the Philippines, minilateral alignments have gone through the enlisting of the Republic of Korea (RoK), better known as South Korea. The advent of the conservative Yoon Suk-Yeol presidency translated into a stronger RoK alignment with the US and its goals. In fact, an Indo-Pacific Strategy was announced in December 2022. Yoon Suk-Yeol specifically assigned its development to the North America Affairs Bureau of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, suggesting a desire to align with Washington. Aided by his forceful character as a former prosecutor, Yoon single-handedly abandoned his predecessor Moon Jae-in's engagement policy towards the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), aka North Korea, and aligned more fully with the United States on the China and Russia dossiers, so much so that it "indirectly" supplied more artillery shells to Ukraine than all European countries combined. Yoon's decision to tilt on one side of the conflict in Ukraine was not a foregone policy choice given the influence and leverage that Russia and China may exert over their North Korean neighbour, which constitutes Seoul's main foreign and security policy preoccupation. These developments cemented the idea of a progressive rift among competitive blocs, following Russia's 2022 war of aggression in Ukraine.
More importantly, and through active US intercession under the Biden administration, the South Korean government took the initiative in perhaps the hardest foreign policy call: reprising dialogue with Japan. This had soured over a negative spiral of disputes over the legacy of past colonial occupation and economic retaliation, especially in 2019. Kishida's mellower public persona and more conciliatory political background compared to his immediate predecessors in Japan's Prime Minister's Office, the late Abe Shinzō in particular, partly smoothened the road. But there were no meaningful concessions from the Japanese government's side, not least because of Kishida's unpopularity and, crucially, the weight of nationalists within his own Liberal Democratic Party (LDP).
Still, the stabilisation of Japan-RoK relations – two major US allies – ushered the way for the landmark trilateral US-Japan-RoK cooperation, as evidenced by the Camp David summit of 18 August 2023.[4] There too, minilateral cooperation expanded horizontally to include the diplomatic, educational and technological fields. But the key "integrated deterrence" outcomes were in security, through expanded intelligence sharing, missile defence and strengthened cybersecurity coordination. More importantly, the three documents released at the summit aimed at regularising security consultations, routinising trilateral meetings, both at the summit and working level, and diversifying and expanding their remit beyond North Korea to include food security, economic security and, importantly, China.The potential benefits of minilateralism
Through these arrangements, first and foremost, the US government aimed at an institutionalisation of US-RoK-Japan cooperation, thus inter-locking the region's most powerful, prosperous and technologically advanced US allies. It did so with an eye on binding South Korea and Japan into cooperation into the future, as successive governments in either country may not be as sympathetic to their counterpart across the sea as the current ones (especially Yoon's). The routinisation of trilateral cooperation and coordination also aimed at damage limitation in the event of a potential Trump comeback, who would prioritise his own interests at the expense of trilateral coordination.
Second, in the context of the RoK-Japan-US minilateral, regularised avenues for dialogue were deepened at multiple levels: from Director General level up to summit meetings, which will be held at least once a year.
Third and in connection to the above, the scope of trilateral cooperation expanded notably across agencies, given the multi-layered nature of the challenges and opportunities faced by the three countries. The inauguration of a Japan-US-RoK Indo-Pacific Dialogue and of a Trilateral Framework on scientific cooperation, including defence technology, testified to this logic, not unlike other minilaterals that the Biden administration promptly revitalised or gave birth to, such as the Quad with Australia, India and Japan, or AUKUS with Australia and the UK (soon to include, perhaps, Japan and Canada in one of their two pillars of cooperation). Japan-US-RoK cooperation, however, promised to go deeper with new dialogues or plans on common or coordinative frameworks aimed at combating North Korea's cyber activities, stifling disinformation and promoting humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HA/DR), as well as government financing across the Indo-Pacific (starting with the Pacific Islands), maritime, space and economic security, including the establishment of an early warning system on potential disruptions to supply chains.
Fourth, the most publicised development has been the strengthening of intelligence sharing, notably by allowing for a trilateral real-time system that linked the three countries radars tracking and evaluating missiles flying from North Korea, with potential implications also in a Taiwan contingency scenario. This may also well apply to the Philippines – although Manila was likely not as appealing as Seoul's capacity in this regard. Notably, reporting has suggested that Japan was quietly beefing up military and intelligence assistance to the self-governing island, if not directly, by triangulation through the United States, and potentially with some help from South Korea as well.[5]Looking ahead to November 2024 and beyond
While momentum has been clear, some of these mechanisms may be put to the test – especially the pledge to consult – by regional dynamics, as North Korea's bellicose behaviour toward its neighbour has been accompanied by DPRK leader Kim Jong-un's overtures towards Japan. Moreover, the Japanese government is still watchful about domestic political developments in South Korea, such as the progressive parties' electoral resounding win in the recent legislative elections (that is, a non-confidence vote against Yoon) and the South Korean Supreme Court's decision to uphold lower courts' orders for compensation by Japanese industries' responsible for wartime labour. Also for this reason, Tokyo is unlikely to allow South Korea into the G7 framework on a more regular basis, which is arguably also one of Washington's desiderata to buttress the rostrum of "like-minded partners". Similar hesitancies have been likely at play vis-à-vis Manila, where former President Rodrigo Duterte's daughter – the current Vice-President – may swift the pendulum away from this alignment of planets carefully engineered by the Biden administration.
