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In this chapter we outline the Danish and Scandinavian experiences with coalition governments and coalition governance. We do so by first briefly describing the historical path that has led to the political system we see working today in these countries. Then we tell about the political culture and institutional factors that lead to coalition governments. In the third section, we look at the nature of political agreements. We discuss the preconditions for coalition governments or coalition governance and its pros and cons. We focus on the trade-offs between including different interests into legislative coalitions and the possible lack of clarity of responsibility or of party identity that this inclusion entails. ; In this chapter we outline the Danish and Scandinavian experiences with coalition governments and coalition governance. We do so by first briefly describing the historical path that has led to the political system we see working today in these countries. Then we tell about the political culture and institutional factors that lead to coalition governments. In the third section, we look at the nature of political agreements. We discuss the preconditions for coalition governments or coalition governance and its pros and cons. We focus on the trade-offs between including different interests into legislative coalitions and the possible lack of clarity of responsibility or of party identity that this inclusion entails.

Denne artikkelen undersøker hvordan nylig inntrufne endringer i amerikansk atomvåpenstrategi kan påvirke krisestabiliteten mellom USA og Russland og hvilke implikasjoner det kan ha for Norge. Enkelt oppsummert fremstår moderniseringsprogrammene til atomvåpnene, introduksjonen av nye våpen og den deklaratoriske politikken egnet til å undergrave krisestabiliteten fordi det gir USA økte counterforce-kapasiteter. Dette har implikasjoner for norsk alliansepolitikk: Endringene i amerikansk atomvåpenstrategi kan senke terskelen for etablering av bastionforsvaret og øke russisk usikkerhet om norsk tilrettelegging for amerikansk politikk. Med utgangspunkt i tradisjonell teori om krisestabilitet, fremstår flere av de identifiserte endringene i USAs atomvåpenstrategi som destabiliserende. Den tyder på at amerikanske myndigheter ikke aksepterer ideen om den «kjernefysiske revolusjonen». Til tross for dette, skal bekymringen for atomkrig ikke overdrives. Militære analyser må omsettes til politikk. Selv om sannsynligheten for et vellykket førsteslag øker, er det vanskelig å forestille seg politikere som vil risikere atomkrig. Det betyr at avskrekking er mer robust enn hva rene militæranalyser tilsier.
Abstract in EnglishIn the Shadow of Nuclear Weapons: American Nuclear Policy and NorwayThe aim of this article is to provide insight into how recent changes in U.S. nuclear weapon strategy might affect crisis stability between the U.S. and Russia and what implications they might have for Norway. In brief, the nuclear modernization programs, introduction of new systems and changes in declaratory policy may undermine crisis stability because they enhance U.S. "counterforce" capabilities. This has implications for Norwegian alliance policy: changes in U.S. nuclear strategy might lower the threshold for Russia to establish the bastion concept and increase Russia's uncertainty about the scope of Norwegian facilitation of U.S. policy. Utilizing traditional theories of crisis stability on recent policy changes indicates that the current stability is tenuous. It seems as if subsequent U.S. administrations do not accept the idea of a "nuclear revolution". Despite this, concerns about a nuclear war should not be exaggerated. Military analyses must be translated into political action. Even if the chance of a successful first strike increases, it is difficult to imagine politicians willing to risk a nuclear war. This indicates that deterrence is more robust than what pure military analyses suggest.

I marts 2005 var det 20 år, siden Mikhail Gorbatjov kom til magten i Sovjetunionen som generalsekretær for Sovjetunionens Kommunistiske Parti og fremlagde sit program til reform af det sovjetiske system. Nøgleordene i reformen var perestrojka, glasnost og demokratisering. De fik ikke alene betydning indadtil, men også udadtil i forholdet til omverdenen, der hurtigt fattede lid til Gorbatjov og hans nyskabelser. Dette working paper giver et overblik over Gorbatjovs og hans meningsfællers opfattelse af udviklingen siden da og deres vurdering af reformernes skæbne og skildrer Ruslands stilling på verdensscenen i dag. Dette indebærer også en kritisk vurdering af præsident Vladimir Putins indenrigs- og udenrigspolitik. Der tegnes et billede af et svagt Rusland, der ikke har frigjort sig fra den sovjetiske arvs byrde, men tværtimod på mange måder søger tilbage til den autoritære styreform, et Rusland, der ved inertiens kraft stadig nyder en vis respekt, om end ikke anseelse i det internationale samfund. ; In March 2005 it was 20 years since Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in the Soviet Union as Secretary-General of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and presented his programme for reform of the Soviet system. Key words in the reform were perestroika, glasnost and democratization. They became important not only internally but also externally in the relations to the outside world that swiftly put its trust in Gorbachev and his innovations. This working paper gives an overview of the perception that Gorbachev and his like-minded have of the development since then, presents their evaluation of the fate of the reforms and of the position of Russia on the world scene today. This also includes a critical evaluation of the domestic and foreign policies of President Vladimir Putin. The paper outlines a weak Russia that has not released itself from the burden of the Soviet heritage but on the contrary in many ways goes back to the authoritarian form of government, a Russia that by inertia still enjoys a certain respect although not esteem in the international community.