"Considering the dramatic changes in the geo-strategic environment one can encounter every day, the future development of the transatlantic partnership as one representative of international coalitions in terms of shaping global politics is inevitably a key factor for finding answers and solutions to the demanding tasks and challenges we are confronted with in the age of globalism. Sovereignty, mobility, security, prosperity are just a few of a whole variety of different aspects combined with the development of interdependent and interacting political, economic, financial and social networks we have to deal with. The future of transatlantic relations is therefore a major topic for defining and implementing the future role of the European Union in the area of foreign, security and defence policy, which will have substantial consequences concerning the political impact of Europe and the United States on the global level ..." (author's abstract)
"The Lisbon treaty will fundamentally alter the foreign policy set-up of the European Union. Among the key innovations figure the establishment of the foreign affairs high representative and the European External Action Service (EAS). Their creation may well lead to a new era of European diplomacy, providing the Union with a genuine foreign policy chief and a full-fledged foreign service. Are these only high hopes, or will the Lisbon institutional engineering really make a difference? Will the Union henceforth speak with one voice at the international level? And will it back up its talk with firm action? This paper attempts to answer these questions by, first of all, analysing the treaty provisions concerned and establishing the way they are to be implemented. This includes ascertaining the high representative and EAS's responsibilities and competences, their respective relationship with other key actors, as well as the possible structure, composition, size and scope of the EAS. In a second step, the paper assesses the new arrangements' implications for EU foreign policy-making. It analyses how foreign policy-making will change and to which extent current institutional shortcomings of EU external action will be addressed. The analysis takes a neo-institutionalist approach, drawing on insights from both historical and sociological institutionalism. The paper argues that the new high representative will be agenda-setter, decision-shaper, coordinator and consensus-builder. He will be chief representative and principal negotiator, implement EU foreign policy and watch over the Union's crisis management. The EAS will support the high representative in all his tasks and is likely to develop into the new analytical hub of EU foreign policy-making. Together, the new office and its service will increase the visibility, continuity, consistency and efficiency of EU external action. They will enhance diplomatic professionalism and have the potential to mitigate the Union's structural lack of leadership. However, many questions still remain open and some new problems might crop up. The ultimate significance of the Lisbon reforms will depend on several conditions, chiefly relating to: the high representative's relations to the Commission president and European Council president; the EAS's exact scope; the member states' feeling of ownership of the new service; and the high representative's skill to pursue a pro-active agenda while gaining the member states' confidence." (author's abstract)
Contents: Euro-Atlantic Community and the South Caucasus: How to Face Russia in the Region? (Nasimi Aghayev) (6-13); Turkish Foreign Policy: From "Surrounded by Enemies" to "Zero Problems" (Ekrem Eddy Güzeldere) (14-19); EU-Russia relations after the Gas-conflict: What lessons we have learned (Stefan Meister) (20-23); EU Membership ambitions: What alternative approaches exist and how is the European foreign policy perceived in Ukraine? (Kateryna Malyhina) (24-28); Final Conclusion and Policy Recommendations (Sebastian Schäffer, Dominik Tolksdorf)(29-31).
"Energy is one of the EU's most pressing recent challenges. While a plethora of policy instruments for competitiveness and sustainability already exists, energy security and especially the external dimension of the EU's energy policy are still underdeveloped. This paper will discuss several EU measures in the field of energy and analyse the variety of the strategies that the EU member states apply in external energy policy. Starting from the finding that these national approaches are highly path-dependent, regionally clustered, and therefore in most cases traditionally conflicting, two solutions for enhancing the Common External Energy Policy are derived. To overcome the inherent obstacles and to ensure a more convergent and sustainable development of the member states' external energy policies in the future, the finalization of the internal energy market is the priority but can only be successful if accompanied by progress in the external dimension. In this respect, prudently institutionalised regionalisation is identified as a rewarding organising principle for certain aspects of a Common External Energy Policy, if based on a joint definition of European energy interests." [author's abstract]
"The crisis over South Ossetia between Georgia and Russia that took place in August 2008 highlights the volatility of the Black Sea region as a new flashpoint in the common neighbourhood between Russia and the European Union (EU). What has made the conflict in Georgia so crucial to the EU is the fact that this is not to be seen as an isolated occurrence. The incidence has repercussions throughout a region that is marked by a plethora of challenges to political stability and democratic consolidation - factors that directly affect European security and welfare. This paper takes a look at the overall and specific challenges that the EU faces in dealing with the Black Sea region. The first section analyses the lack of a European and a regional strategy for the Black Sea states and discusses the competing cognitive labels that frame the Black Sea region's politics. The second section analyses the development of risks to stateness, democracy and economic prosperity in the region. Drawing on both analyses, the paper concludes by drafting suggestions for EU policy to strengthen a pro-European regional identity as well as hedge against risks for the Black Sea region." (author's abstract)
"For decades the Middle East has been one of the most unstable and unsafe regions in the world. Trying to resolve the regional conflicts is a prime goal on the agenda of many governments and international institutions. Nevertheless, most of the peace initiatives proposed by outside actors so far have failed, as their proposed solutions to the conflicts often did not really take into account the political realities in the region, but instead were more oriented towards the interests of the external actors. This instance is particularly apparent in the case of the current US administration. After having already failed at attempting to reorganize the political landscape of the Middle East through power politics, the administration of President George W. Bush turned to diplomacy in order to achieve its goals in the region. However, when that change of attitude gradually evolved the credibility of his administration was already weakened to such an extent that none of the regional players appeared to accept them as a serious partner in the handling and, ultimately, resolving of the various conflicts. What is more, its rhetoric notwithstanding, the US also failed to offer a promising solution to the conflicts. At the same time, neither the so-called Middle-East Quartet (consisting of the US, the European Union, Russia, and the United Nations), nor the Europeans themselves have been able to step in and fill the growing diplomatic vacuum. Instead regional actors have taken on the task of settling the regional disputes. Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Qatar, to only name a few. Their approach: refraining from proposing ready-made solutions, and instead focusing on the negotiation process, including the stake-holders and taking into account their specific interests, dealing with a single issue at a time, and not putting pressure on anyone by officially proclaiming a great breakthrough before anything has been officially agreed upon. What are the prospects of these regional initiatives? Has US engagement in the region become obsolete? And what implications does this have for the European Union? What should its role be? These questions shall be addressed in this paper." (author's abstract)
