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"Territory, Contentious Issues, and International Relations" published on by Oxford University Press.

"Review of Available Data Sets" published on by Oxford University Press.

It is becoming increasingly fashionable to argue that conflict patterns today are fundamentally different from patterns in past eras. If correct, this argument could call into question the future value of decades of seientific research on the sources and consequences of interstate conflict. This paper reviews several Prominent differences that have been proposed and examines major conflict-related data sets for evidence related to these explanations. It appears that intrastate conflict is currelltly more frequent and bloodier than interstate conflict, as many analysts have argued, but that this has been the case for most of the past two centuries. Similarly, while analysts claim that future conflict will revolve around ethnic or cultural issues rather than territoral or ideological questions, the available evidence is mixed. I conclude with seieral suggestions for future research on militarized conflict, focusing on three themes: non-state actors, sub-war intrastate conflict, and (both interstate and intrastate) contentious issues and issue management.

Interstate conflicts emerge when domestic political parties & other groups decide to call attention to existing hostile relations with an external enemy. These conflicts are enhanced when disputed territory becomes an issue & when an entrenched history of conflict already exists. The conflict between Bolivia & Paraguay illustrates the manner in which evolutionary changes in domestic & international politics can instigate conflict. The basic rivalry level (BRL) model & the evolutionary model of conflict are supported by empirical evidence. This is true in cases involving conflicts that emerge as a result of political shock & cases where there exists a history of past conflict. 1 Table, 51 References. K. Larsen

Recent research on interstate conflict and rivalry has shown that most conflict occurs between long-time rival countries, and has used enduring rivalries to test propositions on arms races, deterrence, and power transitions. Yet most of this research has focused on the dynamics of already-established rivalry; little is known about how adversaries become long-term rivals. The present effort attempts to account for the origins of rivalry with an evolutionary model of interstate rivalry that treats rivalry as a dynamic process, evolving out of interactions between two adversaries. Empirical analyses reveal that the context of recent relations between two adversaries has a great influence on their conflict behavior, particularly on their probability of engaging in further conflict along the path toward or away from enduring rivalry. As two adversaries accumulate a longer history of conflict, their rivalry relationship tends to become "locked in" or entrenched, with future conflict becoming increasingly difficult to avoid; specific characteristics of their past confrontations can hasten or reverse this movement toward rivalry. This paper concludes by discussing the implications of this evolutionary model for the understanding of rivalry, conflict, and world politics more generally.

Contentious issues have frequently been overlooked in the study of international relations and interstate conflict. This paper explores the influence of territory and territorial issues on processes of interstate conflict. I begin by reviewing existing approaches to the study of territory, and existing theoretical efforts to understand the role of territory. I then offer an empirical investigation of the effects of territory on conflict, using the Correlates of War Project's data on militarized interstate disputes. Conflict processes are found to differ noticeably when territorial issues are at stake between the adversaries. Disputes in which territorial issues are at stake tend to be much more escalatory than disputes over less salient issues, using several different indicators of dispute severity and escalation. Disputes over territorial issues are less likely to end in stalemated outcomes than disputes over other issues, and more likely to end in decisive outcomes. Furthermore, the same adversaries are more likely to become involved in recurrent conflict in the aftermath of disputes over territorial issues, and this future conflict is likely to recur sooner than after disputes over other issues. Territorial issues thus seem to be especially salient to state leaders, producing more escalatory confrontations and being difficult to resolve through militarized means without triggering recurrent conflict in the future. I conclude by discussing the implications of these findings for future research on conflict and on contentious issues, and by offering some implications for policy-makers.

Most systematic research on interstate conflict has overlooked the effects of one confrontation on subsequent conflict between the same adversaries. This article explores three aspects of recurrent militarized interstate disputes: the likelihood of a subsequent dispute between the same states, the interval between disputes involving the same adversaries, and characteristics of the initiators of recurrent disputes. These three queries are addressed through empirical examination of recurrent militarized conflict in Latin America from 1816-1986. Subsequent conflict between the same two adversaries is found to be more likely when territorial issues are under contention, and less likely when the first confrontation ends in a negotiated compromise outcome. The next confrontation tends to occur sooner after disputes that ended in stalemate, rather than in compromise or in a decisive outcome, and when territorial issues are at stake. The level of escalation reached in the dispute had little effect by itself on the timing of later conflict, but stronger results were produced in interaction with the type of issue at stake. Similar results were obtained both for recurrent conflict overall, and for recurrent conflict over the same contentious issues as before, but the combination of dispute outcomes, contentious issues, and escalation produced much stronger results with respect to the likelihood and timing of future conflict over the same issue(s). Additionally, the results did not provide overwhelming support for any single ideal type of characteristics of recurrent dispute initiators, with different initiation patterns following different types of dispute outcomes.

Rising demand for water in water-scarce areas has led to frequent predictions of looming "water wars," although evidence suggests that water is also an important source of cooperation. This paper follows up on recent research suggesting that river disagreements are more likely to lead to both militarized conflict and peaceful negotiations when water demands and water scarcity are greatest, but that river treaties have generally prevented militarization while increasing negotiations. Here, we examine the effectiveness of these negotiations, in order to determine whether factors that promote negotiation onset have different effects on negotiation outcomes. Empirical analysis suggests that negotiations are most likely to succeed when they concern rivers with high value for the negotiating states (with many uses offering the possibility of negotiating tradeoffs), when they concern a current rather than future problem, and when the adversaries share closer overall relations, but less likely when water scarcity is more acute and when they involve a cross-border river with a stronger upstream state. Adapted from the source document.