Developments in US politics may affect the process too. With a second Trump presidency, the Japanese government would be again fearful of a reprise of US concessions to, and US summit diplomacy with, North Korea. This same logic may apply to the US-Japan-Philippines minilateral and other ententes that have been cajoled or blessed by Washington, such as NATO's outreach towards the Asia-Pacific, especially Japan, South Korea and Australia. A Trump redux may break apart NATO, but he might also rethink the merits of his mercenary and transactional tactics in the context of coercive diplomatic leverage towards China.
Thus, the bigger test of the "resilience" of minilateral alignments is the possible resurface of a disruptive and unilateral Trump presidency, whose transactional logic would thrive on US leverage at a bilateral level, and, perhaps, the incognita of China's staying power and of US-China strategic rivalry at large. As events unfold, the First Island Chain is and will be the place to watch to understand the geopolitics of US-China competition.Giulio Pugliese is Associate fellow (Asia-Pacific) at the Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI), Lecturer in Japanese Politics at the University of Oxford and Part-time Professor on EU-Asia Studies at the European University Institute.
This commentary is an extract and re-adaptation from a forthcoming academic article: Giulio Pugliese and Marco Zappa, "Japan 2023: Still Walking on Abe Shinzō's Footsteps", in Asia Maior, Vol. XXXIV.[1] Elbridge A. Colby, The Strategy of Denial. American Defense in an Age of Great Power Conflict, New Haven/London, Yale University Press, 2021.[2] The English language version of the strategy translates jōhō merely as "intelligence", but it is a broader concept that encompasses (and can be translated as) "information". In fact, the Japanese government has been particularly apt at leveraging information and intelligence to shape its strategic environment. Cfr. Japan Ministry of Defence, Kokka anzen hoshō senryaku [National Security Strategy], December 2022, p. 4, https://www.cas.go.jp/jp/siryou/221216anzenhoshou/nss-j.pdf. For the English language version see: National Security Strategy of Japan, December 2022, p. 3, https://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/nsp/page1we_000081.html.[3] US and Japan, Joint Statement of the Security Consultative e Committee ("2+2"), 11 January 2023, https://www.mofa.go.jp/files/100444894.pdf.[4] Japan, RoK and US, The Spirit of Camp David: Joint Statement of Japan, the Republic of Korea, and the United States, 18 August 2023, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/08/18/the-spirit-of-camp-david-joint-statement-of-japan-the-republic-of-korea-and-the-united-states.[5] Kathrin Hille and Demetri Sevastopulo, "US to Link up with Taiwan and Japan Drone Fleets to Share Real-Time Data", in Financial Times, 8 June 2023, https://www.ft.com/content/bde0db76-a7f8-4ecd-b5d5-03de0b5a8659.

The Operations Evaluation Department (OED) is an independent unit within the World Bank. The goals of evaluation are to learn from experience, to provide an objective basis for assessing the results of the Bank's work, and to provide accountability in the achievement of its objectives. This report on the Post-Conflict Fund (PCF) is one of twenty six case studies that have been prepared as source material for the second phase of OED's independent evaluation of the Bank's involvement in global programs. The program objective is to position the Bank through constructive engagement in conflict-affected countries where normal instruments and budget provisions cannot apply. The key findings are as follows : (i) a flexible instrument such as the PCF serves the needs that the Bank's numerous instruments do not fulfill in conflict-affected countries; (ii) yet if the policy guidelines under which it operates are too flexible, and the DGF criteria are ambiguous and insufficiently enforced, the instrument can be less than fully effective; (iii)Programs can continue over several years without a results-based framework and strong monitoring and evaluation; (iv) as currently designed, the country-by-country approach of the program does not sufficiently generate broader cross-country lessons and does not exploit the program's full potential to serve the Bank and its partners strategically; and (v) a global partnership program on conflict-affected countries with partners at the governance level might help the Bank, United Nations (UN) agencies, and other stakeholders to better respond to the transition from relief, to rehabilitation and reconstruction and development. Finally, this being an OED evaluation, it focuses primarily on the Bank's strategic role and performance in playing up to its comparative advantage relative to other partners in each program.