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The paper presents an overview of M. Weber's modelling paradigm assessing it against the opportunities of using the models in modern science of public policy and administration. Two types of research problems requiring modelling of different levels are identified. The paper defines the static and the dialectic methods of modelling, the limits and possibilities of their application are defined. The novelty and relevance of the paper lies in the substantiation of advantages and drawbacks of static modelling and in the proving of the importance of normative character of science, which contradicts the traditional Weber's methodology. In public administration one may not rely only upon formal procedures, forms and rules, because this will not reveal the functions of the State and the interests underlying them. A public administration model must be characterised by normative content. Models of social processes must not necessarily reflect the reality exactly, however, they may serve as a tool for simplifying the mechanisms of social reality and for attempting to understand its mechanisms. Modelling may be static or dialectic. Static modelling is simpler since the number of variables it takes account of is smaller. In certain cases static modelling may be presented or desirable due to value considerations raised by the idealistic world. Idealistic philosophy gives rise to relevant phenomena, which can be neither confirmed nor rejected. Such models may be desirable as the given required by a peculiar belief and as components of the given. As far as social science is a value and "humanitarian" science, to such extent metaphysics, the static given and static modelling may yield results. Philosophical idealism is often presented as a source of political and economic liberalism, or a sign of equality Is placed between them. This is not entirely correct since state and social policy studies in the liberal social sciences are based on formal concepts without any normative content. Liberal sociological definitions designed for a parliamentary-democratic constitutional state usually cover only procedures, forms, rules and state activity instruments, avoiding a definition of the State's functions completely or partially. Not only the functions of the State remain unsubstantiated; possible consequences of manifestation of these functions or the interests of those who defend them or any backstairs interests behind the declared interests arc not explained. The Weberian methodological concept of democracy turns liberal democracy and pluralist theory into a sheer arsenal of technical means, which is unpredictable and incapable of explaining the deep phenomena of public administration and the more so - of social policy. It is not only in the West, but also in Eastern Europe including Lithuania, individual politicians and public administration experts wish to reduce the principle of social welfare to the constitutional and legal level, absolutising the legal aspect. Dialectic modelling is a kind of opposite to static modelling, or modelling that may supplement the latter substantially. And this is not just because it is able to "see the context". Using the dialectic relationship one may examine such historical dichotomies as belief and science, nationality and globalism, central and local government, private and public interest etc. In the most general sense, dialectic modelling is focussed on the determination of the content, form, contradiction between content and form, and finding of the place of this relationship in the world's development process. The methodology of dialectic modelling asserts that the dialectic relationship is a universal means of modelling of qualitative processes and may be used for the modelling of the processes for which sufficient qualitative exceptionality may be determined as compared with the previous qualitative stage. Eastern Europe encounters difficulties in social modelling due to a distinct transformational nature of social systems of these countries as well as due to frequent changes in the laws governing social security and tax policy. The latter factor also poses problems for Eastern European social scientists in processing the material and in modelling socio-economic development on its basis.

The paper presents an overview of M. Weber's modelling paradigm assessing it against the opportunities of using the models in modern science of public policy and administration. Two types of research problems requiring modelling of different levels are identified. The paper defines the static and the dialectic methods of modelling, the limits and possibilities of their application are defined. The novelty and relevance of the paper lies in the substantiation of advantages and drawbacks of static modelling and in the proving of the importance of normative character of science, which contradicts the traditional Weber's methodology. In public administration one may not rely only upon formal procedures, forms and rules, because this will not reveal the functions of the State and the interests underlying them. A public administration model must be characterised by normative content. Models of social processes must not necessarily reflect the reality exactly, however, they may serve as a tool for simplifying the mechanisms of social reality and for attempting to understand its mechanisms. Modelling may be static or dialectic. Static modelling is simpler since the number of variables it takes account of is smaller. In certain cases static modelling may be presented or desirable due to value considerations raised by the idealistic world. Idealistic philosophy gives rise to relevant phenomena, which can be neither confirmed nor rejected. Such models may be desirable as the given required by a peculiar belief and as components of the given. As far as social science is a value and "humanitarian" science, to such extent metaphysics, the static given and static modelling may yield results. Philosophical idealism is often presented as a source of political and economic liberalism, or a sign of equality Is placed between them. This is not entirely correct since state and social policy studies in the liberal social sciences are based on formal concepts without any normative content. Liberal sociological definitions designed for a parliamentary-democratic constitutional state usually cover only procedures, forms, rules and state activity instruments, avoiding a definition of the State's functions completely or partially. Not only the functions of the State remain unsubstantiated; possible consequences of manifestation of these functions or the interests of those who defend them or any backstairs interests behind the declared interests arc not explained. The Weberian methodological concept of democracy turns liberal democracy and pluralist theory into a sheer arsenal of technical means, which is unpredictable and incapable of explaining the deep phenomena of public administration and the more so - of social policy. It is not only in the West, but also in Eastern Europe including Lithuania, individual politicians and public administration experts wish to reduce the principle of social welfare to the constitutional and legal level, absolutising the legal aspect. Dialectic modelling is a kind of opposite to static modelling, or modelling that may supplement the latter substantially. And this is not just because it is able to "see the context". Using the dialectic relationship one may examine such historical dichotomies as belief and science, nationality and globalism, central and local government, private and public interest etc. In the most general sense, dialectic modelling is focussed on the determination of the content, form, contradiction between content and form, and finding of the place of this relationship in the world's development process. The methodology of dialectic modelling asserts that the dialectic relationship is a universal means of modelling of qualitative processes and may be used for the modelling of the processes for which sufficient qualitative exceptionality may be determined as compared with the previous qualitative stage. Eastern Europe encounters difficulties in social modelling due to a distinct transformational nature of social systems of these countries as well as due to frequent changes in the laws governing social security and tax policy. The latter factor also poses problems for Eastern European social scientists in processing the material and in modelling socio-economic development on its basis.

