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The Lithuanian deterrence strategy is about making use of military threats to prevent other actors from taking particular actions. There are two major components that determine the success or failure of the Lithuanian deterrence strategy: the military's capabilities to carry out its threat against potential aggressors, and the will to do so. Special attention in this article will be given to the effectiveness of extended deterrence. It provides estimation on the sufficiency of Lithuanian capabilities to provide effective deterrence and recommends a potential direction for their use to strengthen deterrence. This article will discern current Lithuanian deterrence potential and possibilities to improve it using military, economic, as well as political means and other measures.

The Lithuanian deterrence strategy is about making use of military threats to prevent other actors from taking particular actions. There are two major components that determine the success or failure of the Lithuanian deterrence strategy: the military's capabilities to carry out its threat against potential aggressors, and the will to do so. Special attention in this article will be given to the effectiveness of extended deterrence. It provides estimation on the sufficiency of Lithuanian capabilities to provide effective deterrence and recommends a potential direction for their use to strengthen deterrence. This article will discern current Lithuanian deterrence potential and possibilities to improve it using military, economic, as well as political means and other measures.

The Lithuanian deterrence strategy is about making use of military threats to prevent other actors from taking particular actions. There are two major components that determine the success or failure of the Lithuanian deterrence strategy: the military's capabilities to carry out its threat against potential aggressors, and the will to do so. Special attention in this article will be given to the effectiveness of extended deterrence. It provides estimation on the sufficiency of Lithuanian capabilities to provide effective deterrence and recommends a potential direction for their use to strengthen deterrence. This article will discern current Lithuanian deterrence potential and possibilities to improve it using military, economic, as well as political means and other measures.

The Lithuanian deterrence strategy is about making use of military threats to prevent other actors from taking particular actions. There are two major components that determine the success or failure of the Lithuanian deterrence strategy: the military's capabilities to carry out its threat against potential aggressors, and the will to do so. Special attention in this article will be given to the effectiveness of extended deterrence. It provides estimation on the sufficiency of Lithuanian capabilities to provide effective deterrence and recommends a potential direction for their use to strengthen deterrence. This article will discern current Lithuanian deterrence potential and possibilities to improve it using military, economic, as well as political means and other measures.

The complexity of the 21st century threat landscape contrasts significantly with the bilateral nuclear bargaining context envisioned by classical deterrence theory. Nuclear & conventional arsenals continue to develop alongside antisatellite programs, autonomous robotics or drones, cyber operations, biotechnology, & other innovations barely imagined in the early nuclear age. The concept of cross-domain deterrence emerged near the end of the George W. Bush administration as policymakers & commanders confronted emerging threats to vital American military systems in space & cyberspace. The Pentagon now recognizes five operational environments or so-called domains (land, sea, air, space, & cyberspace), & cross-domain deterrence poses serious problems in practice. This text steps back to assess the theoretical relevance of cross-domain deterrence for the field of international relations.

Australia needs urgently to improve its understanding of deterrence so that it can build an effective strategy to respond to future provocation and malicious behaviour by aggressive actors. Despite having previously been a global thought ...

There are two fundamentals that must be considered in thinking through the deterrent role of nuclear weapons in the contemporary & future security environments. First, there are the countries that represent nuclear threats. Second, there is the question of "how" US nuclear weapons might deter those discrete threats. Ambassador Joseph makes four conclusions. First, there is a need to retain a nuclear weapons infrastructure that is sufficiently robust to confront actual & potential new adversaries -- with new capabilities. Second, the US must not let outdated Cold War concepts & treaties stand in the way of acquiring new deterrence & denial capabilities to ensure national & global security. Third, echoing Professor Quester, the author argues that thc US must be more realistic about the likely contributions to security that current arms control proposals can make. Finally, the world has changed fundamentally in the past ten years & will continue to evolve rapidly. Our thinking about whom & how to deter must also change. Adapted from the source document.