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This article pushes beyond hard power and soft power to insist on smart power, defined as the capacity of an actor to combine elements of hard power and soft power in ways that are mutually reinforcing such that the actor's purposes are advanced effectively and efficiently. It argues that advancing smart power has become a national security imperative, driven both by long-term structural changes in international conditions and by short-term failures of the current administration. The current debates over public diplomacy and soft power suffer from failures to address conceptual, institutional, and political dimensions of the challenge, three dimensions the author addresses in this article. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Inc., copyright 2008 The American Academy of Political and Social Science.]

This article pushes beyond hard power and soft power to insist on smart power, defined as the capacity of an actor to combine elements of hard power and soft power in ways that are mutually reinforcing such that the actor's purposes are advanced effectively and efficiently. It argues that advancing smart power has become a national security imperative, driven both by long-term structural changes in international conditions and by short-term failures of the current administration. The current debates over public diplomacy and soft power suffer from failures to address conceptual, institutional, and political dimensions of the challenge, three dimensions the author addresses in this article.

Le soft power est un concept omniprésent dans les discours de politique internationale, notamment étatsuniens et chinois, mais sans réelle substance théorique et pratique. Partant d'une critique de l'approche behavioriste de Joseph Nye, cet article mobilise Gramsci et Bourdieu pour analyser le pouvoir symbolique/idéationnel dans les relations internationales. Il montre qu'il est nécessaire de mobiliser davantage le corpus sociologique critique pour saisir les mécanismes de pouvoir et de légitimation. Il soutient que la théorie du soft power n'est pas tant descriptive que prescriptive et constitue une rhétorique politique performative qui transfigure, dissimule et euphémise les rapports de force et de domination dans la politique mondiale.

"The dynamics of transatlantic relations in the twenty-first century have been shaped by an American preference for the exercise of its considerable 'hard power' capabilities while Europeans have preferred to draw upon the considerable 'soft power' resources that have grown from their enviable internal processes of integration. These diverging power preferences have differential impacts on the management of Atlantic security, economic, and social and cultural relations."

Rosja zawsze była państwem, które dążyło, aby być mocarstwem. Nawet jeżeli straciło znaczenie po rozpadzie ZSRR, to chęć powrotu jako twórcy porządku międzynarodowego, wymusza wypracowanie nowej strategii, która przewiduje użycie środków soft power. Stanowi to pewną przeszkodę dla Rosji, która tradycyjnie przygotowana jest do użycia sił zbrojnych czy presji ekonomicznej. Dużo gorzej jest z wykorzystaniem wartości, które w zamierzeniach Moskwy powinny być różne od Zachodu. Wynikało to z tego, że Rosja stara się stworzyć konkurencyjny do zachodu projekt soft power. Rosja stara się dobrze wykorzystać swoją dyplomację, w tym cyfrową, umiejętnie jej używając nawet jako narzędzi propagandy czy walki w cyberprzestrzeni. ; Russia has always been a country seeking the Great Power status. Even though it lost its importance after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the desire to return to the role of the creator of international order force it to introduce new strategy that will implement soft power resources. This represents a certain obstacle for Russia, which traditionally is accustomed to hard power resources like economic pressure or the use of armed forces. Culture is Russia's soft power resource that is significant. Values can be more problematic for Russia, because in Moscow's intentions they should be different from the Western values. Russia is trying to create an alternative soft power project, competitive to that of the West. Russia is trying to make good use of its diplomacy, including digital diplomacy, in order to show the use of its hard power to be seen as soft.

Rosja zawsze była państwem, które dążyło, aby być mocarstwem. Nawet jeżeli straciło tematyce bezpieczeństwa międzynarodowego. W odniesieniu do roku 2016 autor dokonał (siłą rzeczy) subiektywnego wyboru tekstów, które znalazły się na łamach czterech publikacji- ,,Bellony", ,,Rocznika Bezpieczeństwa Międzynarodowego", ,,Rocznika Strategicznego" oraz ,,Stosunków Międzynarodowych". W naturalny sposób tematyka podejmowana przez autorów rzeczonych publikacji stanowi odzwierciedlenie obecnego stanu międzynarodowego środowiska bezpieczeństwa oraz prognoz co do kierunków jego dalszej ewolucji. ; Russia has always been a country seeking the Great Power status. Even though it lost its importance after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the desire to return to the role of the creator of international order force it to introduce new strategy that will implement soft power resources. This represents a certain obstacle for Russia, which traditionally is accustomed to hard power resources like economic pressure or the use of armed forces. Culture is Russia's soft power resource that is significant. Values can be more problematic for Russia, because in Moscow's intentions they should be different from the Western values. Russia is trying to create an alternative soft power project, competitive to that of the West. Russia is trying to make good use of its diplomacy, including digital diplomacy, in order to show the use of its hard power to be seen as soft.