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In: Untersuchungen zur Wirtschaftspolitik 135
Europe's financial crisis cannot be blamed on the Euro, Harold James contends in this probing exploration of the whys, whens, whos, and what-ifs of European monetary union. The current crisis goes deeper, to a series of problems that were debated but not resolved at the time of the Euro's invention. Since the 1960s, Europeans had been looking for a way to address two conundrums simultaneously: the dollar's privileged position in the international monetary system, and Germany's persistent current account surpluses in Europe. The Euro was created under a politically independent central bank to meet the primary goal of price stability. But while the monetary side of union was clearly conceived, other prerequisites of stability were beyond the reach of technocratic central bankers. Issues such as fiscal rules and Europe-wide banking supervision and regulation were thoroughly discussed during planning in the late 1980s and 1990s, but remained in the hands of member states. That omission proved to be a cause of crisis decades later. Here is an account that helps readers understand the European monetary crisis in depth, by tracing behind-the-scenes negotiations using an array of sources unavailable until now, notably from the European Community's Committee of Central Bank Governors and the Delors Committee of 1988–89, which set out the plan for how Europe could reach its goal of monetary union. As this foundational study makes clear, it was the constant friction between politicians and technocrats that shaped the Euro. And, Euro or no Euro, this clash will continue into the future.
The plans for Economic and Monetary Union in Europe became difficult to achieve during the period 1992-1993. The convergence criteria set up in the Maastricht Treaty block the road towards unification. It is very complex to expect twelve governments with different shades of political colour and twelve states with different economic interests to compromise in such criteria (as inflation, government borrowing, exchange rate stability and interest rates) and eventually, speak with one voice at the end of this decade. This current research provides significant modifications in The Maastricht Treaty , policy making, objectives, even changes in political behavior for better coordination to tackle any turbulence that stands on the way. These changes were unveiled and supported by outside views. The right time for transition to the monetary union depends on the rate of progress in Europe in meeting the stability requirements and in the willingness to move to a more developed political union. Monetary Union could occur late in 1990s but with a number of members left out with major dominant the Germany than the EMS.
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In: EUI working papers / Economics Department, 97,10
World Affairs Online
In: Economic Policy Proposals for Germany and Europe; Routledge Studies in the European Economy, p. 54-71
In: European Union Enlargement, p. 184-198
In: The Political System of the European Union, p. 278-306
In: Common Market Law Review, Volume 7, Issue 4, p. 407-422
ISSN: 0165-0750
In: The economic journal: the journal of the Royal Economic Society, Volume 113, Issue 491, p. F678-F680
ISSN: 1468-0297
In: International studies perspectives: ISP, Volume 4, Issue 3, p. 275-292
ISSN: 1528-3585
Europe's financial crisis cannot be blamed on the Euro, Harold James contends in this probing exploration of the whys, whens, whos, and what-ifs of European monetary union. The current crisis goes deeper, to a series of problems that were debated but not resolved at the time of the Euro's invention. Since the 1960s, Europeans had been looking for a way to address two conundrums simultaneously: the dollar's privileged position in the international monetary system, and Germany's persistent current account surpluses in Europe. The Euro was created under a politically independent central bank to meet the primary goal of price stability. But while the monetary side of union was clearly conceived, other prerequisites of stability were beyond the reach of technocratic central bankers. Issues such as fiscal rules and Europe-wide banking supervision and regulation were thoroughly discussed during planning in the late 1980s and 1990s, but remained in the hands of member states. That omission proved to be a cause of crisis decades later. Here is an account that helps readers understand the European monetary crisis in depth, by tracing behind-the-scenes negotiations using an array of sources unavailable until now, notably from the European Community's Committee of Central Bank Governors and the Delors Committee of 1988-89, which set out the plan for how Europe could reach its goal of monetary union. As this foundational study makes clear, it was the constant friction between politicians and technocrats that shaped the Euro. And, Euro or no Euro, this clash will continue into the future.