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Introduced in 2013, China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has had a significant impact within Asia and across other regions. This book provides empirical case studies examining the relations between China and the states in specific regional groupings, including South-East Asia, Central Asia, South Asia, the Persian Gulf, the Horn of Africa, and Central/Eastern Europe. At the theoretical level, Buzan and Waever's work on regional security complexes is used to develop a framework for analyzing the current impact of the BRI and its potential future effects within these regions, while the case studies explore the extent to which different International Relations and International Political Economy theories explain change in these relationships as the regional security environment shifts. The contributors address questions as diverse as the domestic political and economic drivers impacting the level of BRI cooperation; the effects of cooperation with the US; as well as the historical political and economic risk considerations for China in pursuing BRI cooperation; and the motivations of regional responses to the BRI and rivalries and variations in those responses.

Cover -- Half Title -- Title Page -- Copyright page -- Dedication -- Table of Contents -- List of tables -- 1. Introduction -- Key themes -- Structure of the book -- Notes -- 2. China and international order -- Introduction -- Neoclassical realism and China's international political history -- China and the liberal international order -- Intervening variable: elite perceptions of systemic pressures -- Intervening variable: domestic political pressures -- The GCC in the PRC's foreign policy calculations -- Conclusion -- Notes -- 3. The Gulf monarchies: Domestic, regional, and international security dynamics -- Introduction -- Neoclassical realism and the GCC -- The Gulf as a sub-system -- Systemic pressures -- Internal security concerns -- The role of China -- Conclusion -- Notes -- 4. China's relations with Saudi Arabia -- Introduction -- Saudi Arabia: systemic pressures -- Saudi Arabia: domestic pressures -- Pre-People's Republic of China historical legacy -- Indifference (1949-1965) -- Hostility (1966-1971) -- Transition (1971-1990) -- Interdependence (1990-2012) -- Belt and Road Initiative cooperation (2013-present) -- Conclusion: explaining change in Sino-Saudi relations -- Notes -- 5. China's relations with Oman -- Introduction -- Oman: international political pressures -- Oman: domestic political pressures -- China-Oman relations: the pre-PRC historical legacy -- Indifference (1949-1965) -- Hostility (1966-1971) -- Transition (1971-1990) -- Interdependence (1990-2012) -- Belt and Road Initiative cooperation (2013-present) -- Conclusion: explaining change in Sino-Omani relations -- Notes -- 6. China's relations with the United Arab Emirates -- Introduction -- United Arab Emirates: international pressures -- United Arab Emirates: domestic political pressures -- Pre-PRC historical legacy -- Indifference (1949-1965) -- Hostility (1966-1971)

The China-Iran comprehensive strategic partnership (CSP) has been described as a potentially disruptive alignment. This article analyses the impact of the CSP in two regional security complexes (RSCs): the Persian Gulf and South Asia. It finds that of the two RSCs, the China-Iran CSP has a greater likelihood of affecting the strategic landscape of the South Asian RSC as China seeks to contain India's power and influence. In the Persian Gulf, China's economically-motivated regional presence is supported by the maintenance of the status quo, and as a result the CSP is not likely to adversely affect that RSC. (Asian Aff/GIGA)

China's deepening ties to Iran, evident in the comprehensive strategic partnership (CSP) signed in 2021 after five years of stalled progress, is not an indication of a revisionist Chinese approach to the Gulf region. In fact, its CSPs with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, already activated and implemented, are at far more mature levels, commensurate with China's deep levels of economic and political engagement with the Arab side of the Gulf. This is consistent with a strategic hedging approach that Beijing has used to build a sustainable presence without disrupting a competitive and fragile regional order. With far larger and more diverse interests in the Gulf Cooperation Council countries, China's partnership with Iran creates leverage due to the asymmetry inherent in the China-Iran relationship.

Saudi Arabia's geostrategic location and role as a Middle East regional power, combined with its ambitious Saudi Vision 2030 development plan, make it an important Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) partner for China, which has become Saudi Arabia's largest trading partner. Despite mutual interests, the role of the United States as the dominant power in the Persian Gulf region means that the Sino‐Saudi Arabia relationship must be managed in such a way that it does not directly challenge Washington. This article argues that China has followed a strategic hedging approach in developing its relations with Saudi Arabia, focusing on the economic and developmental goals of the BRI and Saudi Vision 2030 to avoid antagonizing the United States (US) while taking advantage of US regional security commitments.

China's involvement with the Gulf monarchies has been built upon an economic foundation. With the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Maritime Silk Road Initiative (MSRI) this has expanded, as the Gulf monarchies see cooperation with China through MSRI projects as a means of advancing economic development programs necessary to move beyond single-resource rentier economies and relationships with external powers as a means of ensuring their security in an unstable region. This has important implications for the shape of the MSRI as a whole, and how it fits together with the larger BRI. China's BRI/MSRI success with participating states will be a matter of matching their specific domestic needs and strategic considerations with Chinese perceptions of the relative importance of those states. (J Contemp China/GIGA)