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Zsfassung in niederländ. Sprache

J. K. De Vree's "A Theory of Human Behaviour and of the Political Process" (see SA 26:2/78J2195) is criticized. The behavior model offered is faulted on the grounds that it is inconsistent & that it is difficult if not impossible to interpret. That the model is inconsistent is easy to see, thanks to its formal presentation. This criticism might not be very serious, due to the fact that it may be remedied through some small adjustments. The author's own interpretation of his model is not congruent with it. In particular, formulae containing variables that range over both cardinal & ordinal numbers seem impossible to interpret. It is concluded that the problems noted are due to too high a level of generality being sought. In Een reactie op De Vree's 'A Theory of Human Behaviour and of the Political Process' (A Reaction to De Vree's 'A Theory of Human Behavior and of the Political Process'), G. P. de Bruin argues that De Vree's theory is empty of empirical significance, & the theory's weakness can be traced to its mathematical axiomatic foundation. It is argued that the set theoretical concepts of ordinal & cardinal numbers have been misinterpreted, & that the whole problem of measurement in social sciences is merely 'axiomatized away'. In Een ordinale algebra en empirische theorie: een antwoord op Kritiek (An Ordinal Algebra and Empirical Theory: An Answer to Criticism), J. K. De Vree concedes that the theory is so far empty, & that the nature of its relationship to empirical data remains an unsolved problem. This is the case with all general theories & does not constitute a valid objection. It is further argued that the proposed axiomatization is nothing more than a systematization of the system of numbers & relations used in actual empirical research, & that far from axiomatizing away the measurement problem, a systematic account is given of the number system without which measurement would not be possible. A. Orianne.

Rational-choice theory is the economic study of nonmarket decision making. The methodology of rational-choice is that of economics: methodological individualism, rationality, & Pareto efficiency. Rational-choice theory is a generic title for four different decision-making theories: collective action, public choice, social choice, & game theory. The distinction between these decision-making theories is the result of the development of the concept of rationality in classical & neoclassical economic theory. For nonmarket decisions (in contrast to market decisions), the economic criterion of Pareto efficiency is not attainable if individuals are behaving as rational utility maximizers. This is one of the main problems for rational-choice theory, described by the prisoner's dilemma game. Several solutions of this dilemma have been suggested, but none can be accepted as conclusive. It is asserted here that the methodological point of departure of rational-choice theory prohibits a solution for the dilemma, because the crux of the economic approach consists in the realization that it is impossible to attain the Pareto optimal. 3 Figures, 1 Schema, 48 References. Modified HA