Economic Policy Coordination: Requiem or Prologue?
In: Foreign affairs: an American quarterly review, Volume 70, Issue 3, p. 164
ISSN: 2327-7793
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In: Foreign affairs: an American quarterly review, Volume 70, Issue 3, p. 164
ISSN: 2327-7793
World Affairs Online
This dissertation asks three interrelated questions about economic policy coordination: (1) Why do we see persistent macroeconomic imbalances that make international coordination necessary? (2) What kind of economic policies does the European Union promote in its member states via its coordination framework, the European Semester? (3) What determines whether governments implement recommendations issued under the Semester? The first paper argues that economic ideas, and their emphasis in media reporting, help secure public support for policies that result in external imbalances. It finds that the dominant interpretations of current account balances in Australia and Germany concur with distinct perspectives: external surpluses are seen as evidence of competitiveness in Germany, while external deficits are interpreted as evidence of attractiveness for investments in Australia. Survey experiments in both countries suggest that exposure to these diverging interpretations of the current account has a causal effect on citizens' support for their country's economic strategy. The second and third papers analyse policy recommendations under the European Semester, arguably the most ambitious example of economic policy coordination worldwide. The findings show that the European Union does not use the Semester to promote a single economic model across all member states. Recommendations do not uniformly recommend more reliance on the market or the state. Rather, they tend to suggest fiscal restraint and less protection for labour market insiders, while simultaneously promoting measures that benefit vulnerable groups in society. During the second decade of EMU, recommendations have gradually become more favourable of state intervention. The fourth paper investigates possible reasons for (non-)compliance with the Semester. It argues that recommendations are more likely to be implemented when their policy direction is in line with national governments' economic ideology. The analysis shows that recommendations advocating less ...
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This book studies the international coordination of monetary and fiscal policies in the world economy. It carefully discusses the process of policy competition and the structure of policy cooperation. As to policy competition, the focus is on monetary and fiscal competition between Europe and America. Similarly, as to policy cooperation, the focus is on monetary and fiscal cooperation between Europe and America. The spillover effects of monetary policy are negative while the spillover effects of fiscal policy are positive. The policy targets are price stability and full employment. The policy makers follow either cold-turkey or gradualist strategies. Policy expectations are adaptive or rational. The world economy consists of two, three or more regions. TOC:Part One. The World of Two Monetary Regions: Basic Models.- Part Two. The World of Two Monetary Regions: Intermediate Models.- Part Three. The World of Two Monetary Regions: Advanced Models.- Part Four. The World of Three Monetary Regions.- Part Five. The World of N Monetary Regions.- Part Six. Rational Policy Expectations
Successive EMU roadmaps have presented the expansion of EU controls over Member States' economic policies as an integral part of monetary union, vital to its survival. Possible alternatives have been hardly discussed. In this contribution we trace the evolution of the EU economic policy coordination framework from a relatively narrow, rules-based exercise into a largely discretionary process that reaches even the most politically salient areas of the Member States' economic policies. We then discuss how the extensive coercive powers the EU formally possesses have turned out to be difficult to use in practice. This reflects the fundamental limits of the EU's legitimate use of power over its Member States, set by its current level of political and cultural integration. To have a chance of success, further designs EMU need to respect these limits. ; The ADEMU Working Paper Series is being supported by the European Commission Horizon 2020 European Union funding for Research & Innovation, grant agreement No 649396.
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In: Springer eBook Collection
The launch of European Monetary Union (EMU) marked the beginning of a new era, and its establishment has proved an impressive success at the technical, legal, and procedural level. After all, EMU has accelerated economic and political integration in the European Union and tied the economies of the Member States closer together. However, the performance of the euro, high unemployment rates, uneven output and investment growth, and the issue of structural reforms that have yet to be tackled have raised questions about the performance of EMU in practice. There is a general consensus on the justification for economic policy coordination. The existing literature on economic policy coordination, however, seems far from able to provide robust conclusions about how to organize the necessary interaction of institutions and policies. Therefore, there seems to be a case for re-examining the subject under the new framework set by EMU. The objective of such a reassessment is to enhance the understanding of what type of coordination and what institutional setting for policy coordination can be expected to be most favorable. Challenges for Economic Policy Coordination within European Monetary Union provides an intellectually stimulating contribution to the ongoing debate
In: The Polish quarterly of international affairs, Volume 23, Issue 3, p. 19-35
ISSN: 1230-4999
World Affairs Online
In: CEPAL review, Volume 2016, Issue 120, p. 31-49
ISSN: 1684-0348
This thesis proposes an analysis of the triangle formed by monetary policy, prudential policy and bank's risk-taking. Accordingly, this thesis aims to study the effects of monetary policy on banks' risk-taking and to determine the conditions for monetary and prudential policy coordination in order to ensure the stability of the banking sector and the solvency of financial institutions. At the macroeconomic level, we also assess the impact of this coordination on domestic credit and on the expected cost of bank failure. The first chapter reviews the literature on theoretical and empirical analysis of the risk-taking channel, and the analysis of the issue of monetary policy coordination with prudential policy. This literature review reveals that the effects of monetary policy on bank risk-taking are not one-sided, calling into question our knowledge of the monetary risk-taking channel. Similarly, this chapter suggests that the nature of monetary and prudential policy coordination is not unique. The second chapter is devoted to an original empirical study on the risk-taking channel of monetary policy. Using a panel threshold model, we show that monetary policy has different effects depending on the "monetary regime" in which monetary policy is conducted. Thus, a fall in interest rates leads to more risk-taking if monetary policy is considered loose (interest rate below the Taylor rule rate). Conversely, when monetary policy is considered as restrictive (interest rate above Taylor's rule rate), a decrease in interest rate reduces banks risk level. The third chapter examines the impact of monetary policy on bank's risk according to the nature of prudential policy. Using a partial equilibrium model, we determine conditions under which monetary policy, in presence of a risk sensitive capital requirement ratio, would lead the bank to take more risk. The results show that the effects of monetary policy on banking risk are not independent of the nature of microprudential policy. The objectives of financial stability and ...
