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Defence date: 23 March 2007 ; Examining board: Prof. John Hemery (Centre for Political and Diplomatic Studies, Oxford) ; Prof. Jacek Wasilewski (Warsaw School of Social Psychology) ; Prof. Jaap Dronkers (European University Institute)(Supervisor) ; The aim of this study is to explore the process of diplomatic elite transformation in the post-communist countries within the context of political elite transformation and to analyse whether the process of circulation or reproduction prevailed among the diplomatic elites during the first decade and a half after the change of the political regime (1989-2004). I focus upon the entry-level diplomats to a greater degree than in the older works on political elite and diplomacy. The key to capturing the process of circulation/ reproduction among diplomatic elites is through analysis of the general characteristics of diplomats as well as the system of personnel selection. I argue that a better understanding of the transformation processes could be achieved by looking at people at the entry level into political elite, i.e., by looking at newcomers. The thesis is further set out to show how the historical, political and cultural legacy of the past and geographical realities shaped the emerging diplomatic elites. The analysis presented in the thesis is based on a survey that I conducted. Several conclusions can be drawn from the analysis of diplomats in 27 countries. The composition of the emerging diplomatic elite across countries shows some striking similarities and some striking differences. The areas of important similarities are education, social origins and channels of recruitment. The differences mainly occur in age, gender, recruitment channels, previous professional experience, type of residence and additional jobs performed. Particularly illuminating in this respect is the division of respondents by geographical criterion into the CEE/FSU countries. A more meticulous analysis shows that the revolutionary political transformations were not followed by a revolutionary transformation of elites, or of diplomatic elites in particular. There was a modest degree of circulation from the lower classes into the elite role (in particular, into the diplomatic elite), but it did not transcend the socially desirable and socially stabilising moderate level. It was certainly not a revolutionary degree of circulation into the diplomatic elite. Nor was there a full-scale reproduction of elites.

The concepts of power and state - particularly embedded in the idea of the Great Power, with a geopolitical perspective and a profoundly aggressive character - are tantamount in importance to the Russia's elite political ideology. However, the existence of different emphases within such a political ideology, ranging from the active-obstructive to the passive stances, brings into question the factors of variation that might be responsible for the elite's level of determination to pursue these concepts over an internal or foreign policy development.In addressing this query, two tasks are set: descriptive - involving a survey of the content of Russian aggressive political ideology over different periods in history; and explanatory - determining circumstances that might account for the empowerment of one or other option of Russian aggressive political ideology. Therefore, the thesis includes a comparison of historical periods with similar relevance to the Russian state. The concern here is in relation to shifting factors of variations of aggressive political ideology acting in the space-frame of one state, but in different time-frame. Resting on these frames the thesis explores the shaping of the Russian elite's defining principles of state internal and foreign policy development and traces the factors of variation responsible for the empowerment of one or other particular form of the aggressive political ideology.The factors of variation discussed in the thesis are different in nature and intensity. The primary impetus for variation in the form that aggressive political ideology would take is determined by the factor of national distress. Other factors (regime volatility, political and economic motivations, information dissemination, and challenges within the international system) are responsible for the depth and extent to which aggressive ideology is going to resonate. No factor could create the variation by itself. The argument is that a specific set of factors is required to create the conditions for variations in the form the aggressive political ideology would take and to determine whether aggressive ideology would generate or not an obstructive political decision.

This book explores the political games of the Moroccan democratization process in the period from independence in 1956 until 2006. The purpose of the book is not only to analyze the strategies and actions of the various political actors, but also to evaluate the level of democracy present in the country after the adoption of new constitutions in 1962, 1970, 1972, 1980, 1992 and 1996.

Elite theory critiques of corporate political action rest on the claim that it advances the political interests of elite status groups. This article examines that claim by investigating the relationship between a British corporation's propensity to make donations to the Conservative party and its directors' educational backgrounds and social club affiliations. Using a structural equivalence blockmodel, it is shown that among the largest 250 British corporations in 1995 there was a set with directors who came from elite educational backgrounds and were members of elite social clubs. These corporations made a disproportionate number of donations. I argue that these results support the elite theory critique.

Defence date: 25 June 2007 ; Examining board: Prof. Philippe C. Schmitter, EUI (Supervisor) ; Prof. Adrienne Héritier, EUI (Co-supervisor) ; Prof. Nikiforos Diamandouros, University of Athens ; Prof. Christopher Lord, University of Reading ; This project focuses on the interrelations between the micro-level of popular attitudes to European integration and the macro-level of elite justifications for pursuing membership. Drawing on extant research on Eastern Enlargement this study develops an approach of 'theoretical differentiation' and distinguishes between rationally oriented 'Utility Maximizing' entrants (UM) and constructively driven 'Value Maximizing' countries (VM). 'Theoretical differentiation' in elite attitudes then, becomes the default drive in empirically investigating public support for the EU. First, explaining the dynamics of utilitarian public attitudes, this study 'differentiates' the short- term, economic factors from the long-term, elite-driven stimuli that render the UM group of countries more eurosceptic than the VM group. The regression analysis shows that while in both groups short-term support fluctuates with the business cycle, the intensity of long-run support is determined by the set of structural characteristics that identify them as either UM or VM. Similarly, 'differentiation' in affective support shows that the latter is a mixture of the longterm disposition towards EU, determined by historical elite attitudes, and the current socialization factors that govern short-run variations. Yet, the affective attitudes of the two groups not only differ in their mean levels of support (i.e. intensity) but also in their responses to direct and indirect socialization stimuli (i.e. fluctuations). In other words, EU enlargement politics and the distinct elite frames they produce increase the stickiness of affective attitudes to European integration and partially regulate the utilitarian public sentiment. Both utilitarian and affective models of EU public opinion were tested at the aggregate level of survey respondents, using Eurobarometer polls from the fifteen 'old' member states. OECD data were compliled to control for the economic factors, while original data on the national distribution of EU officials in the Commission and the European Parliament were gathered by the author to control for the EU socialization stimuli.