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To what extent do cyberspace operations increase the risks of escalation between nation-state rivals? In 'Escalation Dynamics in Cyberspace', Erica D. Lonergan and Shawn W. Lonergan tackle this question head-on, presenting a comprehensive theory that explains the conditions under which cyber operations may lead to escalation. In doing so, they challenge long-held assumptions about strategic interactions in cyberspace, arguing that cyberspace is not as dangerous as the conventional wisdom might suggest. In some cases, cyber operations could even facilitate the de-escalation of international crises. Through extensive case studies that explore the role of cyber operations in routine competition, crises, and warfighting, the book presents nuanced insights about how cyberspace affects international politics.

Strategic A2/AD in Cyberspace focuses on exclusion from cyberspace, or the ability of a state to be cut off entirely from cyberspace. Strategic anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) operations are common in other domains, but, before now, they have not been examined for their relevance to cyberspace. This book examines how strategic A2/AD operations can cut off states from cyberspace through attacks at either the physical or logic layers of cyberspace. The result of strategic cyber A2/AD operations could be catastrophic for modern economies, governments, military forces, and societies, yet there has been surprisingly little study of these threats to states' access to cyberspace. This book examines the implications of strategic cyber A2/AD operations for deterrence strategy and proposes a new view of how exclusion from cyberspace can be used as a coercive tool in diplomacy

This report presents an open source analysis of North Korea's cyber operations capabilities and its strategic implications for the United States and South Korea. The purpose is to mitigate the current knowledge gap among various academic and policy communities on the topic by synthesizing authoritative and comprehensive open source reference material.

Cover -- Half Title -- Title -- Copyright -- Dedication -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Chapter 1 Setting the Stage: China's Evolving Views of Information -- Chapter 2 China's Military: This Is Not Your Father's PLA -- Chapter 3 Informationized Conflict: Maintaining Party Control amid the Information Revolution -- Chapter 4 Information Warfare: Waging Information Campaigns in the Next War -- Chapter 5 Information Operations: Putting Theory into Practice -- Chapter 6 Space and Information Warfare: A Key Battleground for Information Dominance

This book offers a comprehensive analysis of the international law applicable to cyber operations, including a systematic examination of attribution, lawfulness and remedies. It demonstrates the importance of countermeasures as a form of remedies and also shows the limits of international law, highlighting its limits in resolving issues related to cyber operations. There are several situations in which international law leaves the victim State of cyber operations helpless. Two main streams of limits are identified. First, in the case of cyber operations conducted by non-state actors on the behalf of a State, new technologies offer various ways to coordinate cyber operations without a high level of organization. Second, the law of State responsibility offers a range of solutions to respond to cyber operations and seek reparation, but it does not provide an answer in every case and it cannot solve the problem related to technical capabilities of the victim.

This book offers a comprehensive analysis of the international law applicable to cyber operations, including a systematic examination of attribution, lawfulness and remedies. It demonstrates the importance of countermeasures as a form of remedies and also shows the limits of international law, highlighting its limits in resolving issues related to cyber operations. There are several situations in which international law leaves the victim State of cyber operations helpless. Two main streams of limits are identified. First, in the case of cyber operations conducted by non-state actors on the behalf of a State, new technologies offer various ways to coordinate cyber operations without a high level of organization. Second, the law of State responsibility offers a range of solutions to respond to cyber operations and seek reparation, but it does not provide an answer in every case and it cannot solve the problem related to technical capabilities of the victim.

Information as a Military Asset -- Targets and Combatants -- Cyberwarfare, Law, and Ethics -- Intelligence Operations in a Connected World -- The Evolving Threat: From Script Kiddies to Advanced Attackers -- Social Engineering and Cyberwarfare -- Weaponizing Cyberspace: A History -- Nonstate Actors in Cyberwar -- Defense-in-Depth Strategies -- Cryptography and Cyberwar -- Defending Endpoints -- Defending Networks -- Defending Data -- Cyberwarfare and Military Doctrine -- Pandora's Box: The Future of Cyberwarfare.

While the deterrence of cyber attacks is one of the most important issues facing the United States and other nations, the application of deterrence theory to the cyber realm is problematic. This study introduces cyber warfare and reviews the challenges associated with deterring cyber attacks, offering key recommendations to aid the deterrence of major cyber attacks

Part I: Theoretical Discussions, 1. Global Factors that Influence Warfare, 2. The Future Trends of Warfare, 3. The Transformation of Intelligent Warfare, 4. Military Intelligence and Intelligent Technologies, 5. AI-based Intelligent Ecology, 6. Parallel Military and Intelligent Training, 7. The Evolution of OSoS, Part II: Strategic and Tactical Applications, 8. Unmanned Operations, 9. Cyberspace Operations, 10. Hypersonic Confrontation, 11. Joint All-Domain and Cross-Domain Operations, 12. Cognitive Confrontation, 13. Global Military Operations, 14. Future Urban Operations, 15. Gray Zone Operations, 16. Intelligent Construction and Evaluation

Cyber-warfare is often discussed, but rarely truly seen. When does an intrusion turn into an attack, and what does that entail? How do nations fold offensive cyber operations into their strategies? Operations against networks mostly occur to collect intelligence, in peacetime. Understanding the lifecycle and complexity of targeting adversary networks is key to doing so effectively in conflict. Rather than discussing the spectre of cyber war, Daniel Moore seeks to observe the spectrum of cyber operations. By piecing together operational case studies, military strategy and technical analysis, he shows that modern cyber operations are neither altogether unique, nor entirely novel.

Tallinn Manual 2.0 expands on the highly influential first edition by extending its coverage of the international law governing cyber operations to peacetime legal regimes. The product of a three-year follow-on project by a new group of twenty renowned international law experts, it addresses such topics as sovereignty, state responsibility, human rights, and the law of air, space, and the sea. Tallinn Manual 2.0 identifies 154 'black letter' rules governing cyber operations and provides extensive commentary on each rule. Although Tallinn Manual 2.0 represents the views of the experts in their personal capacity, the project benefitted from the unofficial input of many states and over fifty peer reviewers.