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This thesis proposes an analysis of the triangle formed by monetary policy, prudential policy and bank's risk-taking. Accordingly, this thesis aims to study the effects of monetary policy on banks' risk-taking and to determine the conditions for monetary and prudential policy coordination in order to ensure the stability of the banking sector and the solvency of financial institutions. At the macroeconomic level, we also assess the impact of this coordination on domestic credit and on the expected cost of bank failure. The first chapter reviews the literature on theoretical and empirical analysis of the risk-taking channel, and the analysis of the issue of monetary policy coordination with prudential policy. This literature review reveals that the effects of monetary policy on bank risk-taking are not one-sided, calling into question our knowledge of the monetary risk-taking channel. Similarly, this chapter suggests that the nature of monetary and prudential policy coordination is not unique. The second chapter is devoted to an original empirical study on the risk-taking channel of monetary policy. Using a panel threshold model, we show that monetary policy has different effects depending on the "monetary regime" in which monetary policy is conducted. Thus, a fall in interest rates leads to more risk-taking if monetary policy is considered loose (interest rate below the Taylor rule rate). Conversely, when monetary policy is considered as restrictive (interest rate above Taylor's rule rate), a decrease in interest rate reduces banks risk level. The third chapter examines the impact of monetary policy on bank's risk according to the nature of prudential policy. Using a partial equilibrium model, we determine conditions under which monetary policy, in presence of a risk sensitive capital requirement ratio, would lead the bank to take more risk. The results show that the effects of monetary policy on banking risk are not independent of the nature of microprudential policy. The objectives of financial stability and ...
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In: The international spectator: a quarterly journal of the Istituto Affari Internazionali, Italy, Volume 24, Issue 3-4, p. 214-234
ISSN: 0393-2729
SINCE 1985, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION HAS INVOLVED MONETARY AUTHORITIES, PARTICULARLY CENTRAL BANKS, TO AN UNPRECEDENTED EXTENT IN COORDINATED ACTION IN THE FIELD OF MONETARY AND EXCHANGE RATE POLICIES. THIS FACT HAS INFLUENCED THE AUTHORS' APPROACH TO THE ISSUE OF ECONOMIC POLICY COORDINATION (EPC). THEY DO NOT OFFER A NEW MODEL OR PROVIDE A COMPREHENSIVE THEORETICAL EXPLANATION FOR THE EVENTS OF 1985-88. RATHER, THEY DESCRIBE THE PROBLEMS AND THE ACHIEVEMENTS OF EPC AS SEEN BY PRACTITIONERS OF EXCHANGE RATE AND MONETARY POLICY COORDINATION. THE FIRST SECTION OF THEIR PAPER BRIEFLY SURVEYS THE LITERATURE ON POLICY COORDINATION. THE SECOND SECTION DISCUSSES A NUMBER OF ISSUES THAT ARE CRUCIAL TO THE FEASIBILITY OF POLICY COORDINATION. THE THIRD ASSESSES THE OUTCOME OF THE EPC EXERCISE IN 1985-88, FOCUSING ON THE REACTIONS OF MONETARY AND FINANCIAL MARKETS TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COORDINATED STRATEGY, BOTH WITHIN THE G-7 AND THE EMS.
In: Central issues in contemporary economic theory and policy
In: The European Union review, Volume 13, Issue 1, p. 77-107
ISSN: 1606-8963
In: Werkdocument
Economics; European Union - De serie 'Werkdocumenten' omvat stukken die in het kader van de werkzaamheden van de WRR tot stand zijn gekomen en die op aanvraag door de raad beschikbaar worden gesteld. De verantwoordelijkheid voor de inhoud en de ingenomen standpunten berust bij de auteurs.