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The purpose of this theoretical essay is to revisit, in a didactic and non-exhaustive way, the main ideas of Enrique Dussel and his Philosophy of Liberation, exploring the main concepts and categories elaborated by the author. The positive basis of this philosophy puts the challenge of breaking with the silence of the voices of the oppressed, exploited or victims who were not considered relevant agents in the construction of modern society (women, indigenous population, slaves, peasants, etc.). The Philosophy of Liberation is based on the concepts of Totality, Exteriority, Alienation, Mediation, Proximity and Liberation. Totality, based on the conquering pretension of the colonizers, is obtained from an ontological dimension that reveals truth as what stems from those who consider themselves superior by their technological or economic domination. This discourse resulted in the exteriority of those who do not originally integrate this public, excluding them from the system and attributing to them the alienation, which is the denial of their subject status. We confirm the colonization of the Administration when we substitute critical consciousness of the administration for the reading of popular business media, for rhetoric of the consultants and for the belief of a free market where, naturally, there are resources only for those who are to prosper in a scenario of uncertainties. The classic theory of economy makes the competition and the exteriority natural, however, we can organize ourselves to meet popular needs in a more inclusive, democratic way, respecting the limits of the environment. Proximity and liberation are a fundamental thought for overcoming such vision. ; La propuesta de este ensayo teórico es revisar, de manera didáctica y no exhaustiva, las principales ideas de Enrique Dussel y su filosofía de la liberación, pasando por los principales conceptos y categorías elaborados por el autor. La base positiva de esta filosofía nos desafía a romper con el silencio de las voces de los oprimidos, de los explotados o de las víctimas que no fueron considerados agentes relevantes en la construcción de la sociedad moderna (mujeres, indios, esclavos, campesinos, etc.). La filosofía de la liberación se basa en los conceptos de totalidad, exterioridad, alienación, mediación, proximidad y liberación. La totalidad, fundamentada por la pretensión conquistadora de los colonizadores, se da a partir de una dimensión ontológica que revela la verdad como la que deriva de aquellos que se juzgan superiores por su dominio tecnológico o económico. Este discurso resultó en la exterioridad de aquellos que no integran originalmente ese público, excluyéndolos del sistema y atribuyéndoles la alienación, que es la negación de su status de sujeto. Afirmamos la colonización de la Administración cuando sustituimos la conciencia crítica de la administración por la lectura de medios populares de negocios, por la retórica de las consultorías y por la creencia de un libre mercado en el que, naturalmente, no habrá recursos para todos, sino solo para aquellos que prosperen en un escenario de incertidumbres. La teoría clásica de la economía naturaliza la competencia y la exterioridad, sin embargo, podemos organizarnos para atender a las necesidades populares de manera más inclusiva, democrática y respetando los límites de la naturaleza. La proximidad y la liberación son la clave del pensamiento teórico para la superación de esa visión. ; A proposta deste ensaio teórico é revisitar, de modo didático e não exaustivo, as principais ideias de Enrique Dussel e sua Filosofia da Libertação, passando pelos principais conceitos e pelas categorias elaboradas pelo autor. A base positiva dessa filosofia nos desafia a romper com o silêncio das vozes dos oprimidos, dos explorados ou das vítimas, que não foram considerados agentes relevantes na construção da sociedade moderna (mulheres, índios, escravos, sertanejos etc.). A Filosofia da Libertação se baseia nos conceitos de totalidade, exterioridade, alienação, mediação, proximidade e libertação. A totalidade, fundamentada pela pretensão conquistadora dos colonizadores, dá-se a partir de uma dimensão ontológica que revela a verdade como aquela decorrente dos que se julgam superiores por sua dominação tecnológica ou econômica. Esse discurso resultou na exterioridade daqueles que não integram originalmente esse público, excluindo-os do sistema e atribuindo a eles a alienação, que é a negação do seu status de sujeito. Afirmamos a colonização da Administração quando substituímos a consciência crítica da Administração pela leitura da mídia popular de negócios, pela retórica das consultorias e pela crença de um livre mercado em que, naturalmente, não haverá recursos para todos, mas apenas para aqueles que prosperarem em um cenário de incertezas. A teoria clássica da economia naturaliza a competição e a exterioridade, entretanto, podemos nos organizar para atender às necessidades populares de modo mais inclusivo, democrático e respeitando os limites da natureza. A proximidade e a libertação são a chave do pensamento teórico para a superação dessa visão.