This article continues the investigation on the relationships between science and social engineering. We inquire and critically analyze the ideas of P. Feyerabend on the social possibilities of science, political role of scientific experts and social engineers. The objective of the article is the reconstruction of Feyerabend's reception of science and its socio-political role, then, the presentation of Feyerabend's counter-arguments against Popper's rationalism and the project of social engineering. According to Feyerabend, an open and free society is the society where every (cultural, religious, epistemological etc.) tradition is provided with equal rights and equal possibilities. Any attempt to impose the standards of one tradition on the others rejects the idea of freedom and liberty. Science is only one epistemological traditions among others, therefore, in a free society scientific standard cannot dominate over the standards of the other traditions. Thus, Feyerabend interprets Popper's idea of scientifically grounded social engineering as politically harmful, misleading and incompatible with the requirements of a free society.

This article continues the investigation on the relationships between science and social engineering. We inquire and critically analyze the ideas of P. Feyerabend on the social possibilities of science, political role of scientific experts and social engineers. The objective of the article is the reconstruction of Feyerabend's reception of science and its socio-political role, then, the presentation of Feyerabend's counter-arguments against Popper's rationalism and the project of social engineering. According to Feyerabend, an open and free society is the society where every (cultural, religious, epistemological etc.) tradition is provided with equal rights and equal possibilities. Any attempt to impose the standards of one tradition on the others rejects the idea of freedom and liberty. Science is only one epistemological traditions among others, therefore, in a free society scientific standard cannot dominate over the standards of the other traditions. Thus, Feyerabend interprets Popper's idea of scientifically grounded social engineering as politically harmful, misleading and incompatible with the requirements of a free society.

This article continues the investigation on the relationships between science and social engineering. We inquire and critically analyze the ideas of P. Feyerabend on the social possibilities of science, political role of scientific experts and social engineers. The objective of the article is the reconstruction of Feyerabend's reception of science and its socio-political role, then, the presentation of Feyerabend's counter-arguments against Popper's rationalism and the project of social engineering. According to Feyerabend, an open and free society is the society where every (cultural, religious, epistemological etc.) tradition is provided with equal rights and equal possibilities. Any attempt to impose the standards of one tradition on the others rejects the idea of freedom and liberty. Science is only one epistemological traditions among others, therefore, in a free society scientific standard cannot dominate over the standards of the other traditions. Thus, Feyerabend interprets Popper's idea of scientifically grounded social engineering as politically harmful, misleading and incompatible with the requirements of a free society.

This article continues the investigation on the relationships between science and social engineering. We inquire and critically analyze the ideas of P. Feyerabend on the social possibilities of science, political role of scientific experts and social engineers. The objective of the article is the reconstruction of Feyerabend's reception of science and its socio-political role, then, the presentation of Feyerabend's counter-arguments against Popper's rationalism and the project of social engineering. According to Feyerabend, an open and free society is the society where every (cultural, religious, epistemological etc.) tradition is provided with equal rights and equal possibilities. Any attempt to impose the standards of one tradition on the others rejects the idea of freedom and liberty. Science is only one epistemological traditions among others, therefore, in a free society scientific standard cannot dominate over the standards of the other traditions. Thus, Feyerabend interprets Popper's idea of scientifically grounded social engineering as politically harmful, misleading and incompatible with the requirements of a free society.

