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Theories of international political influences on trade maintain that shared alliance commitments affect bilateral commercial exchange. The most prominent of these suggests that trade produces a security externality threatening states, but that a military alliance alleviates these concerns, leading to greater trade among allies. Yet past empirical analyses produce inconsistent findings with respect to the effect of military alliances on bilateral trade levels. This article presents a new argument to explain the inconclusive findings in previous studies. The potential increase in military power from efficiency gains through trade is a positive security externality only when a commitment to defend one's alliance partner exists. In essence, cooperative security agreements that require states to give military assistance to each other if attacked (i.e. defense pacts) will lead to greater trade among their members than agreements in which the members promise neutrality, non-aggression, or consultation. The analysis distinguishes alliances that include commitments of defense from those that do not, and uses two different sources of alliance data to examine the effects of defense pacts on trade levels between major powers from 1885 to 1990. The results demonstrate that defense pacts are associated with higher trade among alliance members, but that trade between members of non-defense pacts is statistically indistinguishable from trade between non-allies. This article recognizes that a link between economic and security issues exists and emphasizes their mutual relationship.

How and to what extent is the preventive use of force becoming the future of foreign policy for states around the world? We explore the spread of preventive logic to increasing numbers of states and examine the degree to which an international norm toward preventive self-defense is cascading in the international system. Through content and comparative case study analysis, we investigate leaders' rhetoric and security policies concerning what we theorize is the key indicator of a country's emulation of the United States: assertion of the right to the unilateral, preventive use of force outside of its borders. Our evidence indicates that there has been a shift away from the established international norm-which considers the use of preventive force illegal and illegitimate-toward growing acceptance of unilateral preventive strategies, a shift largely propelled by the precedents set by the United States in the war in Iraq and its use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs or drones) in the global war on terror. Our findings also reveal that some states are applying the strategy of preventive self-defense beyond the use of UAVs for targeted killings to the extreme contingency plan for nuclear war. We conclude by discussing possibilities for further research and considering the implications of this phenomenon. Adapted from the source document.

Important international law questions for formulating cyber strategy and policy include whether and when a cyber-attack amounts to an "act of war," or, more precisely, an "armed attack" triggering a right of self-defense, and how the international legal principle of "sovereignty" could apply to cyber activities. International law in this area is not settled. There is, however, ample room within existing international law to support a strong cyber strategy, including a powerful deterrent. The answers to many international law questions discussed below depend on specific, case-by-case facts, and are likely to be highly contested for a long time to come. This means that the United States should continue to exercise leadership in advancing interpretations that support its strategic interests, including its own operational needs, bearing in mind that we also seek rules that will effectively constrain the behaviors of others.

Cover -- Half Title -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Table of Contents -- Preface -- Acknowledgements -- Chapter 1 Introduction -- Chapter 2 Self-Determination and the Western Sahara Question -- A. UN and ICJ Involvement up to the Creation of the SADR in 1976 -- (i) The General Assembly's Early Involvement (1963-1974) -- (ii) The UN's Visiting Mission and the Western Sahara Advisory Opinion -- (iii) Overview of the UN's Subsequent Involvement in the Western Sahara Question -- B. The SADR's Struggle for Recognition as a State -- Chapter 3 The Doctrine of Recognition and Morocco's Claim to Western Sahara -- A. The Duty of Non-Recognition -- B. The Discretionary Character of Acts of Recognition -- C. Formalism and Implied Recognition -- (i) EU/Morocco Trade and Fishing Agreements and Implied Recognition -- D. The Consequences of the Duty of Non-Recognition -- (i) Persistent Illegal Situations and Territorial Claims -- (ii) The African Court's Judgment in the Bernard Mornah Case -- Chapter 4 Recent Developments in UN Practice Concerning Western Sahara -- A. The Security Council's Approach to the Western Sahara Question Since 2018 -- B. The General Assembly and Western Sahara in Recent Years -- (i) C24 and Fourth Committee Meetings Since 2020 -- (ii) Recent General Assembly Resolutions on Western Sahara -- Chapter 5 Implications of Growing Support for the Moroccan Position on Western Sahara -- A. Growing Support for the Moroccan Autonomy Plan: Has a Tipping Point Been Reached? -- B. Establishing Consulates in Western Sahara and Implied Recognition -- The Territorial Foundations of Consular Representation -- Chapter 6 Conclusion: The Future of Western Sahara and the Future of International Law -- Index.

Cover Page -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Dedication -- Contents -- Foreword -- Introduction -- Part One: United Nations Action -- 1: Security Council Authorization -- 2: Expanding Reach of the Security Council -- 3: Implied Authorization and Intentional Ambiguity -- Part Two: Self-defence -- 4: 'Inherent Right' of Self-defence -- 5: Self-defence against Terrorism -- 6: Pre-emptive Self-defence -- Part Three: Humanitarian Intervention -- 7: Pro-Democratic Intervention -- 8: Unilateral Humanitarian Intervention -- 9: Responsibility to Protect -- Part Four: International Law during Armed Conflict -- 10: Protection of Civilians -- 11: Protection of Combatants and Prisoners of War -- 12: War Crimes Courts and Tribunals -- Epilogue: War Law and the Single Superpower -- Appendix: Charter of the United Nations, 1945 -- Further Reading -- Selected Internet Sites -- Index

In The Law of Peoples (1999), John Rawls's goal is to develop a theory of international justice that will be acceptable to both liberal & decent hierarchical peoples. His "law of peoples" tries to extend the general idea of the social contract to a reasonably just "society of peoples," & to describe a minimal moral threshold of decency. According to many critics, however, Rawls omits from his law of peoples certain political principles & ideas that are necessary preconditions for a sound theory of international justice. In this paper, we try to show that although all these critics deal either directly or indirectly with Rawls's idea of reason & his conception of the self, they fail to provide a thorough analysis of either. Without such an analysis, this kind of criticism not only is unable to present a convincing argument against Rawls's theory of international justice, but also loses sight of the fact that a valid argument against Rawls's theory has to start with his theory of justice & political liberalism. 18 References. Adapted from the source document.