In 1969, when "Alternative Possibilities and Moral Responsibility" (1969) was published, Harry Frankfurt changed the course of the discussion about the free will problem. Frankfurt showed, through some thought experiments, agents that, he argued, were moral responsible for their actions even though they could not have acted otherwise. Frankfurt's essay pushed several philosophers, remarkably John Fischer, to rethink the problem of moral responsibility. For Fischer, Frankfurt showed that the debate should not be about the compatibility between freedom and determinism, but rather should address the question of whether moral responsibility is compatible with determinism.

This paper explores the role that the recognition of the other plays for morality in Raimond Gaita's Good and Evil: An Absolute Conception, from the centrality of the notion of remorse, understood as the remembrance of moral meaning for the agent of what he did. The examples from which Gaita intends to emphasize the weight of morality and the meaning of doing evil morally for someone will be rescued. One can not understand, according to the philosopher, a situation as morally problematic if it is not intelligible that whoever realized it should feel a genuine remorse in the face of the evil generated by their actions.

The concept of the other (autrui) did not receive due attention in Deleuze's philosophy as a whole until recently (VENTURA, 2020; FERREIRA, 2021). The Other appears in Deleuze's work in some moments of Difference and Repetition, in What is philosophy? – a work written together with Félix Guattari – but, above all, in a text present in the appendix of Logic of Sense entitled "Michel Tournier and the world without others", in which he comments the M. Tounier's novel, Friday or the pacific limbo. The Other is nothing but the expression of a possible world, or even a structure that organizes perception and ensures the margins and transitions of the world. When this structure dissolves, the simulacra ascend to the surfaces, destroying the forms and releasing the forces and intensities. We believe that the agent of this dissolution is Friday, whose coming disrupts the order forged by Robinson on his island. Friday no longer functions as the structure-other, since it is another of the Other, which will allow access to an impersonal, pre-individual transcendental field, populated by free singularities. Emmanuel Lévinas's concepts of "face" and "wholly other" (tout autre) will help in this movement in order to understand Deleuze's other, although it is necessary to point out its pertinence and its limitations.

Recently, contemporary epistemology come systematically discussing the theme of disagreement. In our everyday life, although many cases can be seen as merely apparent disagreements, there are also some cases where disputes are legitimates and the disagreements are real. But, would be possible to occur real disagreements between agents we consider epistemic peers? If that is possible, how can we react to these cases, in others words, what is the correct rational attitude in cases of peer disagreements? These are some of the main questions raised by what we call epistemology of disagreements. The aim of this article is to offer a general vision of this contemporary debate. Firstly, I will to present the problem and demonstrate why the scenario of disagreement - mainly between epistemic peers - would be an important philosophical question. Then, I will to present the main theoretical alternatives that arose on the contemporary epistemology as an answers to this problem. Therefore, the aim of this article is to be explanatory it not search for any original position on this debate.

This paper is divided into two parts. In the first section, after the introduction, we exposedthe various occurrences of "physis" throughout Sextus Empiricus' Outlines of Pyrrhonism, dividing them into 5 categories: (1) "nature" as the real, in contrast to "appearance"; (2) the "natural" as that which seems characteristic, peculiar to something or someone; (3) "Nature" as a creative and guiding agent; (4) the "natural" as opposed to "unnatural"; (5) the "nature of men". The way these various uses appear in the work is invariably critical, as elements of argumentation against the dogmatists, especially the Stoics. In the second part of this paper, however, we show how "physis" also appears positively at the beginning of the Outlines with the guiding function for life, as part of the answer to the famous objection of apraxia. In addition, we defend the hypothesis that "nature", from Sextus' point of view, does not oppose nor surpass conventions and customs; on the contrary, nature is what is recognized by all and is even determined by conventions and customs.

