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There exist today a number of conventions aimed at combating terrorism. These treat acts of terrorism as criminal acts. However, the events of 11 September 2001 introduced a new dimension into the debate on the use of force in addressing the problem of terrorism. This article discusses whether the UN Security Council has given its approval for the USA's use of force in the wake of 11 September 2001 and whether this use of force can be justified under the right of self-defence. The article's conclusion is that the Security Council has not given its approval. Nevertheless, the USA may invoke the right of self-defence on the basis of the Taliban's support for the terrorists. However, it is important to remember that acts of terrorism ought as far as possible to be addressed through criminal prosecution. Furthermore, any use of force ought to take place under the control of the UN. And we must be on our guard against any erosion of the prohibition against the use of force in international law.

Since the early 1970s a considerable number of multilateral agreements have been concluded in the environmental field that establish a common pattern of institutional arrangements. The purpose of these arrangements is to develop the normative content of the regulatory regime established by each agreement1 and to supervise the states parties' implementation of and compliance with that regime. These institutional arrangements usually comprise a conference or meeting of the parties (COP, MOP) with decision-making powers, a secretariat, and one or more specialist subsidiary bodies. Such arrangements, because of their ad hoc nature, are not intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) in the traditional sense. On the other hand, as the creatures of treaties, such conferences and meetings of the parties, with their secretariats and subsidiary bodies, add up to more than just diplomatic conferences. Because such arrangements do not constitute traditional IGOs and yet are freestanding and distinct both from the states parties to a particular agreement and from existing IGOs, we have chosen to describe them as "autonomous." They are also autonomous in the sense that they have their own lawmaking powers and compliance mechanisms.