The main objective of this article is critical reconsideration of Popper's ideas, concerning the influence of science on society and the social engineering. Our aim is the reconstruction of Popper's counter-arguments against utopian social engineering and arguments for rational and scientific control of open society with the help of the piecemeal social engineering. He claims that the open society has many features in common with the science: both are based upon critical thinking, both are ready to admit their mistakes, both progress through critical discussion. If, according to Popper, reason is the only alternative to violence so far discovered, then the politics of the open society is strongly dependent on the science. Science provides methods and ideas for piecemeal social engineering that successfully solves majority of social and political problems. Therefore, without science, a society cannot be open. We seek at the critical evaluation of practical possibilities to exercise piecemeal social engineering and its obstructions.

The main objective of this article is critical reconsideration of Popper's ideas, concerning the influence of science on society and the social engineering. Our aim is the reconstruction of Popper's counter-arguments against utopian social engineering and arguments for rational and scientific control of open society with the help of the piecemeal social engineering. He claims that the open society has many features in common with the science: both are based upon critical thinking, both are ready to admit their mistakes, both progress through critical discussion. If, according to Popper, reason is the only alternative to violence so far discovered, then the politics of the open society is strongly dependent on the science. Science provides methods and ideas for piecemeal social engineering that successfully solves majority of social and political problems. Therefore, without science, a society cannot be open. We seek at the critical evaluation of practical possibilities to exercise piecemeal social engineering and its obstructions.

The main objective of this article is critical reconsideration of Popper's ideas, concerning the influence of science on society and the social engineering. Our aim is the reconstruction of Popper's counter-arguments against utopian social engineering and arguments for rational and scientific control of open society with the help of the piecemeal social engineering. He claims that the open society has many features in common with the science: both are based upon critical thinking, both are ready to admit their mistakes, both progress through critical discussion. If, according to Popper, reason is the only alternative to violence so far discovered, then the politics of the open society is strongly dependent on the science. Science provides methods and ideas for piecemeal social engineering that successfully solves majority of social and political problems. Therefore, without science, a society cannot be open. We seek at the critical evaluation of practical possibilities to exercise piecemeal social engineering and its obstructions.

The main objective of this article is critical reconsideration of Popper's ideas, concerning the influence of science on society and the social engineering. Our aim is the reconstruction of Popper's counter-arguments against utopian social engineering and arguments for rational and scientific control of open society with the help of the piecemeal social engineering. He claims that the open society has many features in common with the science: both are based upon critical thinking, both are ready to admit their mistakes, both progress through critical discussion. If, according to Popper, reason is the only alternative to violence so far discovered, then the politics of the open society is strongly dependent on the science. Science provides methods and ideas for piecemeal social engineering that successfully solves majority of social and political problems. Therefore, without science, a society cannot be open. We seek at the critical evaluation of practical possibilities to exercise piecemeal social engineering and its obstructions.

One of the most important changes in the development of population in European Union (EU) is demographic ageing - due to remarkable reductions in fertility levels and increasing life expectancy, the proportion of persons aged 60 and over is increasing very rapidly. The actual size of the elderly population in several EU countries already exceeds the projected estimations for 2010. These demographic challenges confirmed the importance of social affairs for its policy agenda. In combination with technological, structural and political change, Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and the prospects for further enlargement of the Union to the East, socio-demographic trends had intensified pressures on welfare systems, raising questions about the feasibility and desirability of achieving a common social policy and about the future shape of the "European social model". The emphasis placed on workers' rights in the Community's and Union's treaties and charter signalled that European social policy was only indirectly concerned with categories of the population who did not gain entitlements to social protection as active members of labour force. The Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, later the Single European Act and the Treaty on European Union made no reference to older people. A statement on European policy for this potentially disadvantaged category of former or would be workers was, however, introduced into the Community Charter of the Fundamental Social Rights of Workers and a new article on non-discrimination in the Treaty of Amsterdam identified age among the areas where discrimination was to be eliminated. ; Spartus ES valstybių demografinis senėjimas XX–XXI amžių sandūroje bei šio proceso prognozės kelia didelį susirūpinimą socialinės politikos kūrėjams: kaip užtikrinti lygias galimybes visoms kartoms ir integruoti pagyvenusius žmones į visuomenę. Siekiant spręsti šias problemas, nauji uždaviniai kyla socialinių paslaugų, pensijų, darbo rinkos politikos ir kitoms sritims. Straipsnio tikslas – įvertinti visuomenės demografinio senėjimo padarinius ir aptarti socialinės politikos pagyvenusiems formavimąsi ES valstybėse. Šiuo tikslu aptariami gyventojų amžiaus struktūros pokyčiai ir demografinio senėjimo veiksniai ES valstybėse, analizuojama socialinės politikos pagyvenusiesiems raida nuo Europos Bendrijos sukūrimo iki paskutiniosios Europos Sąjungos plėtros į Vidurio ir Rytų Europą bei išryškinamas jos vaidmuo integraciniuose procesuose.