The present work is focused on the epistemological investigation about the relation between Nonconceptual Self, nonconceptual content of perception, awarenes and recognition of place in the context of the Gibsonian ecological perspective. In view of this investigative purpose our objectives are the following: 1 - to characterize the nonconceptual content of perception in the anti-representationalist context and 2 - to question whether consciousness is necessary for organisms to act in the environment and to acquire perceptual experiences such as the recognition of place. In the context of Gibsonian perspective, we will argue in support of the hypothesis that the ecological-informational and anti-representationalist theory of perception offers innovative theoretical subsidies for the analysis of our research purpose. We understand that in order to have awareness and to be able to think about oneself, the agent must first have basic perceptual experiences of the environment. We consider that the agent's basic perceptual experiences, such as recognition of place, does not necessarily involve consciousness.

Lately there have been works that show that Kant bases human rights on innate freedom as the only innate right that man has by virtue of his humanity. However, innate freedom cannot justify a theory of human rights because it is only an innate right over my inner self that allows for empirical possession, and although a human right is inalienable, it must be renounced in order to enter the world; Moreover, the four analytical derivations of innate freedom generate consequences that are incompatible with a human rights doctrine, for as human rights refer to all, innate equality and innate independence apply to a limited number of people; Finally, there is a differentiation in the interpretation of humanity's formula in law and ethics, because, subjectively, treating humanity as an end requires the agent to consider that the end of humanity is the motive of his action in ethics, but in law it is only required that its external behavior be in accordance with the end of humanity, and objectively, in law, treating humanity as an end produces criminal law contrary to human rights and the law of humanity requires that innate integrity be suspended during the period of condemnation, furthermore, this differentiation in the idea of ​​humanity becomes explicit in innate imprehensibility, for in ethics lie is the greatest violation of the duty of humanity in his person, but in law only violates the right of humanity if it causes harm to others.

In the Critique of practical reason, Kant develops the foundation of moral law in its objective and subjective aspects. After claiming that it is plausible to postulate the determination of will only through pure reason, it was necessary for the philosopher to demonstrate how it becomes conscious and acceptable to the moral agent. In this step, he examines the feeling of pleasure and displeasure, to which he associates, at first, the humiliation of the will given to the satisfaction of the senses, so that in the subject emerges a new quality of feeling, respect, also called moral sentiment. The same strategy is found in the third critique, where the constraint, this time, acts on the imagination, unable to encompass the sublime immensity with the help of understanding. The displeasure that comes from it leads to the recognition of reason as a higher faculty and, from it, to the pleasure that comes from the conscience of the moral law as a higher destination. To consider the way in which the subjective assimilates the moral law, here it is intended to think it under the hypothesis of being it, rather, through embarrassment and displeasure, not only founded on the freedom, but also on the humiliation of presumption. The argument follows Kant's works on ethics, beginning with the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, then follows the path of the second to the third criticism. In this journey, we intend to examine the place that the feeling of pleasure occupies in the a priori foundation of the moral law, whether in the analytical of practical reason or in the analytical of the beautiful and the sublime.

Due to the naturalization of the protagonism of the concept of experience in the interpretation of Theodor Adorno's dialectic, this article intends to elucidate some lines of displacement from the category of experience to the category of mediation, from the critical appropriation of this category of Hegel's thought by Adorno; because, since all experience is mediated, mediation presents itself as a condition for the realization of the experience and, for this reason, mediation is established as a privileged instance in the process of knowledge in the scope of the subject and object relationship, given that defines itself as a cause and condition for the organization of experience. Fundamentally, the proposal is to demonstrate that both Hegelian and Adornian dialectics - despite their idiosyncrasies - have in mediation their motivic aspect of determining the subjective and the objective. Therefore, the concept of mediation will be presented as a transversal and reciprocal component that, at the same time that it brings together, distinguishes the related aspects, making dialectics a procedure, within which mediation becomes a condition and fundamental for the development and the determination of the concepts circumscribed in a given context or situation. In this sense, mediation will emerge as the structuring agent of experience, a fact that justifies its priority in relation to experience, as described by Hegel.