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The paper deals with the ideological position of a newly formed business-firm party called ANO in the contemporary political environment of the Czech Republic. Although the advent of the party was truly rapid and ANO is a fairly unique formation, it is possible to employ some conventional analytical tools to reveal the party's ideological position. Firstly, I show that ANO is a vote-seeking party and it is therefore possible to analyse it in accordance with a Downsian spatial modelling. Next, I describe a roll call analysis method that is able to objectively identify the party's ideological position based on legislators' parliamentary votes. After I form several hypotheses, a data set consisting of 8,559 roll calls of 215 members of the Chamber of Deputies is depicted. Finally, the results show that ANO is located in the ideological centre, closer to social democrats rather than to right-wing parties. Besides this, ANO covers a smaller ideological space compared to traditional political parties. Finally, the results do not anticipate a potential split of ANO in the near future since the party's legislators have acted cohesively in the parliament so far.

Radicalism has been relatively weak in the US, so strong is the Amer consensus. In the past, most radical movements were leftists or liberal. Today, right-wing radicalism is strong. Its intellectual & pol'al roots are found in leftist movements such as populism & the protofascism of the 1930's as well as pre-WWII isolationism. McCarthy was a link between these movements & the present radical right. The major tenet of contemporary right-wing extremism is an anticommunism which stresses the domestic aspect of the Communist threat. Because of belief in the absolute nature of the struggle against communism & a conspiracy theory of history inherited from leftist & isolationist movements of the past, the radical right has little faith in traditional constitutional & pol'al processes & stresses clandestine & massaction methods for fighting communism. In econ's, the radical right favors a return to 19th-cent laissez-faire liberalism; in soc life, it favors greater conformity to traditional norms. The future of right-wing radicalism depends primarily on the course of internat'l events but also, in part, on the nature & strength of contemporary left-wing radical movements. AA.

THE ISSUE OF CLASS IS RE-EMERGING IN AMERICAN POLITICS. THIS ARTICLE PREDICTS THAT THE REALIGNMENT PROCESS WILL BE SLOW AND MESSY, AND THAT THE SCENE WILL BE DISTINGUISHED BY A DISJUNCTION BETWEEN POLITICO-MILITARY OUTLOOKS AND ECONOMIC POSITIONS. TO REINFORCE THIS VIEW, THE ARTICLE EXPLORES: THE COLD WAR DEBATE OVER MEANS; THE GULF WAR; FUMBLERS ON THE RIGHT; OUT OF LEFT FIELD; AND A NEW ALIGNMENT. IT SUGGESTS THAT THREE MAJOR FORCES--SOCIAL, POLITICAL, AND INTELLECTUAL---ARE ESTABLISHING NEW DIVIDING LINES IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, AND BY EXTENSION REORDERING AMERICAN POLITICS.

Emotions are prevalent in the rhetoric of populist politicians and among their electorate. We argue that partially dissimilar emotional processes may be driving right- and left-wing populism. Existing research has associated populism with fear and insecurities experienced in contemporary societies, on the one hand, and with anger, resentment, and hatred, on the other. Yet there are significant differences in the targets of right- and left-wing resentment: A political and economic establishment deemed responsible for austerity politics (left) and political and cultural elites accused of favoring ethnic, religious, and sexual out-groups at the expense of the neglected in-group (right). Referring to partially different emotional opportunity structures and distinct political strategies at exploiting these structures, we suggest that right-wing populism is characterized by repressed shame that transforms fear and insecurity into anger, resentment, and hatred against perceived "enemies" of the precarious self. Left-wing populism, in turn, associates more with acknowledged shame that allows individuals to self-identify as aggrieved and humiliated by neoliberal policies and their advocates. The latter type of shame holds emancipatory potential as it allows individuals to establish bonds with others who feel the same, whereas repressors remain in their shame or seek bonds from repression-mediated defensive anger and hatred.

It is often claimed that parties on the left and right have different preferences for scholarly knowledge. However, little research has addressed whether partisanship actually matters for science advice preferences, particularly in the European setting. Drawing on original data on governmental appointments of academic scholars to more than 1400 public advisory commissions in Norway between 1969 and 2020, this article examines whether the left–right divide matters for cabinets' consultation of economists and social scientists. The findings reveal that left-wing governments in Norway have consulted scholars of social science—such as sociologists and political scientists—more frequently than right-wing governments. In contrast, partisanship seem to matter less for the consultation of economic scholars, as economists have been extensively used as advisors by both blocs in the period studied. Overall, the article contributes theoretical and empirical knowledge to the politics of science advice.

A growing literature finds that social identity attachments to ideological and partisan groups often generate mistrust, hostility, and prejudice toward opposition groups. Yet, there are no studies of whether attachments to ideological groups (i.e., left, right, liberal, and conservative) contribute to political intolerance—defined as an unwillingness to extend basic liberties to groups one opposes—a widely studied and politically consequential form of outgroup hostility. Using both observational and experimental data, we examine how social identity attachments to left–right groups in Israel influence Jewish Israelis' political intolerance of disliked domestic groups, that is, least-liked groups and Arab citizens. In contrast to other studies—mostly in the US—that find roughly parallel levels of political and social prejudice toward opposition groups, we theorize and find that more strongly attached rightists and leftists in Israel become more polarized in their levels of political tolerance toward disliked groups. Among rightists, stronger identities decrease tolerance, whereas among leftists, political tolerance increases. Thus, outside the US, identity strength can actually be a protector of democratic values, leading some groups (i.e., Jewish leftists) to become more tolerant.

One of the basic concepts of modern political analysis is the dichotomy (or continuum) of left–right. It has been a fundamental element of the ideological apparatus of the modern world at least since the French Revolution.There have been two kinds of intellectual debates concerning this concept throughout modern history. One revolves around the criteria that should be used to delineate the ideal-typical poles of the concepts, and the degree to which the concept has discrete points or is a continuum. A subordinate question has always been whether it is fruitful to make the concept tri-modal and include a 'centre'. Obviously, this debate has both moral and intellectual dimensions, and it is doubtful whether it is either possible or desirable to separate them.