The article seeks to demonstrate the changes in the conception of relations between science and politics in the 20 th century German tradition of social philosophy. This tradition encompasses Max Weber, Karl Mannheim, Frankfurt School and Jürgen Habermas. The analysis of their works revealed that Weber's neutral attitude towards the political role of science had experienced couple of transformations. First, Weber's idea of science as a political instrument was radicalized in Mannheim's sociology of knowledge. In the latter science as an institution is conceived much more positively because it can replace politics by controllable administration. Second, Frankfurt School denies the mannheimian optimism stressing the negative consequences of that substitution: scientific rationalism invades social and political life at the same time ignoring qualitative aspects that are so important in political field. And, finally, trying to breakthrough the one-sided negativism of elder colleagues in Frankfurt School, Habermas restores weberian attitude towards instrumental character of science. In order to elude the dominance of science two steps are of crucial importance: repoliticization of public sphere and removing restrictions on communication.

The article seeks to demonstrate the changes in the conception of relations between science and politics in the 20 th century German tradition of social philosophy. This tradition encompasses Max Weber, Karl Mannheim, Frankfurt School and Jürgen Habermas. The analysis of their works revealed that Weber's neutral attitude towards the political role of science had experienced couple of transformations. First, Weber's idea of science as a political instrument was radicalized in Mannheim's sociology of knowledge. In the latter science as an institution is conceived much more positively because it can replace politics by controllable administration. Second, Frankfurt School denies the mannheimian optimism stressing the negative consequences of that substitution: scientific rationalism invades social and political life at the same time ignoring qualitative aspects that are so important in political field. And, finally, trying to breakthrough the one-sided negativism of elder colleagues in Frankfurt School, Habermas restores weberian attitude towards instrumental character of science. In order to elude the dominance of science two steps are of crucial importance: repoliticization of public sphere and removing restrictions on communication.

The article seeks to demonstrate the changes in the conception of relations between science and politics in the 20 th century German tradition of social philosophy. This tradition encompasses Max Weber, Karl Mannheim, Frankfurt School and Jürgen Habermas. The analysis of their works revealed that Weber's neutral attitude towards the political role of science had experienced couple of transformations. First, Weber's idea of science as a political instrument was radicalized in Mannheim's sociology of knowledge. In the latter science as an institution is conceived much more positively because it can replace politics by controllable administration. Second, Frankfurt School denies the mannheimian optimism stressing the negative consequences of that substitution: scientific rationalism invades social and political life at the same time ignoring qualitative aspects that are so important in political field. And, finally, trying to breakthrough the one-sided negativism of elder colleagues in Frankfurt School, Habermas restores weberian attitude towards instrumental character of science. In order to elude the dominance of science two steps are of crucial importance: repoliticization of public sphere and removing restrictions on communication.

The article seeks to demonstrate the changes in the conception of relations between science and politics in the 20 th century German tradition of social philosophy. This tradition encompasses Max Weber, Karl Mannheim, Frankfurt School and Jürgen Habermas. The analysis of their works revealed that Weber's neutral attitude towards the political role of science had experienced couple of transformations. First, Weber's idea of science as a political instrument was radicalized in Mannheim's sociology of knowledge. In the latter science as an institution is conceived much more positively because it can replace politics by controllable administration. Second, Frankfurt School denies the mannheimian optimism stressing the negative consequences of that substitution: scientific rationalism invades social and political life at the same time ignoring qualitative aspects that are so important in political field. And, finally, trying to breakthrough the one-sided negativism of elder colleagues in Frankfurt School, Habermas restores weberian attitude towards instrumental character of science. In order to elude the dominance of science two steps are of crucial importance: repoliticization of public sphere and removing restrictions on communication.